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This dissertation uses the Enron Corporation as a case study to examine the ways 
in which large-scale corporations become cultural actors in pursuit of establishing 
favorable regulatory environments, and how Enron's collapse in 2001 allowed United 
States citizens to protest and express anxiety over a national and international economic 
shift towards postindustrialism that began in the early 1970s. Through a consideration of 
materials such as marketing literature, correspondence between Enron executives and 
state and federal government officials, and the entire run of Enron Business, the 
employee magazine, as well as popular cultural texts, including, newspaper and magazine 
articles, as well as film and book-length narrative accounts of the company, this study 
contributes to an understanding of the cultural work that must be performed in order to 
establish and maintain political economic systems, as well as the ways in which cultural 
production is used to make sense of economic change.  
 
 ix 
In many ways, Enron manifested a number of prominent political economic 
changes during the late twentieth century that have been identified by scholars such as 
David Harvey and Frederic Jameson. From the 1980s onward, the company increasing 
eschewed large-scale industrial operations in favor of information-based businesses that 
mirrored industries such as finance. Enron’s concomitant rhetorical shift to an emphasis 
on information technologies worked to mask and render culturally palatable the spatial, 
economic and political implications of this change. Because Enron was a company that 
engaged in cultural production, and because its transformation from a pipeline operator to 
a derivatives trading house was so dramatic, the company became an ideal site for 
Americans to express cultural anxieties about the move away from Fordist, material 
production and towards an emphasis on working with complicated pieces of information. 
However, despite the company's symbolic value, no coherent criticism of the economic 
features Enron embodied emerged in the public outcry, suggesting that the cultural 
materials needed to advance a sustained critique of late capitalism had not yet developed. 
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In late 2001 and 2002, the Internet was rife with jokes skewering the recently 
disgraced energy company, Enron. In the wake of the company’s bankruptcy (then the 
largest in U.S. history), more than a few amateur and professional humorists pilloried 
Enron’s convoluted finances and political ties. One such online joke was titled 
“Capitalism vs. Enron Venture Capitalism.” With regular capitalism, the joke went, “You 
have two cows. You sell one and buy a bull. Your herd multiplies, and the economy 
grows. You sell them and retire on the income.” However, when it came to “Enron 
Venture Capitalism” the joke continued,  
You have two cows. You sell three of them to your publicly listed company, using 
letters of credit opened by your brother-in-law at the bank, then execute a 
debt/equity swap with an associated general offer so that you get all four cows 
back, with a tax exemption for five cows. The milk rights of the six cows are 
transferred via an intermediary to a Cayman Island company secretly owned by 
the majority shareholder who sells the rights to all seven cows back to your listed 




While some may have found a perverse humor in the joke, it also pointed to some of the 
anxieties that Enron’s collapse unleashed. The joke worked by just barely exaggerating 
the types of financial maneuvers the company had made the core of its business. Though 
the gag took Enron as its subject, the punchline uncomfortably hinted that there might be 
something nonsensical about the U.S. economy at the start of the twenty-first century. 
                                                 
1
 “Capitalism vs. Enron Venture Capitalism,” Enron Owns the GOP, 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20021020055333/http://www.enronownsthegop.com/humor/capitalism.htm>, 




Curiously, while jokes about the company proliferated online, studies from business 
historians did not appear as quickly. 
In the journal Enterprise & Society’s memorial for business history’s most 
dominant figure, Alfred Chandler, the historian Christopher McKenna gently took issue 
with Chandler’s influence on the field, writing that it was  “striking how little American 
business historians had to say (or were asked to say) when Enron, the Houston oil-trading 
behemoth, collapsed amidst great public uproar in 2001.”
2
 McKenna lamented that while 
business historians had focused on “accounting, gas pipelines, and financial markets,” the 
theoretical framework first laid out by Chandler “didn't permit business historians to say 
very much about fraud, corporate corruption, or business ethics.”
3
  Early on, Chandler 
emphasized studying the internal structures and strategies of successful firms. By 
contrast, little attention was given to wider social, political and cultural contexts as 
categories for analysis. Consequently, the Chandlerian paradigm was not particularly 
helpful when analyzing a corporate scandal.  
Yet there were other factors that made Chandler’s approach ill-suited for a firm 
like Enron. Significantly, the company’s collapse had more cultural, as opposed to 
economic, significance.
4
  This is not to say that Enron’s fall was not dramatic, but its 
economic effects were not lasting. Though Enron was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. 
history when it occurred, it was eclipsed only months later by WorldCom’s bankruptcy. 
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 Kenneth Lipartito, “Business Culture,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business History, Ed. Geoffrey Jones 




Today, the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers is the largest in U.S. 
history. Likewise, while Enron employees lost their jobs and secure retirements suddenly 
vanished as the stock’s price plummeted, the collapse’s negative economic effects were 
relatively mild compared to the global economic recession of 2007 and 2008. Even if 
Enron’s business and the nature of its meltdown reflected a type of capitalism that was 
more oriented around financial markets, it was not even that era’s first financial crisis. 
Rather, some scholars have given that honor to the October 1987 stock market crash.
5
 
However, Enron proved to be a significant cultural event. The history of 
commerce in the United States is punctuated by scandalous episodes such as the attempt 
by “Jubilee Jim” Fisk and the “Mephistopheles of Wall Street” Jay Gould to corner the 
gold market in the Gilded Age, the Teapot Dome scandal in the Roaring Twenties, or 
even “Junk Bond King” Michael Milken’s corporate raiding and insider trading during 
the Reagan years.
6
 For an American public uneasy with economic excess, change and 
inequality, the symbolic value proved to be equal to, or even more important than, the 
economic and financial fallout in such cases.
7
 These were moments that were the subject 
of newspaper stories and political cartoons, as well as the inspiration for novels such as 
Frank Norris’s The Pit, Upton Sinclair’s Oil!, and Thomas Wolfe’s The Bonfire of the 
Vanities. Enron is another such episode and presents a unique opportunity for examining 
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American Life, (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 115, 376, 559. 
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various aspects of American culture towards the end of the twentieth century and at the 
beginning of the twenty first.
8
 Indeed, the sheer quantity of cultural production that 
followed Enron’s collapse was astonishing for a company that was not a household name. 
Books, films, magazine articles, jokes, plays and musicals about this complex business 
quickly permeated the popular cultural landscape. However, since the late 1980s, the 
company itself had been toiling to change its image from an environmentally friendly 
industrial corporation into a champion of knowledge work and free markets. Long before 
Enron was the subject of cultural production, in its marketing literature, employee 
magazines, community outreach and so on, Enron was a producer of culture. Because of 
the enormous amount of ink spilled, both by and about Enron, looking at the conversation 
surrounding this corporation can present a portrait of changing and equivocal American 
attitudes towards business and commerce. Specifically, I argue that because of its cultural 
production, the dramatic shift in its business practices, and the outrageous details of its 
collapse, Enron provided a near-ideal vehicle for Americans to express their frustrations 
and anxieties about the political-economic regime under which they lived.  
 
AMERICAN STUDIES AND BUSINESS HISTORY 
Uncovering the cultural import of the corporation’s collapse requires a different 
approach than the scholarly treatments of Enron that have already appeared. The most 
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1998 meltdown of the hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, and even the current Wall Street 
debacle that has been largely attributed to the proliferation of mortgage-backed securities (physical assets 
that have been reconceptualized and abstracted as apparently poorly understood pieces of information). 




prominent study of the subject thus far has been management scholar Malcolm Salter’s 
Innovation Corrupted, which attributes Enron’s slide into fraud to negligent board 
oversight, compensation schemes that encouraged excessive risk-taking, and so on.
9
 
Other case studies have examined the legal and accounting issues associated with the 
scandal. More recently, Rosalie Genova has looked at how Enron’s collapse has 
influenced political narratives.
10
 However, to date none of these studies have adequately 
examined how and why the downfall of an obscure business with convoluted strategies 
resonated so quickly and so broadly in U.S. culture.   
Because Enron did make a large cultural splash, consideration must be given to 
the documents that emerged in the scandal’s wake. Getting this side of the story requires 
sources that fall outside of the Chandlerian paradigm of focusing on the relationship 
between a firm’s organization and strategy that has dominated business history for so 
long. However, such documents, ranging from book length narratives to films, and ways 
of reading these documents, are familiar to American Studies scholars. If we are to 
understand Enron’s cultural significance, it requires looking for the connections between 
the business itself and a range of cultural producers. Accomplishing this task entails 
looking at the company from two angles – both the company’s business practices and 
how they were interpreted by the public.  
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Looking at these aspects of Enron’s history requires examining a range of sources 
including archival documents that outlined the company’s business practices and how 
these practices were communicated both to employees and a wider audience. Many of 
these sources and documents, such as professional correspondence, internal publications, 
press releases and advertisements, are commonly used by business historians to 
understand how firms react to their environments. While these sources are useful, on their 
own they do not allow for a complete understanding of Enron’s cultural significance. In 
this case, it is equally important to draw on the sources and methodologies used by 
cultural historians and cultural geographers.  
Just as business history could benefit from cultural studies, so too does business 
history as a discipline have much to offer cultural historians. As much as scholars in 
American Studies have recently turned their attention to studying the effects of 
neoliberalism, and late capitalism in general, these same studies do not linger on modern 
capitalism’s primary institution – the corporation. Likewise, while many American 
Studies classics are concerned with the role of enterprise in society, a cursory glance at 
such titles reveals a striking thread. While graduate students in American Studies find 
books such as Advertising the American Dream, Land of Desire and Imagining 
Consumers on comprehensive exam lists, all of these works are ultimately concerned 
with firms and industries that produce consumer goods. One could even go so far as to 
claim that while the field has a rich tradition of consumer studies, it does not have a 




Incorporation of America focuses on the overall structure of feeling in the Gilded Age, 
but does not devote any space for an extended discussion of a single firm. Yet an 
individual firm is an active participant in its cultural and social milieu.  
In arguing for a “new synthesis of business and culture,” the business historian 
Kenneth Lipartito calls attention to several steps required of the historian.
11
 First, 
Lipartito argues that “the information and texts of business life can be read for the 
meanings and values they encode, the way of life they express, the arguments they 
make.”
12
 This process means looking at documents such as annual reports, press releases, 
employee publications, and so on, through the lens offered by cultural theory. However, 
Lipartito also calls attention to a second group of sources. He writes: “Images and 
representations of business practices, protocols and rules for behavior, dramatizations of 
business life all become important to understanding the core economic functions of 
firms.”
13
 This second group that Lipartito references includes sources that are not always 
generated at the level of the firm or even during the life of a firm. These documents 
include angry letters to the editor, book length exposés of corporate wrongdoing and even 
politically-minded documentaries. In Enron’s case, its collapse produced a wealth of such 
documents, allowing the historian to get a more complete picture of the different cultural 
responses to and sentiments towards corporations and economic life at the end of the 
twentieth century. 
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BACKGROUND ON ENRON 
Though many Americans only became aware of the company when it fell from 
grace in 2001, the firm’s history spanned the 1980s and 1990s. Enron was created when 
two older natural gas companies, Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth, merged in 1985.
14
 
Ken Lay, who had been the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Houston Natural Gas, 
became the new company’s Chairman and CEO. When the merger was completed, the 
new company was the largest natural gas pipeline system in the United States. However, 
in the 1990s, Enron moved away from operating as a traditional natural gas company and 
entered a number of different ventures. By the end of the decade, Enron resembled an 
Internet company in style and an investment bank in substance. The business press (as 
well as financial analysts) hailed the transformation, as well as the primary force behind 
it – the company’s CEO and president, Jeff Skilling – as a business genius. 
However, at the same time, there were significant problems inside the company. 
Academics in business schools have come to criticize Enron’s internal culture as unduly 
cutthroat and offering “perverse incentives” that led to an over emphasis on making 
deals, deemphasized running operations after deals had been made, and encouraged too 
much risk-taking.
15
 Other problems included a poorly managed international arm that 
focused on building power plants, and a failed partnership with Blockbuster intended to 
provide movies online. Famously, when California deregulated electricity in the late 
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1990s, Enron was widely blamed for an ensuing energy crisis that involved outrageous 
prices and rolling blackouts.  
Finally, and most significantly, the company’s aggressive expansion required it to 
accumulate a large amount of debt. In order to keep the debt off of the company’s 
balance sheet, Enron’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Andy Fastow, created a number of 
shell corporations called Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), with names such as Chewco, 
and LJM1 and 2. The first of these, Chewco, was created in 1997. While SPEs are 
perfectly legal, the rules that govern them are very complicated. As anyone familiar with 
Enron now knows, the structures that Andy Fastow created did not meet the legal 
requirements for SPEs. In fact, they covered up a massive financial rot inside the 
company. Enron was not nearly as profitable as it appeared to be on paper. 
In the summer of 2001, Enron realized that these SPEs were a potential disaster 
and attempted to “unwind” them, but it was too late. That fall, the company issued a 
number of public financial restatements and provided a more accurate – and much less 
flattering – picture of the company. These announcements arrived just as some (though 
not all) business journalists and financial analysts were voicing skepticism about the 
company’s businesses and financial health. Enron’s already-declining stock price 
subsequently dropped rapidly, along with its credit rating and the company declared 
bankruptcy at the end of the year.  
As Enron became a hot news item, outlandish details about the company came to 




Enron’s CFO and as the Managing Partner of several of these SPEs, Andy Fastow was 
actually defrauding Enron while at the same time aiding Enron in this larger fraud.
16
 
Likewise, its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, also came under intense criticism for its 
insufficient oversight. Indeed, Arthur Andersen no longer exists today because of the 
fallout from its relationship with Enron. The debacle also resulted in prison sentences for 
a number of executives.
17
 Enron’s collapse appeared to be all the more spectacular 
because it seemed to happen so suddenly. Even more stunning was the swift and loud 
public outcry over Enron’s misdeeds. Outside of the business community, investors and 
Houstonians, Enron was not a terribly well-known company. However, the sudden public 
reaction had much longer historical roots. 
Throughout the late 1990s, Enron and its managers, most notably Jeff Skilling, 
touted the company as one of the most “innovative” of the era, possibly even within the 
annals of corporate and economic history. To be sure, in the late 1980s, the company’s 
approach to regulatory changes in the natural gas pipeline industry was novel. The 
company attempted to repeat this innovation in related industries throughout the 1990s. 
However, in other ways, the company was not so much a drastic break with the overall 
economic landscape in the U.S. as it was emblematic of it. 
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and Legacy of Enron’s Collapse (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2008), 136. 
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As Karl Marx argued long ago, there has always been a split between use value 
and exchange value. Yet the late twentieth century did witness a change whereby 
exchange value became a defining feature of economic life. Added layers of derivatives, 
stocks and the like further complicated matters. David Harvey is one scholar who has 
identified a sea change in capitalism that began around 1973 resulting from the crisis and 
collapse of the Fordist system of production and accumulation.
18
 For Harvey, 1973 
marked the starting point for what he terms “flexible accumulation” which involves a 
number of economic changes, including “new ways of providing financial services, new 
markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and 
organizational innovation.”
19
 Writing in 1990, Harvey argued that the end of the Fordist 
system meant a new round of “time-space compression.”
20
 As a result, capitalism became 
faster and more abstract. Workers and companies were forced to change and adapt at a 
much quicker pace, and information itself became “a very highly valued commodity.”
21
 
Yet information itself – and specific types of information – became increasingly 
complicated. In grappling with these issues, Harvey points to the growth of the financial 
services sector, writing that it had become so complex that it was beyond “most people’s 
understanding” and gave rise to “paper entrepreneurialism.”
22
 This type of economic 
activity emphasizes “finding ways other than straight production of goods and services to 
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19




 Ibid. 159. 
22






 All the characteristics of this newer style of capitalism that Harvey 
describes could be applied to Enron. However, this is a very different statement than 
saying Enron instigated these changes, many of which were well underway by the time 
the company was founded in 1985. 
Even the innovations that Skilling ushered in might be considered as part of 
broader trends in U.S. business history. As Karen Ho points out in her ethnographic study 
of Wall Street investment bankers, Wall Street conceptions of corporate organization and 
why corporations exist are developments that have their roots in the shareholder 
revolution of the 1980s. Ho writes that since that time, Wall Street bankers have in effect 
forced their vision and even their particular culture onto U.S. corporations in general.
24
 
While Ho sees this as a disciplining function, the ways in which Skilling reorganized 
Enron also resembled an investment bank. Even the types of financial instruments that 
Enron first used in the natural gas industry and later tried to apply to other utilities and 
services were creations of the early 1970s. Enron was also a champion of free markets 
and deregulation as guiding economic principles. However, as business historians have 
illustrated, the deregulation of U.S. industries was a trend that dates to the 1970s.
25
 Nor 
was Enron’s involvement in Houston novel. While downtown Houston was one place 
that Enron vigorously tried to change in the 1990s, Houston’s transformation mirrored 
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25
 Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth: United States Business and 
Public Policy in the 20
th




changes in urban centers throughout the United States. In fact, some executives’ civic 
engagement reflected a typical Sunbelt attitude. 
Likewise, Enron can hardly be considered a trailblazer in its advertising and 
marketing. In transforming its business model, the company drew on the anti-
bureaucratic sensibility of the “new economy” which historian Fred Turner argues has its 
roots in the counterculture of the 1960s.
26
 If Enron’s marketing stood out in the late 
1990s, it was not because its corporate imagery was unique, but because it was not an 
Internet company. Contrary to the company’s pronouncements, Enron was not a 
completely new entity, but rather represented a concentration of these other trends. What 
is more, because Enron engaged in cultural production throughout the 1990s, it had 
already entered the cultural realm in a significant way. Because of this, the company was 
laden with the symbolic content needed to express anxiety about the changes that had 
taken place since the rise of the informational economy. In short, the company 
synthesized many of the cultural tropes, political sensibilities and economic ideologies of 
the late twentieth century into a single, coherent whole.  
Here, Enron was significant in that it provided a concrete example in an era that 
many have regarded as being marked by its immateriality. Harvey has described the 
experience of these sweeping political-economic changes as the “condition of 
postmodernity.” As Harvey writes, postmodernity:  
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is dominated by fictitious capital, images, ephemerality, chance, and flexibility in 
production techniques, labour markets and consumption niches; yet it also 
embodies strong commitments to Being and place, a penchant for charismatic 





These qualities have had disastrous political consequences since postmodernity signaled 
the “triumph of aesthetics over ethics.”
28
 Fredric Jameson has also noted a postmodern 
emphasis on image, what he laments as a “depthlessness.”
29
 Like Harvey, Jameson 
connects such an aesthetic and cultural sensibility to a shift in economic conditions. For 
Jameson, postmodern cultural production and aesthetics are, “distorted figuration[s] of 
something even deeper, namely, the whole world system of a present-day multinational 
capitalism.”
30
 Perhaps the phrase “distorted figuration” is the key point in Jameson’s 
statement, implying that the cultural production typical of postmodernity is at once an 
expression of late stage capitalism as well as a failure to directly address this new form of 
capitalism. The literary critic Terry Eagleton argues that the postmodern “world as 
information” calls attention to a problem of representation.
31
 As he writes, “suddenly, 
anti-realism was no longer just a question of theory. How could you conceivably 
represent in realist terms the great invisible criss-crossing of circuits of communication, 
the incessant buzzing of to and fro of signs, which was contemporary society?”
32
 The 
form of capitalism all of these scholars described was at once pervasive and invisible. Its 
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characteristics often influenced and directed representation and imagery, but 
simultaneously eluded direct criticism.  
However, the Enron Corporation, both in its rise and collapse, offered a relatively 
tangible case for Americans to grab a hold of and use as an expression of anxiety about 
the post-1973 political-economic order. Because of its transformation from an industrial, 
natural gas pipeline operator to a financial services company connected to that industry, 
its use of new economy rhetoric and symbolism, its commitment to what Robert Reich 
termed “symbolic analysts,” its aggressive pursuit of neoliberal markets and deregulation 
and its transformation of specific spaces, most notably Houston, Texas, Enron constituted 
an almost ideal forum for critiquing these changes. However, as I will argue, the critiques 
that emerged were hardly straightforward and should be read as further indications of 
how complex economic life was in the late twentieth century. 
 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Academics have used a number of terms, such as “postmodernity,” 
“postindustrialism” and “Postfordism,” to describe the post-1973 era. These phrases 
imply that large-scale industrial activity is no longer at the heart of U.S. economic 
production. While “postindustrialism” and “Postfordism” might appear to be 
straightforward concepts, on some level they are misleading terms. Industrial processes 




came to oversee these processes.
33
 For example, in Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri describe the current phase of capitalism as being characterized by the increasing 
use of “symbolic manipulation” and the production of meaning. They write that work is: 
“characterized in general by the central role played by knowledge, information, affect, 
and communication. In this sense many call the postindustrial economy an informational 
economy.”
34
 For this project, I will primarily use the term “informational economy” 
because I find it to be the most descriptive of Enron’s business activities. 
The informational economy also has profound geographic implications. As 
Manuel Castells notes, the informational economy does not mean the end of industrial 
production, but rather that production and knowledge work become spatially separated.
35
 
Geographers Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore note that this sort of spatial separation is 
also typical of neoliberalism. By neoliberalism, I mean both an ideal conception of a 
world that is a unified and unregulated space that finance and investment capital can 
move through unimpeded, as well as the policies and practices intended to create this 
ideal spatial environment. Yet there is an unmistakable divide between the ideal 
neoliberal state and the way it exists on the ground. David Harvey and others have noted 
that rather than eliminate spatial differences, neoliberal practices actually create new and 
different spaces and that capital accumulation under neoliberalism is predicated on 
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 Similarly, Brenner and Theodore have gone so far as to suggest 
that the idea of a pure deregulated environment is an entirely theoretical concept without 
any real world corollary.
37
  Rather, neoliberalism advances in fits and starts with the 
elimination of certain regulatory policies (in a word, deregulation), as well as the 
introduction of other policies that are decidedly pro-business. 
Though their fields can be diverse, all of the thinkers I have mentioned here point 
towards a contradiction at the root of both the informational economy and neoliberalism. 
Namely, that for all of the rhetoric of immateriality and universality, neither the 
informational economy nor neoliberalism can entirely escape or transcend material 
reality. Physical production still happens and the world is not transformed into a smooth 
and seamless space, but, instead, numerous places are created and transformed.
38
 The 
terms “informational economy,” “neoliberalism” and “symbolic manipulation” all 
describe economic factors that, as I will argue, can be found in the cultural production 
surrounding Enron. 
In discussing Enron as a cultural event, I am using a specific idea of what 
“culture” is. Many have noted that “culture” is a particularly slippery concept, and it is 
worth outlining what I mean when I use the term. First, I take it that culture itself is not a 
unified, superorganic whole. Rather, as James Duncan argues, culture should be thought 
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of as a “context for behavior” instead of something over and beyond the level of 
individuals.
39
 In Keywords, Raymond Williams calls attention to the eighteenth century 
intellectual Johann Gottfried Herder’s argument that it is almost proper “to speak of 
‘cultures’ in the plural: the specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods, 
but also the specific and variable cultures of social and economic groups within a 
nation.”
40
 Similarly, I assume that culture can incorporate many different voices at the 
same time. However, I also mean “culture” to include, as Don Mitchell puts it, “a 
structured system of representation of both people and things.”
41
 Yet these 
representations can also be complex. For example, Stuart Hall sees forms of popular 
culture, “by definition contradictory and which therefore appear as impure, threatened by 
incorporation or exclusion.”
42
 Similarly, I view the cultural production around Enron not 
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THE CORPORATION AS A CULTURAL ACTANT 
As historians Kenneth Lipartito and David Sicilia point out, business history was, 
for a long time beholden to the “Chandlerian model” of examining the corporation as an 
organization without considering the corporation in a wider social, political, and cultural 
setting.
43
 However, they also note that in recent years business historians have begun to 
examine the corporation in these contexts. Ultimately, Lipartito and Sicilia point out that 
“no strict and simple line can be drawn to divide the corporation from the rest of the 
social order.”
44
 This insight implies that “corporations are best seen as actors caught up in 
the very process of defining or constituting the social order.”
45
 
This last point is doubly important, implying that a corporation can also have 
agency. Corporations are made up of individuals, but have always been something more 
than the individuals within a firm. As Alan Trachtenberg notes, since at least the 
nineteenth century, “the corporation embodied a legally sanctioned fiction, that an 
association of people constituted a single entity which might hold property, sue and be 
sued, enter contracts, and continue in existence beyond the lifetime or membership of any 
of its participants.”
46
 Because of this legal fiction, it also becomes possible to consider a 
corporation, like Enron, as a unified whole in a cultural context. What is more, this legal 
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fiction has implications beyond economics. Lipartito and Sicilia write that “real markets 
consist of real actors, who bring to the marketplace their values, identities, and 
feelings.”
47
 In Bruno Latour’s terms, markets are “actor-networks,” where corporations 
(and not the individuals working for them) are one of many “actants.”
48
 Given the 
expansive conception of markets that Lipartito and Sicilia provide, corporations can be 
considered cultural actants in addition to being economic ones. 
Of course, the individuals within a corporation are the actual engines who account 
for the corporation’s activity. Still, even then, some sociologists have provided a 
theoretical frame for considering corporations as “institutions” that “are something more 
than collections of individuals.”
49
 The term “institution” “implies a structure that 
becomes permanent and fixed enough to influence and constrain, and also enable, 
individuals.”
50
 In this conception, “individuals operating within institutional structures 
are given to following rule-like patterns or scripts.”
51
 Enron was staffed with thousands 
of workers, and the corporation’s history was significantly shaped by their individual 
actions. Jeff Skilling in particular, had considerable influence over the direction that 
Enron took in the mid-1990s. Likewise, popular accounts of the company and its collapse 
focus on groups within Enron, such as the company’s West Coast electricity traders. 
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However, the company’s official messaging, encompassing its public relations statements 
and actions, its advertising, and internal employee communications, presented the 
corporation as a unified whole. This is significant, since it sometimes is difficult to 
determine an individual author or producer of a specific piece of marketing literature or 
similar cultural artifact. In these instances, the absence of a specific actor or document 
author highlights how the corporation as a whole can be a cultural actant. Indulging in the 
longstanding legal fiction of the corporation while acknowledging its paradoxical and 
imperfect construction, from time to time I will refer to an action that “Enron” (and not 
individuals inside Enron) took.  
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 In charting how Enron became a flashpoint for people in the United States to 
express anxiety about the informational economy, I am not offering up an exact 
chronology of the company’s history. While I do touch on some of the business activities 
the company engaged in, I am more concerned with the ways in which these changes 
played out on a cultural and symbolic level. In the first chapter, I recount the company’s 
founding, as well as give a general overview of Enron’s primary business operations. In 
this section, I chart the company’s drastic transformation in the 1990s as the business 
model Jeff Skilling introduced meant that Enron would begin to resemble a financial 
services company in its business practices and internal corporate identity. However, I 




these changes in its corporate rhetoric, identity, advertising and marketing literature. For 
years, Enron and its executives struggled to find an adequate way of representing its 
increasingly immaterial business practices to a wider public of investors, consumers and 
the press. This struggle was not because Enron had hired incompetent marketing 
personnel. Rather, the company’s newer businesses presented the same issues of 
representation that Harvey and Jameson see as symptomatic of late capitalism.  
Enron’s problem was partially alleviated with the appearance of the “new 
economy” in the late 1990s. This development provided Enron with the rhetorical and 
symbolic tools to represent and communicate its newer businesses. However, the “new 
economy” was not a complete solution for Enron’s communication problems. 
Specifically, the “new economy” did not allow Enron to define its business, but rather 
allowed Enron to celebrate and promote some of the political, economic and cultural 
aspects of the informational economy. In doing so, Enron’s marketing efforts were 
cultural iterations for neoliberalism and symbolic analysts. What is more, throughout this 
process, the company abandoned an earlier commitment to environmental sensitivity. 
Yet however much the company’s rhetoric and imagery moved away from the 
physical world, the company’s newer business practices belied a profound interplay with 
the material world, and U.S. geography in particular. In the second chapter, I address the 
unique spatial contradictions inherent in Enron’s business. Throughout the decade, 
Enron’s increasing commitment to both an international project of globalization and a 




While this ideal seemed to line up perfectly with the corporation’s shift toward symbolic 
analysis, achieving this goal meant a complex relationship with individual geographies 
around the United States. I document this interplay as Enron pushed for electricity trading 
in several states, such as New Hampshire, Texas and, finally, California – a case that 
revealed many of the hidden dangers of symbolic analysis and neoliberal deregulation. 
In this chapter, I also consider the complicated and evolving relationship between 
the corporation and Houston, Texas, where it was headquartered. Not only has Houston 
historically been a “business friendly” environment, but business forces, operating under 
a free market ideology, have also helped shape the way in which the city developed.
52
 
Though Enron was a relatively new organization at the time of its demise, the company 
had deep roots in Houston. In its industry and in the way it aggressively lobbied for 
deregulation, Enron was operating within the city’s business tradition.
53 
Enron also had a 
very visible, material presence in Houston. Enron’s history is punctuated by attempts to 
leave its mark on the city, such as its involvement with local charities as well as the 
construction of the Enron Field ballpark in downtown Houston. However, the company’s 
vision for the city was tantamount to a decisive break with Houston’s past. Enron’s 
involvement in community affairs in Houston was oriented toward transforming the 
metropolis from an industrial city to a location that would be attractive to the symbolic 
analysts the company required as it changed its focus in the late 1990s. 
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The third chapter addresses the public collapse of Enron in late 2001 through 
2003. In this section, I argue that Enron became a vehicle for Americans to express their 
anxiety over many of the contradictions inherent to the informational economy. 
Immediately following Enron's collapse, the authors of documents such as media reports, 
editorials, and letters to the editor used the complexity of the company's business and its 
demise to express a wider cultural anxiety over the complicated nature of the 
informational economy.  
In chapter four, I look at extended treatments of Enron, including two of the most 
prominent books on the subject, as well as The Crooked E, a made for TV movie from 
2003 and the 2005 film documentary, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room. While 
these works attempted to make cultural sense of Enron’s collapse, they were documents 
that were shot through with contradictory sentiments, illuminating how a variety of 
cultural and political categories had been jumbled by the post 1973 economy. Anti-
intellectual impulses mixed uneasily with other sensibilities, including a populist disdain 
for big business and a liberal political ethos that condemned a laissez-faire approach to 
business regulation. I argue that authors and filmmakers used these older, sometimes 
contradictory tropes, such as business's antipathy towards intellectualism and populist 
mistrust towards large corporations, in an ultimately failed attempt to make sense of 
Enron's collapse.  
Writing and researching a dissertation on the vagaries of Enron’s immaterial 




of the financial services sector across many parts of the world. Here again, almost 
absurdly complicated financial instruments that referred more to each other than they did 
to the material world had concrete consequences. The context of this much larger and 
devastating crisis of the informational economy informed this dissertation. Not only did it 
seem germane to understand why Enron’s collapse triggered a wave of public outcry over 
a way of economic life and production, but it also seemed important to understand why 
that outcry and cultural production failed to stop the financial collapse which ultimately 





CHAPTER ONE  
 
“THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE CONCEPT TO GET ACROSS” – THE MOVE 
TOWARDS IMMATERIALITY IN ENRON’S RHETORIC AND PRACTICE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I chart Enron’s history from its formation in 1985 until just before 
the company’s collapse in 2001.
1
 Though narrative accounts of the company appeared 
almost immediately after the collapse, their authors tended to focus on an arc whereby 
Enron moved from being a profitable, albeit uninteresting natural gas pipeline operator 
into a company that, while dazzling the business community, was little more than an 
accounting scam. Such books often track the creation and subsequent unraveling of the 
various Special Purpose Entities that Chief Financial Officer Andy Fastow created 
throughout the late 1990s. In addition to emphasizing the outright fraud, journalists such 
as Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, as well as management scholars like Malcolm 
Salter, point to poor management controls, negligent board oversight and ill-conceived 
ventures, such as Enron Broadband, a joint deal with Blockbuster Video, and Azurix (the 
company’s failed water utility venture). While the narrative I provide touches on some of 
these issues, this chapter also deviates from such narratives in significant ways.  
Like many Enron narratives, mine tracks the corporation’s movement from 
pipeline company to “new economy” darling. However, my focus is on the cultural 
contours of this transformation. Rather than linger over the intricate details of rotten 
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accounting deals and other acts of corporate deceit, I seek to call attention to the 
rhetorical and representational modes the company used to present itself to the business 
community, its own employees, and, finally, a larger national public. Indeed, such 
rhetorical and representational modes changed dramatically over the course of the 
company’s existence. Paradoxically, as Enron’s business became less about physical 
processes and more about the production and manipulation of information, the ways of 
representing that information became increasingly difficult. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Enron wrapped its corporate image in a mantle of environmental responsibility. 
However, as Enron changed its business model and engaged in what was immaterial 
economic activity, it was forced to delve into modes of representation that were far more 
abstract in nature. 
Below, I argue that the drastic changes in Enron’s identity over the course of the 
1990s were largely cultural. In advocating for a “cultural turn” in business history, 
Kenneth Lipartito has stressed the importance of “the relationship between the firm” and 
the world around it.
2
 I read both Enron’s early environmental emphasis and later 
celebration of the “new economy” as the company’s attempt to “understand” its own 
services as both culturally and socially relevant, and to “push [its] interpretations beyond 
[its] own walls into the public realm.”
3
 Both moves are striking, since gas pipeline 
transporters such as Enron would typically have no reason to burnish a public image. 
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PIPELINES AND HARDHATS 
On April 10, 1986, a press release went out over the news wires announcing that a 
company called HNG/InterNorth was changing its name to Enron. The last paragraph of 
the release, commonly called the “boiler plate,” described Enron as having “nearly $10 
billion in assets” and as “involved in natural gas transmission and marketing, exploration 
and production of gas and oil, liquid fuels, petrochemicals and international and domestic 
trading of hydrocarbons.”
4
 HNG/InterNorth itself was a relatively new company, the 
product of Houston Natural Gas merging with InterNorth, a natural gas company based in 
Omaha, Nebraska (where Enron was temporarily headquartered). The release itself was 
full of scripted quotations from Enron’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Ken Lay. The 
executive, who held a Ph.D. in economics, was originally from Missouri, and had spent 
time working for the Pentagon in Washington, DC, had been head of Houston Natural 
Gas when the merger took place. Many of the statements attributed to the new company’s 
CEO focused on reassuring investors that Enron could weather difficult times. 
Indeed, Enron came together in what was a very turbulent period for both 
Houston, then in the middle of a recession, and the natural gas industry. Though natural 
gas had been used as fuel and heating for years, the industry was highly regulated. For 
much of the twentieth century, gas was sold at set prices at the wellhead and oil fields to 
pipeline carriers that then sold the gas to what were termed “local distribution centers,” 
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again at prices that were determined by regulatory bodies. Because natural gas was 
perceived to be a limited resource, until the late 1970s U.S. energy policies tended to 
discourage excessive exploration and production, leading to shortages in the latter part of 
that decade.
5
 In fact, in the winter of 1976 and early 1977, the shortage in gas for power 
generation and heating was so severe in the northeast that schools and industrial plants 
shut down. A state of emergency was even declared in New York.
6
  
 The Carter administration’s response to the problem was the Natural Gas Policy 
Act in 1978, which inaugurated a process of deregulation spanning over a decade.
7
 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) orders completed the industry’s deregulation.
8
 For example, in 
1985, FERC Order 436 allowed “open access transport” of natural gas over pipelines, 
which “marked the beginning of the end for pipelines as monopoly sellers of bundled gas 
and transportation service.”
9
 The next year, Order 451 raised the ceiling price of wellhead 
gas so high that it was, in effect, deregulated. Finally, in 1992, Order 636 completed the 
“open access” of gas pipelines.
10
 The result was dramatic. Rather than the steady, 
predictable business that it had been, the natural gas industry was now characterized by 
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 Gas prices were now determined on the “spot market” and 
could change frequently.  
These shifts had wide reaching practical and ideological implications for Enron. 
While this could have been a disaster, Enron learned how to profit from the instability 
that deregulation provoked. The company’s ultimate success in profiting from this 
deregulated business landscape had a huge impact on how Enron would develop for the 
remainder of its life. Certainly, Order 636 was treated internally as a significant event. 
However, throughout this period, the image Enron presented to the public ignored these 
changes (to a degree) and emphasized different aspects of the natural gas industry, 
specifically, the material benefits and characteristics of the commodity. In fact, in the 
early 1990s natural gas companies provided good models for corporate stability. As 
energy historian Christopher Castaneda writes: “In some respects, the 1990s utility 
industry resemble[d] the utility industry of the 1920s and 1930s, when a few huge public 
utility holding companies dominated their industry.”
12
 Enron, with its extensive pipeline 
system, was one such company. 
 
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE MATERIAL WORLD 
As a corporation that had power generation plants and oil and gas exploration 
operations in addition to its gas pipeline network, Enron had a number of options for 
establishing its corporate identity. However, the avenue the company ultimately took in 
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this regard was striking. Beginning in the late 1980s, Enron cultivated an environmentally 
friendly image. However, there was a specific logic at work behind this image. The early 
environmental focus was an attempt by the company and its managers to engage in the 
physical world. In images that placed the company’s power plants and pipelines in 
harmony with the natural world, Enron was acknowledging the inherent materiality at the 
core of the energy business.  
While, as Castaneda notes, natural gas is cleaner than coal and oil, historically the 
industry itself could hardly be viewed as “green.” As he writes, “For many years, pipeline 
companies used oils, which contained PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls).”
13
 Yet this 
patina of corporate social responsibility was so ingrained that it formed the core of 
Enron’s corporate identity. By 1994, the company had even introduced an 
“Environmental Code of Ethics.” As the code stated, “Enron Corp. is committed to the 
protection of the environment. Environmental concerns are embodied in the company’s 
Vision and Values.”
14
 After declaring that employees must comply with environmental 
regulations, the code went even further to mandate that “Employees must consider the 
environmental consequences of all aspects of company operations.”
15
 In fact, by the time 
this Code of Ethics appeared, care of the environment had been at the core of the 
company’s public image for at least four years. 
On October 9th, 1990, the Newcomen Society, an organization devoted to 
celebrating the histories of industries and individual companies, invited Ken Lay to 
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address an audience in Houston, Texas. Referring to the instability ushered in by natural 
gas deregulation, Lay seemed relieved that Enron had weathered “a rough, chaotic 
time.”
16
 Indeed, that October, the CEO appeared to be in an upbeat mood. As Lay told his 
audience, he was  
convinced that Enron is in the right business at the right time. We firmly believe 
natural gas will be the fuel of the 1990s – and for good reasons. First of all, it’s a 
clean source of energy, contributing less than any other fossil fuel to the 
emissions which cause acid rain, the greenhouse effect or the destruction of the 




Lay clearly regarded natural gas’s environmental benefits as critical to Enron’s fortunes. 
It was a point that he emphasized again towards the end of his talk, when he called 
attention to what he termed the company’s “Vision” - a concise statement intended to 
provide focus for the company throughout the new decade. Enron, he declared, wanted to 
become “The First Natural Gas Major, The Most Innovative and Reliable Provider Of 
Clean Energy Worldwide For a Better Environment.”
18
  
As the example of Enron’s first vision statement suggests, in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s the company adjusted its corporate identity and strategy in response to 
shifting cultural attitudes toward environmental stewardship. Part of this process meant 
building on cultural values, concerns and tropes already in circulation. Frederick Buell 
has argued that the 1980s witnessed a sea change in U.S. environmentalism, when it lost 
its activist bent and was largely co-opted by reactionary forces. As he notes:  
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The list of ‘real’ environmental stewards came to include not only specific 
corporations – ones that claimed to be green in products and processes – but also, 
astonishingly, free-market capitalists and even grassroots antienvironmentalists. If 
you asked, in the wake of the 1970s, who was looking out for the environment, 
everyone’s hands went up – including those of the antienvironmental right and the 
nation’s most polluting corporations. And when the hands went up, it would be 




In other words, though it seems paradoxical that a fossil fuel company would make such 
use of environmental imagery, by the 1980s environmentalism had moved into the 
mainstream of U.S. public discourse and a business that touted itself as “green” would 
not have been noteworthy. 
Indeed, the greenhouse effect, acid rain and a general concern over the state of the 
environment loomed large in U.S. culture in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Not only did 
President George H. W. Bush put a good deal of energy into the Clean Air Act, but the 
twentieth anniversary of Earth Day in April 1990 promised to be a major event. As to be 
expected¸ both Time and Newsweek both ran long stories on that occasion, though the two 
magazines evoked different attitudes. Time hopefully proclaimed that “a quiet revolution 
is greening the country,” while Newsweek pessimistically shed light on environmental 
degradation up and down the Mississippi River.
20
 Given the amount of media attention 
afforded environmental anxieties during this time, it should come as no surprise that a 
host of corporations began promoting “themselves as friends of the Earth.”
21
 No wonder 
Ken Lay felt that the timing was right for Enron’s business. Even before Earth Day and 
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Enron’s first vision statement, the company had placed considerable emphasis on 
environmental stewardship in its marketing literature.  
The company began using environmental rhetoric and visual imagery in earnest 
with its 1988 annual report.
22
  In the report’s “Letter to Shareholders” the “authors” 
(nominally Ken Lay and then-president Rich Kinder) suggested that “renewed interest in 
clean air” would be good for the natural gas company.
23
 Similarly, the report’s cover 
featured a gas power plant in the background with a field of flowers in the foreground.
24
 
The image embodied a “pastoral ideal” that sought to harmonize the photograph’s two 
elements – the industrial power plant and the fields.
25
 Here the plant and field coexisted 
peacefully and without contradiction. This picture was striking when considering the 
image that had appeared on the cover of the previous year’s annual report – a close up of 
a gas pipeline and workers wearing hard hats, leaving no room on the page for even the 
presence of the natural world. Rather, industrial might was the photograph’s dominant 
motif. Even the two employees at the center of the page were revealed as insignificant 
figures among the hard materiality of the gas pipelines. 
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In tandem with increasing concern over environmental degradation in public 
discourse, there was an even bigger leap in the company’s environmental rhetoric the 
following year. The 1989 report’s cover proclaimed that natural gas was the “cleanest 
burning and most economical of all fossil fuels” and that it held “the promise for a 
cleaner world….”
26
 For the next several years, environmental rhetoric and iconography 
appeared regularly in Enron’s marketing literature.
27
 Indeed, illustrations and 
photographs throughout the 1992 annual report featured all of Enron’s business 
operations and units as in harmony with green, nature-themed backdrops – an extension 
of the same themes the company had been working with for years. That the report’s 
imagery was dominated by illustrations was also significant, endowing each scene with a 
friendly, nonthreatening quality. Unlike photographs of power plants, there was no need 
for captions to provide context. The artist (and company) could simply present an 
untroubled co-existence of industry and the natural world. In fact, the number of Enron-
related operations stuffed into each imagined landscape implied a “naturalness” to the 
company itself. Such images call to mind Buell’s argument about the vast 
transformations in American environmentalism in the 1980s. To be sure, Buell has in 
mind an environmental backlash that was part of the Reagan Right. Still, it is worth 
noting that by 1992, an energy company headed by an avowed free marketer could 
present itself as an effective and dedicated environmental steward.  
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What’s more, in Enron’s case, these were not merely superficial statements meant 
to produce a friendlier corporate image. To a degree, these larger cultural concerns also 
shaped Enron’s business strategy in the early 1990s.
28
 For example, in 1989 and 1990 
Ken Lay began promoting what he referred to as the “natural gas standard.” Again 
emphasizing the environmental benefits of natural gas relative to other fossil fuels, Lay 
suggested that no other power generation plants be built unless they could at least equal 
gas fired cogeneration plants in both cost and environmental impact.
29
 In an odd way, one 
could argue that Enron was ahead of the curve. Writing in 2001, business historian 
Christine Rosen noted a change in management attitudes towards the environment that 
neatly sums up some of the trends of the 1990s, writing that such managers “are realizing 
that it is in their firm’s strategic self-interest to identify and find ways to embrace the 
business opportunities inherent in taking a constructive approach to solving society’s 
environmental problems.”
30
 Indeed, Enron’s emphasis on cogeneration plants can be seen 
as an example of what Rosen calls “environmental innovation.”
31
 Environmental 
sensitivity was undeniably at the core of the company’s internal and external identity for 
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years. When the company began expanding beyond natural gas, they primarily entered 
into environmentally friendly industries such as wind and solar power.
32
 
Likewise, Enron never hesitated in strategically deploying “green” rhetoric when 
it proved useful. For example, in 1997 the company’s annual report cover featured a close 
up of lush, vibrant green leaves.
33
 Similarly, when Enron began consumer directed 
advertising in the mid to late 1990s, the company sometimes highlighted its 
environmental image. 
 Of course, given the company’s ignominious demise in 2001, it is tempting to cast 
a jaundiced eye towards its environmental image. To be sure, Enron’s brand of 
environmentalism was hardly straightforward. Environmentally beneficial suggestions 
such as the “natural gas standard” were also obvious attempts to gain a competitive 
advantage for the company. Likewise, even when the company put a pastoral scene on 
the cover of its 1989 annual report the caption revealed an inherently market-oriented 
logic. The cover depicted antelope in dimming light grazing along vast plains. 
Throughout the first few years of the following decade, Enron often featured photographs 
such as this one in its marketing literature. However, the caption accompanying this 
photograph identified the location as Big Piney, Wyoming – the company’s largest gas 
field in the United States and site of one of its drilling and exploration operations.  
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 Nor was this environmental focus limited to the corporation’s public image. 
Throughout the first part of the 1990s, the company touted its commitment to 
environmental responsibility in the pages of Enron Business, the company’s internal 
publication for employees. In fact, the May 1994 issue was dedicated entirely to Enron’s 
environmental efforts. In an echo of earlier annual report covers that evinced a pastoral 
ideal, the May 1994 Enron Business cover took the same approach, linking this ideal to 
Enron’s power plant in Teeside, England, which was the company’s most ambitious 
international development project at that time. The photograph foregrounded cows 
meandering in a field with a mammoth industrial structure in the background while the 
caption read: “Nature and technology harmoniously coincide at Enron’s 1,875 megawatt 
Teeside Power Facility, which is fueled by clean-burning natural gas. The facility, 
located in the United Kingdom, exemplifies Enron’s commitment to a better environment 
worldwide.”
34
 Much like the cover, many of the articles inside sought to reconcile the 
company’s profit-making activities and political leanings with a sense of environmental 
responsibility. For example, in an article about Enron’s lobbying efforts on Capital Hill, 
Terry Thorn, senior vice president of government affairs and public policy, applauded the 
Clinton administration’s “willingness to use market-based solutions to solve 
environmental problems as progressive, innovative and a step in the right direction.”
35
 
Such reasoning calls to mind Buell’s point about how environmental rhetoric and 
attitudes in the 1980s blurred the line between what previously had been oppositional 
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camps. The idea that the free market could lead to “innovative” environmentally sensitive 
outcomes was echoed later in the article when Thorn commented that “environmentalists 
today have basically debunked the theory that economic growth and environmental 
controls cannot coincide.”
36
 Other articles in the May 1994 issue were far more rhapsodic 
in tone. One article about Enron’s oil and gas exploration unit began:  
Maneuvering through West Texas ranch lands or along Wyoming 
riverbeds is a stark contrast to the rush hour congestion endured by most 
American workers.  
Few industries have the added benefit of operating beneath snow-tipped 
mountain ranges or along coastal shores like Enron Oil & Gas (EOG) field 





The article itself made repeated appeals to local environmental issues, insisting that 
Enron employees in these areas also had a vested interested in stewardship of the land. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the article prominently featured the photograph of antelope along 
the gas fields in Big Piney, Wyoming, that had graced the 1989 annual report cover.  
 Even two years later, in 1996, Enron Business ran an article that called attention 
to the company’s efforts at laying pipe through wetlands near Lake Superior in Michigan. 
That article even included photographs of pipeline waiting to be put into the ground, as 
well as one after the area had been restored to “pristine” condition. That the environment 
was a recurring theme both in its outward marketing and branding efforts, as well as its 
internal communications, suggest how central environmental stewardship (albeit of a 
market-friendly variety) was to the company’s brand and identity. However, the ways in 
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which Enron deployed these visual and linguistic tropes were fraught with contradiction. 
Such rhetoric and imagery offered an uncomfortable echo of William Cronon’s argument 
that “wilderness” as a concept “represents the false hope of an escape from responsibility, 
the illusion that we can somehow wipe clean the slate of our past and return to the tabula 
rasa that supposedly existed before we began to leave our marks on the world.”
38
 Images 
of Big Piney or green rolling hills among Enron’s various operations worked to absolve 
the company’s very real, physical reworking of the land. 
Still, despite the potential contradiction, throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s 
Enron attempted to ground itself both politically and culturally in the material world. 
Rather than presenting itself as operating solely in the realm of thought and information, 
the company was acknowledging its own embeddedness, through its large, industrial 
operations, in the physical world. Of course, the company explored other modes of 
representation in the early nineties. Around 1994, the company began to make known its 
global ambitions. Enron often touted large scale overseas projects, particularly massive 
power plants in Teeside, England, and Dhabol, India, as evidence of the company’s 
growing influence. Domestically, however, the company continued to emphasize its 
commitment to environmental stewardship. By the late 1990s, Enron’s image had shifted 
drastically. However, much like the “green” rhetoric, the seeds of this change in the 
company’s image also lay in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even at the beginning of the 
decade, changes were underway within the company which eventually pushed it to 
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celebrate a world dominated by the sophisticated manipulation of complicated pieces of 
information.  
Internal corporate identities are rarely, if ever, as unified as a company’s public 
image. As much as environmental stewardship may have been central to the company’s 
public, corporate identity, each individual unit within Enron did not necessarily embrace 
this theme wholeheartedly. In their study of organizational structure and identity, Stuart 
Albert and David Whetton have argued against the notion that any large organization 
possesses one, unified organizational (as opposed to a public or corporate) identity.
39
 
Even reviewing the various articles in Enron Business, it is clear that the company always 
contained multiple internal identities. Of course, Albert and Whetton point out that such a 
phenomenon should be expected with large organizations. What makes Enron’s case so 
striking in this regard is the severity of the change that took place during the 1990s. 
Albert and Whetton have identified a temporal factor in a shifting organizational identity, 
arguing that a firm’s rapid growth, acquisitions and divestitures can all force a change in 
organizational identity.
40
 In Enron’s case, it was rapid growth in one specific area – 
Enron Gas Services – that eventually produced a revamped image in the late 1990s. 
 
BANKING CULTURE COMES TO ENRON 
 Although the company’s environmental focus was its predominant public identity 
throughout the early part of its existence, the company was large and there were other 
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operations within Enron that possessed a very different ethos. One such unit was Enron 
Gas Services, created and headed by Jeff Skilling. The executive’s involvement with 
Enron predated the company’s existence. In the early 1980s, Skilling was an employee 
for McKinsey & Company, a management consulting firm. Significantly, Skilling was 
not initially interested in energy but wanted to focus on banks and other financial 
institutions. However, with an economic crisis in Houston in the 1980s, he saw that 
practically “every bank in the State of Texas was bankrupt.”
41
 As he put it, “I kind of 
realized that, if I was going to be in Texas, there were no more financial institutions left 
here, so I better learn the energy business.”
42
 This detail is not insignificant. In 1988 and 
’89, in his capacity as a consultant, Skilling devised a concept called the “Gas Bank,” 
which would allow Enron to profit from deregulation’s volatility and fluctuating prices in 
the spot market. As he began to advise and eventually join Enron, Skilling introduced a 
style of business and internal culture that resembled banking and financial activities far 
more than it did the operation of gas pipelines, cogeneration power plants, and 
exploration and development. In essence, Skilling’s arrival at Enron touched off a 
gradual, though ultimately sharp, move away from the material world and toward the 
immateriality that came to define the company by the end of the decade. 
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 About a year later, Ken Lay and others at Enron convinced Skilling to leave 
McKinsey and join Enron as head of Enron Gas Services.
43
 It was this unit that later 
housed the Gas Bank and, in time, grew so influential that it drove the direction the 
company took throughout the 1990s. However, the Gas Bank and Enron Gas Services 
were significant for several interrelated reasons. First, one of the ways the bank 
functioned was by offering different derivative products, many of which could be used to 
secure futures of prices. Indeed, in some ways Enron had no choice but to function as a 
bank. As an overall celebratory Harvard Business School case study from 1993 pointed 
out, in the wake of bankruptcies that spread through Houston in the late 1980s with the 
collapse of oil prices, Enron had to develop ways to lend to gas suppliers.
44
 From the 
beginning, Enron Gas Services was “a hybrid natural gas and financial services firm.”
45
 
In effect, the company was now offering long term contracts. What is more, it was 
this banking activity that eventually brought Andy Fastow to the company. Like Skilling, 
Fastow had a background in finance, in particular with securitization. While this 
particular financial operation had been typically used in pooling mortgages, as Skilling 
noted during his criminal trial, early in his career Fastow became known in the business 
community for applying securitization to other areas.
46
 Fastow was also the catalyst for 
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Enron’s extensive use of off-balance sheet partnerships which proved to be a major factor 
in the company’s eventual demise.
47
  
The first of these fraudulent accounting structures was not created until 1997, but 
the roots go back to 1993, when, under Fastow, the company entered into a partnership 
with CalPERS (the California Public Employee Retirement System) and established JEDI 
(Joint Energy Development Investments).
48
 JEDI’s purpose was to identify and invest in 
profitable opportunities. While this arrangement worked for a time, when, in 1997, Enron 
wanted CalPERS to invest in a second fund, they created an illegitimate Special Purpose 
Entity called “Chewco” to take over CalPERS’ investment in JEDI.
49
 SPEs require at 
least three percent of their equity financing to come from a different source than the 
original company (in this case, Enron). However, Fastow had a difficult time finding 
outside investors and wound up creating byzantine structures and agreements that 
effectively guaranteed others’ investments, meaning that little to no risk was transferred 
from Enron. Such schemes violated both the spirit and the law concerning SPEs. What is 
more, this move set a pattern for Fastow and the company for the remainder of its 
existence. SPEs with ever more elaborate structures ballooned over the next few years 
and allowed Enron to hide substantial amounts of debt. 
 Beyond these issues, Enron Gas Services and the Gas Bank also introduced the 
company’s use of Mark-to-Market accounting, which allowed Enron to claim profits 
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before the money itself had been realized. In later Enron narratives, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)’s response was used to highlight systemic failure (in 
essence, that the agency never should have allowed Enron to use this kind of accounting). 
However, the presentation that Enron sent to the SEC reflected the pervasiveness of the 
firm’s banking mentality. Specifically, the authors tried to position the business unit as 
more of a bank than anything that had been previously connected to the natural gas 
industry. Indeed, the presentation (signed by Jack Tompkins, EGS’s Chief Financial 
Officer, and George Posey, the VP of Finance and Accounting) argued that the company 
should be given mark-to-market accounting treatment, since it was more like a trading 
business (contrary to what the company would insist later). As they put it in their letter, 
the business unit was “substantially different” from the company’s other businesses since 
its “assets” were “comprised of contracts and financial instruments, as opposed to fixed 
assets such as natural gas pipelines.”
50
 In effect the unit was emphasizing immateriality 
as opposed to materiality; the company was more like a bank than a regular pipeline 
operation. What is more, the letter highlighted the novelty of what Enron Gas Services 
was doing. As they put it, the unit was “among the first traders of natural gas under long-
term fixed price contracts and derivative products.”
51
 The report that the company sent to 
the regulatory body was also significant in that it compared its own operations to a series 
of financial institutions (including Continental Bank, where Andrew Fastow had learned 
structured finance).  
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 In effect, even as it witnessed the introduction of policies that eventually proved 
to be the company’s undoing, Enron Gas Services pointed toward a way to profit from 
the suddenly unstable natural gas business. What is more, Enron had done so in a way 
that resembled “knowledge work” instead of the traditional way of operating gas 
pipelines. Natural gas had suddenly become a risky business to be in, and it was Enron’s 
offering various immaterial risk management products (such as certain types of 
derivatives) that provided a way for the company to make money.  
 As the Harvard Business School case study put it, by 1992 “EGS could engineer 
virtually any type of financial contract its users demanded, and it often bundled physical 
and financial contracts together for ease in marketing.”
52
 Specifically, the business unit 
had developed a number of derivative products, and even had “the largest portfolio of 
fixed-price gas and natural gas derivative contracts in the world.”
53
 Indeed, throughout 
the application to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the authors repeatedly 
highlighted the role of risk management in their day-to-day operations. By using a 
number of “financial instruments, including long-term price swaps, options (collectively, 
‘derivative products’) and forward contracts” the company could “eliminate economic 
risk” that, with deregulation, had become “associated with natural gas prices.”
54
 Indeed, 
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  Still, to the outside world, Enron’s image was that of an environmentally 
responsible natural gas company. While the company advertised its financial products, 
such as EnFolio, in the early 1990s, the company’s overall ad campaign and internal and 
external message told a much broader story (even if, at least on some level) the language 
the company used was becoming less specific. To an extent, this is understandable. Even 
by Skilling’s own admission, it would take years before Enron Gas Services became the 
primary force behind Enron’s earnings and dominate both the company’s internal culture 
as well as its self-representation to the outside world. However, even glancing at some of 
the company’s marketing literature from the early 1990s reveals the creeping banking 
culture that gradually took center stage within the company. One striking example 
appeared in the company’s 1990 annual report. While that document largely promoted 
the company’s environmentally friendly image, its inside flap hinted at the changes to 
come. The page, which folded out, was meant to provide a snapshot overview of the 
company as a whole.  
At the time, Enron was divided into five different business units, of which Enron 
Gas Services was but one. Readers (primarily shareholders and potential investors in the 
company) were greeted by five images meant to convey the types of activities undertaken 
                                                 
55
 Though the imagery associated with investment banking would, to a degree, be replaced by the visual 
and linguistic rhetoric of the “new economy” Enron would continue to have a complex relationship with 
risk. As the decade wore on, the company would both celebrate a world of risk (and in some cases seek to 




by each business unit. In this lineup, Enron Gas Services stuck out. All of the other 
images, associated with business units that had long been a part of the company and 
would have been familiar to anyone in the natural gas industry, featured photographs of 
the material world. The pipeline group foregrounded land and featured employees 
working on it (presumably determining where to put a new pipeline or working with a 
pipeline that was already underground). Other groups, such as the power generation 
group, highlighted large industrial processes, here represented by a power plant. By 
contrast, the image of Enron Gas Services was a disruptive break. The image itself was 
taken from the outside looking in, the viewer seeing workers through blinds and a 
window. Unlike the other scenes on the page, this work was not taking place outside. The 
workers themselves sat at desks, answered phones and consulted each other. Instead of 
dealing with large material structures, such as pipelines, power plants or exploration rigs, 
these were “knowledge workers” manipulating information. 
The brief description of the business unit also emphasized both the immaterial 
nature of its work (“marketing products” and “financing alternatives”) and values 
(“innovative”) that implied the company was able to handle the chaotic world of the 
“rapidly changing natural gas industry.” In time, these values and ideas afforded cause 
for celebration by the company. Though the company continued to operate its pipeline 
system right up until the end, the constant reorganizations and name changes the 
company experienced in the mid to late 1990s placed increasing emphasis on businesses 




integrated clean energy company, in a section of the 1995 “Letter to Shareholders” 
entitled “Unique and Forward Strategy,” the management predicted that “40 percent” of 
the company’s “projected $1 billion net income in the year 2000” would come from 




CHANGE IN LANGUAGE AND FOCUS 
Though these new, more informational modes of production proliferated within 
the company, they also presented a unique problem of representation. By the late 1990s, 
the environmental concern formerly at the center of Enron’s corporate identity had 
largely faded from view and with it, the company’s overt commitment to the material 
world.
57
 The company’s earlier image had been relatively easy to represent. The 
environment and the power business came with stock images of pristine wilderness and 
industrial might. By contrast, Enron would find that, at least at first, no language existed 
that could adequately describe what it was the company did. Ironically, as Enron’s 
business practices moved towards emphasizing information, communicating the nature of 
that information became increasingly difficult. Throughout the middle of the decade, 
Enron struggled to find the words to describe itself, settling on increasingly vague 
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language imparting feelings and values, rather than defining concrete products and 
processes. 
The next time the company changed its “vision” in 1994, it reflected the internal 
changes in Enron’s culture and operations as well as these problems. The company was, 
it now declared, “The world’s first natural gas major …  creating energy solutions 
worldwide.”
58
 Though the 1994 annual report still mentioned the environmental benefits 
of natural gas, the issue had clearly taken a back seat to far more abstract ideas and values 
– as evidenced by the use of words like “creative,” “energy solutions,” and, of course, 
“innovative.”
59
 While such words could be used to describe the feel of a company, unlike 
earlier descriptions, these words and phrases failed to convey the precise nature of the 
company’s operations. This trend continued over the next several years. In 1995, Enron’s 
marketing literature declared that the company had established itself as an 
“entrepreneurial, innovative, and vision-driven company.”
60
  
To be sure, this was heady stuff. Indeed, Enron had changed significantly since 
1990 (when the Gas Bank was first introduced). Perhaps it is the nature of corporate 
“visions” to be vague and aspirational, but these linguistic contortions were also taking 
place on a smaller scale inside the company. This issue first appeared and was addressed 
in the section that Skilling had formed, Enron Gas Services. In 1994, the business unit 
underwent a name change, to Enron Capital and Trade. When it was covered in Enron 
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Business, the new name was treated as a momentous event.
61
 As the article noted, the 
team involved in coming up with the new name took their charge seriously. The author 
wrote that the team “evaluated the marketplace. They consulted dictionaries and 
thesauruses [sic].”
62
 The change was more than cosmetic and represented fundamental 
shifts taking place inside the company. Significantly, the word “gas” was removed from 
the title. The material commodity that Enron had been dealing in since its inception was 
removed altogether. Almost immediately, the business unit faced the challenge of 
explaining what it actually did. The issue was apparently significant enough that the 
writer of the Enron Business piece went so far as to dissect the new name. The word 
“Enron” communicated “the notion of energy,” while “Capital” represented finance and 
“Trade” (according to the article) represented the physical side of the business.
63
 Still, 
even though the last word in the title was meant to signify the physical, material aspects 
of the business, the description had more to do with risk management services than 
physical delivery of natural gas. The new name, as imprecise as it was, served as an 
important marker for the direction the company was moving in.  
Paradoxically, as Enron (and this business unit in particular) moved more towards 
an ethos of knowledge work, the language itself became far less concrete than it had been 
before. The problem of language in describing what Enron did was not lost on the 
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company’s senior managers. Years later, during his criminal trial, Jeff Skilling reflected 
on this problem. Skilling himself could not quite seem to find the words to describe 
Enron.
64
 As he put it, “we tried over the years – it was hard because this was new – to 
describe what it was. And we tried lots of different words over the decade.”
65
 While at 
first Enron’s identity had been linked directly to gas and electricity, Skilling admitted to 
worrying about being too closely tied to the material itself, since the company’s stock 
would rise and fall with the price of gas (something Skilling felt was unfair since the 
company was providing services related to gas). In Skilling’s telling, Enron was known 
later as a “merchant” company, though the executive felt that the word didn’t “sound 
quite right.”
66
 He preferred the term “intermediation,” though “everybody told me that 
it’s just too hard for people to understand, just, you know, sounds kind of technical. We 
tried logistics.”
67
 Still, Skilling tried to come up with some way to describe the company. 
As he put it: “I think the communication over a decade […] was that the company was a 
sophisticated deliverer of product and services to customers.”
68
 Yet the phrase Skilling 
ultimately settled on was tortured and lacking in description. What is more, it coincided 
with a general lack of specificity in describing what Enron did. The problem of language 
had significant consequences for the company.  
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 The seeming inherent incommunicability of the business unit’s activities found its 
way into the 1993 Harvard Business School case study. The study’s authors even opened 
with it, citing a 1993 Forbes article that was critical of Enron Gas Services. As the 
Harvard study’s authors put it, the Forbes criticism was unwarranted because Enron Gas 
Services was “a complex hybrid of a natural gas company and a financial institution, 
which made the task of understanding its business and associated risks extremely difficult 
for outsiders.”
69
 The study did agree that the business was “opaque” but still noted that 
Enron Gas Services had also become extremely adept at risk management services.
70
 The 
study even noted that a Lehman Brothers analyst thought the Forbes writer did not 
understand what the company did. As the case study concluded, the Forbes article “was a 
disturbing reminder that EGS had not completely communicated the degree to which this 
internal system had succeeded.”
71
 Here, the Harvard Business School case study’s 
authors regarded both the level of informational complexity in what Skilling had done 
and subsequent problems with communication and language as evidence of 
sophistication. 
The connections between the case study’s criticism and the ones that McLean 
made later on were not lost on Skilling. As he put it during his trial, the case study 
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sounded “remotely familiar with the Fortune Magazine article in the year 2001.”
72
 Yet, 
as Skilling himself put it, representing Enron’s evolving business “was an ongoing issue 
that went way back in time, and it was – it was difficult because this is not a simple 
concept to get across.”
73
 Just as language was a problem in describing Enron, so too, was 
visual imagery. While in the past the company had been able to visually represent itself 
with large industrial processes or even bucolic scenes of the natural world, increasingly 
Enron would have to resort to both vague language and visual metaphor to represent itself 
and its activities.  
By 1997, however, Enron’s language problems were in part resolved by the 
emergence of a “new economy” culture. Once again, the company’s rhetoric and imagery 
changed drastically. 1997 was a watershed year for Enron in many ways. Of course, the 
most outward change was the company’s new logo. What is more, the year was, 
according to many, when Enron slid into outright fraud with developments such as 
Fastow’s accounting schemes. 1997 was also the year that Enron launched an effort to 
establish a more prominent public presence in the United States. In part, the rebranding 
worked in tandem with the company’s initial foray into retail electricity. Suddenly, it 
mattered that U.S. consumers knew the name. And while environmentalism played a role 
in some of this rebranding, it was no longer the company’s marketing focus. Such 
changes in corporate imagery and identity, as well as the slide into fraud, and the 
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company’s overt cultural production, corresponded with the ultimate triumph of the 
business strategy and style that Skilling had developed with Enron Capital and Trade.   
By 1997, the company reached a milestone. As Jeff Skilling put it during his trial 
testimony, around this time Enron reached a “tipping point” where Enron Capital and 
Trade – the business Skilling had started – became the company’s most profitable 
business unit.
74
 As Skilling described it then, Enron decided to focus on developing what 
he termed “brain-intensive businesses” as opposed to “capital-intensive projects.”
75
 The 
language the embattled executive used was striking, as were its implications. Skilling 
wanted the company to focus less on the material world and more on manipulating 
complex pieces of information. The new focus meant operating primarily in the style of 
Enron Capital and Trade. By favoring “brain-intensive businesses,” Skilling and Enron 
were privileging the immaterial world of ideas, but the phrase implied more than a 
particular corporate strategy. The phrase explicitly prioritized intelligence above anything 
else in the company’s business. In effect, Skilling’s statement revealed that Enron now 
wanted to focus on “symbolic analysis,” work that required a specific type of employee: 
the “symbolic analyst.” Yet the company’s dedication to this type of work carried with it 
a very specific ideological underpinning revealing yet another contradiction of the 
informational economy. With the success of Enron Gas Services and the Gas Bank, 
Enron had learned to profit from an unstable, unpredictable world. As the 1990s wore on, 
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Enron engaged in a political-economic, as well as cultural project of both creating and 
celebrating a newly unstable, risky world. 
 
SYMBOLIC ANALYSTS 
 During the latter part of the decade, Enron faced the problem of communicating 
the idea of its “brain intensive businesses.” One early response was the company’s 
celebration, both internally and externally, of what political economist Robert Reich has 
termed the “symbolic analyst.”  
Many have described the post-1973 informational economy as a contemporary 
political economy that has come to be defined by “knowledge work,” information, and 
the annihilation of space and time. By the late 1990s, writers in the popular and business 
press described this type of economic production in breathless terms and ahistorically 
heralded it as a dramatic and definitive break with the past that had been brought about 
by entrepreneurial businessmen creatively utilizing new technologies.
76
 However, these 
writers did not necessarily grasp the full import of the informational economy. Just as the 
nature of work changed in the informational economy, new categories of workers also 
emerged, with symbolic analysts performing the highest level tasks.
77
  
Though the concept of “knowledge workers” dates back to at least the 1960s, 
Reich sees symbolic analysts as something different. Writing in 1992, Reich explained 
that, “Symbolic analysts solve, identify, and broker problems by manipulating symbols. 
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They simplify reality into abstract images that can be rearranged, juggled, experimented 
with, communicated to other specialists, and then, eventually, transformed back into 
reality.”
78
 Reich’s definition of “symbolic analysts” is very broad, even including artists 
and musicians. However, for Reich, there are similarities uniting this seemingly disparate 
group of workers. Notably, the “products” that symbolic analysts produce are  
not standardized things. Traded instead are the manipulations of symbols – data, 
words, oral and visual representations. 
 Included in this category are the problem-solving, -identifying, and 
brokering of many people who call themselves research scientists, design 
engineers, civil engineers, biotechnology engineers, sound engineers, public 
relations executives, investment bankers, lawyers, real estate developers, and even 




Another distinction that sets symbolic analysts off from other workers is the actual labor 
involved. As Reich explains: “symbolic analysts sit before computer terminals – 
examining words and numbers, moving them, altering them, trying out new words and 
numbers […] Final production is often the easiest part. The bulk of the time and cost 
(and, thus, real value) comes in conceptualizing the problem, devising a solution, and 
planning its execution.”
80
 Of course, one could make the argument that symbolic analysts 
do not represent anything new; large corporations have always had managerial classes, 
including large “brain work” departments devoted to research and development or 
marketing. However, Reich argues that one can be a white collar worker without being a 
symbolic analyst. It is the creative manipulation of symbols and information (the same 
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type described by Hardt and Negri in Empire) which is qualitatively new and constitutes 
an explicitly postmodern type of work.
81
  
 However, the core inconsistencies of the informational economy are also present 
in the nature of symbolic analysts’ work. As Reich points out, “Symbolic analysts rarely 
come into contact with the ultimate beneficiaries of their work.”
82
 Despite the limited 
view symbolic analysts have - Reich notes that the way in which these workers see the 
world while at work is literally abstracted - they have enormous influence. Symbolic 
analysts and those affected by their work may never meet, yet symbolic analysts are 
intimately tied to these people. In other words, the creative manipulation of symbols and 
information has real, tangible consequences. For example, Manuel Castells’s observation 
that production and knowledge work have become spatially separated leads to what 
Anthony Giddens refers to as “disembeddedness.” Disembeddedness is a condition 
whereby “local practices” are linked with “globalized social relations” which “organize 
major aspects of day-to-day life.”
83
 Giddens argues that people must now place trust in 
“abstract” or “expert” systems. As he puts it, “Trust relations are basic to the extended 
time-space distanciation associated with modernity. Trust in systems takes the form of 
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faceless commitments, in which faith is sustained in the workings of knowledge of which 
the lay person is largely ignorant.”
84
 More recently, some have pointed to the powerful 
role symbolic analysts play in expert systems
85
 
 Yet the trust people must place in the expert knowledge of symbolic analysts can 
also produce a jittery and anxious dread.
86
 This is because the informational economy is 
far from a moral order. As Reich points out: “Problem-solving, -identifying, and 
brokering can create substantial value for individual consumers, but these services do not 
necessarily improve society.”
87
 While symbolic manipulation can contribute to the public 
good, Reich argues that at times “symbolic analysts simply enhance some people’s 
wealth while diminishing other people’s to an equal extent; or their net effect may be to 
reduce almost everyone’s well-being.”
88
 
 In some ways, Enron is typical of this economy and its workers. Since the 
creation of the Gas Bank in 1990, Enron had moved in the direction of symbolic 
manipulation and analysis and away from tangible, physical production. This move 
became more pronounced throughout the decade, eventually coming to define the 
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company – even if this definition came in the form of vague phrases such as the 
“financialization of energy.”
89
 The manner in which Enron workers described and 
understood their jobs also points to the creative manipulation of symbols. For example, 
one worker described his job as taking complicated insurance and financial products and 
translating them into language that final customers could understand. Indeed, some would 
point to the work of a symbolic analyst par excellence, Andy Fastow, as causing Enron’s 
downfall. To be sure, the potential dark side of symbolic analysts and symbolic 
manipulation was not lost on everyone, and its role is crucial for understanding Enron. 
 Throughout the second half of the 1990s, Enron morphed into a company full of 
symbolic analysts. What this meant for employees was a barrage of messages as to what a 
“symbolic analyst” was like and the type of work that they did. Increasingly, Skilling 
sought to create an internal culture that catered to symbolic analysts, giving them a great 
deal of freedom (a management style he referred to as “loose/tight”). In a 2000 Fortune 
article, he described Enron as a “free market” of people.
90
 As Skilling described this 
system during his criminal trial:  
The loose side was, if somebody had a new idea, as long as they worked within 
this control system, they were encouraged to try it. And if somebody wanted to 
wear – well, we didn’t have a dress code. You know, we – I used to say that some 
of our most innovative people were kind of the weirdest people that we had 
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working for us. So, you need to give people latitude because they liked – you 




After the company collapsed, many commentators pointed to the internal chaos that 
“loose/tight” fostered, including poor internal controls, perverse incentives, and a brutal 
employee evaluation process. Still, it is worth noting how these internal developments 
were directly related to the company’s increasing commitment to immaterial production 
and symbolic analysis. 
Still, representing immaterial processes was inherently problematic. Indeed, in his 
contribution to the 1998 management book, Straight from the CEO, Ken Lay highlighted 
Enron’s strategy of direct engagement with culture, as well as the problems the company 
faced.  Specifically citing some of the recent regulatory changes in both natural gas and 
electricity that were in the offing, Lay noted that the company would have to directly 
engage consumers.
92
 As part of the changes that were taking place, the executive 
reasoned that “branding and aggressive advertising” would be a hallmark of the new 
industry.
93
 Yet this would be no easy task. As Lay himself put it, “Given the invisibility 
of both methane and electrons, a company’s most important marketing edge will be the 
public’s goodwill.”
94
 In effect, Enron would not be able to rely as much on the relatively 
                                                 
91
 11925. Transcript of Jury Trial Before the Honorable Sim Lake United States District Judge, Vol. 37, 10 
Apr. 2006. 
92
 Ken Lay, “Coming Soon to Your Home and Business: The New Energy Majors,” in Straight from the 
CEO: The World’s Top Business Leaders Reveal Ideas that Every Manager Can Use, G. William 
Dauphinais and Colin Price, Ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). 251. 
93
Ibid., 255. Even if the gas itself was invisible, manipulating it necessitated large, industrial objects such as 
processing plants and lengthy pipelines. 
94




straightforward concept of environmental responsibility in its corporate imagery (though 
it would never completely abandon this ethos). Rather, the company would have to find 
new ways of engendering public goodwill in a business that increasingly dealt with 
intangible products. Enron’s public face would have to change and the company would 
have to be more aggressive in its engagement with the U.S. public. 
 
THE NEW ECONOMY, CULTURE AND THE CELEBRATION OF 
INSTABILITY 
 
The change was almost immediately recognizable in the 1997 annual report. 
Throughout Enron’s career, the annual reports had been relatively sober statements about 
the company’s performance and prospects. These were also the places where Enron 
publically unveiled its “visions” for the future.
95
 The 1997 report contained an 
introductory section entitled “Who we are.” In this section, the company declared, “We 
begin with a fundamental belief in the inherent wisdom of open markets. We are 
innovative. We are all about creating energy. We operate safely and with a concern for 
the environment.”
96
 In many ways, this statement operated as a good indication of the 
direction Enron was taking. Of course, the environmental rhetoric was still there (and, 
indeed, was more or less featured on the cover). However, it had taken a back seat to a 
political economic investment in “open markets.” The following statement, that Enron 
was “innovative,” deliberately highlighted a word that the company had always used, but 
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that now began to form the core of the company’s identity. Not only did the business and 
general media pick up on the term and use it to describe the company over the next 
couple of years, but the company emphasized the idea to both its employees and the 
public. Significantly, the term “innovative” was a description, but nothing concrete. Still, 
the term implied a style of business and carried far more philosophical weight than 
perhaps the company at the time realized. The next statement, where Enron declared that 
it was “all about creating energy,” was far less specific than such earlier self-
characterizations as a “vertically integrated clean energy company.” The problem of 
language that Enron had struggled with in the past was still present, but the company, it 
seemed, had found a solution. In its declarative statement, the company effectively 
jettisoned concrete descriptions of its business and instead emphasized a set of cultural, 
political and economic values. Political-economic maxims about “open markets” replaced 
references to the material world.  
However, the changes ushered in by the 1997 annual report went beyond such 
statements. Strewn throughout the annual report were images from a new print 
advertising campaign that Enron had begun, directly engaging in cultural production and 
representing itself to the public at large. What is more, as the company became more 







DERIVATIVES AND THE ABSTRACTION OF FINANCE  
Though some, including Bethany McLean, would complain about Enron’s 
description of its business practices as the “financialization of energy,” the phrase itself is 
not wholly without merit. The inspiration for and logic behind the work Enron performed 
through the 1990s to 2001 could be found in the financial services sector of the economy. 
As Enron adopted Skilling’s emphasis on immaterial labor and symbolic analysis, the 
company dealt largely in different types of risk-management instruments collectively 
known as derivatives. 
Generally, derivatives are defined as “tradable contracts” where the value is 
derived from “the value of other assets.”
97
 As Bill Maurer notes, “futures contracts, 
forward contracts and options contracts” are all classes of derivatives.
98
 Despite 
differences in the types of derivatives, all of them have the same basic function of 
hedging against risk associated with economic activity. For example, one type of 
derivative is a “put option” - a contract that gives the buyer the right to sell something (a 
stock or a commodity) at a set price at a specific time in the future.
99
 Some have 
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Derivatives have a long history and were a part of what William Cronon refers to 
as the “necessary fiction” of the commodities market that developed in late nineteenth 
century Chicago. Rather than merchants directly examining individual bushels of grain, 
the stuff was grouped into broad categories. Merchants and sellers would then work with 
slips of paper instead – buying and selling grain throughout the day without ever laying 
eyes on the material itself.
101
 This abstraction of economic activity then allowed for the 
development of contracts like grain futures, a type of derivative. As Cronon explains, 
futures contracts, an agreement to deliver grain on a future date, amounted to trading in a 
commodity that did not yet exist.
102
 Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee call these earlier 




This qualifier is crucial, and it is important to distinguish these types of 
derivatives from a variety that began to emerge in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which 
are sometimes called “financial derivatives.” These types of derivatives are “essentially 
wagers on changes in the price of money.”
104
 Many economic anthropologists, 
geographers and critics regard this period as a watershed moment in the global 
economy.
105
 During this period, there were a number of significant economic changes. 
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First, in 1971, the United States moved off the gold standard, which meant that the value 
of the U.S. dollar would no longer be linked to gold. In effect, the system of fixed 
exchange rates for currencies that had been in place since the Bretton Woods agreement 
in 1944 was no longer operative. Instead, these exchange rates could “float.” The term 
“float” itself is fitting, since mobility (in almost every sense) became a new quality in 
world economy. As Pryke and Allen note, newer financial derivatives were “financial 
instruments to counteract the risks of interest rate movements, exchange rate fluctuations 
and price volatility.”
106
 It was in this period that the global market for options, futures 
and other derivatives grew exponentially, constituting, in the eyes of some, new types of 
money.
107
 In the world of “financial economics,” the publication of the Black and Sholes 
Option Pricing Model equation in 1973 was widely regarded as a landmark, contributing 
to an already increasing level of complicated mathematics in the financial markets and 
with financial derivatives.
108
 In general, global capitalism and finance became far more 
mobile and complex, making participation in finance and economic activity riskier. 
 Paradoxically, though such derivatives were born out of a need to deal with risk, 
they also spread risk. Derivatives cannot eliminate risk, but only move it somewhere 
else.
109
 As some have noted, this process helps to connect different parts of the globe in a 
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 MacKenize refers to this process as “disentanglement,” where the risk, in 
an abstract form, is removed from its local, physical origins and can be “placed” 
elsewhere.
111
 If, as Nigel Thrift argues, firms during the late twentieth century saw the 
world as “inherently uncontrollable,” derivatives were both causes of and responses to 
anxieties surrounding this risky, uncontrollable world.
 112
 
 Derivatives are also inherently immaterial since they can be disassociated from 
the original asset (whether it be stock in a company, a nation’s currency or some 
commodity). As Pryke and Allen observe, in “99 per cent of futures trades, physical 
possession of the underlying security never takes place.”
113
 Brian Rotman, for instance, 
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However, Rotman’s claim goes too far. The immaterial realm of financial 
derivatives is not entirely disconnected from the material world. Rather, they are active 
agents in that world. MacKenize and others have noted the “world making” potential of 
derivatives and other financial instruments and theories. Pryke and Allen, for example, 
note that derivatives have the ability to “recompose, re-rhythm ‘real’ geographical spaces 
as financial calculations unwind in the everyday, far away from the terminals in financial 
centres.”
115
 In other words, disparate spaces and (since derivatives are always looking to 
the future) times are connected through derivative contracts. 
Derivatives and their implications are crucial for understanding Enron’s business 
practices.
116
 Enron’s “market making” activities throughout the 1990s usually involved 
introducing some sort of derivative product. Most infamously, Enron was one of the first 
companies to offer a weather derivative (in 1997) which promised to hedge against 
adverse weather conditions – perhaps one of the most audacious attempts to avert risk 
inherent in the material world.
117
 Internally, the advent of weather derivatives was 
regarded as significant enough that Enron Business included it as a major milestone in a 
2000 timeline. That same year, when Enron launched an advertising campaign, one of the 
television commercials exclusively focused on weather derivatives. The idea of weather 
derivatives offered the most striking rejoinder to the company’s earlier image and focus 
on environmental stewardship. While, earlier in the decade, Enron had espoused a 
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sensibility to the world in which it was embedded, now, through symbolic manipulation, 
the natural world could be transcended.  
However, weather derivatives were only the most obvious and extreme examples 
of the company’s attempts to supersede the material world through symbolic 
manipulation. Much like Enron Capital and Trade’s early success offering stability in the 
suddenly chaotic natural gas industry through the use of various derivatives, Enron now 
sought to introduce similar services across different industries. Ironically, the company 
began to market credit risk and bankruptcy derivatives. Enron planned to offer even more 
types of derivatives, such as those that hedged against the risk of a workers’ strike. Other 
schemes included trading commodities such as paper and pulp, and Internet bandwidth.
118
 
In all of these instances, Enron was attempting to both profit from and remove various 
risks associated with the physical material world through the use of symbolic 
manipulation.  
 The move was so striking that in 2000 and 2001 Skilling would describe Enron as 
an e-commerce company. However, try as they might, the company could never 
completely transcend the material world. For instance, even though Skilling clearly saw 
bandwidth trading as another “brain-intensive” venture at which the company would 
excel, it required the decidedly physical activity of laying fiber optic cable. Likewise, to 
facilitate its electricity trading capabilities, the company sought to build “peaking” power 
plants (gas-fired, of course) all over the country. As one BusinessWeek article pointed 
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out, this particular scheme amounted to bringing the logic of finance to the power 
business (in effect overcoding the material processes), but escape from the physical world 
and the promise of one where the mind could imagine anything was elusive.
119
 Still, as 
Enron, largely led by Jeff Skilling, sought to market itself as a new economy, a “brain-
intensive” business, the company engaged in processes of representing itself as such. 
 
THE NEW ECONOMY AS A CULTURAL PROJECT 
Significantly, the shift in rhetorical and representational modes coincided with a 
larger movement in U.S. business. The late 1990s, of course, witnessed a boom in 
information technologies leading to what many came to dub the “new economy.” 
Geographer Nigel Thrift points out that the “new economy” was in many ways a cultural 
project. For Thrift, the “new economy” was marked by the proliferation of various 
cultural outlets (what Thrift refers to as the “cultural circuit” of capitalism) including 
management consultants, business schools and magazines such as Fast Company and 
Business 2.0. Thrift argues that business organizations became “cultural entities” which 
attempted to “generate new traditions, new representations” of themselves “and the 
world.”
120
 Interestingly, Thrift also points to the role of rhetoric and visual style.  
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Perhaps surprisingly, given the company’s roots in the energy industry and 
Houston (far from the “new economy’s” epicenter in Northern California), Enron became 
a major participant in this decidedly cultural project.
121
 Enron’s immersion in “new 
economy” culture accelerated and highlighted changes in the company that had been well 
underway for years. In some ways, this should not be too surprising. Enron had long 
struggled to find some adequate way of representing itself to the world. With the arrival 
of the “new economy,” the company was supplied with a ready stock of tropes, images, 
and metaphors that it could use in describing its businesses. What is more, Enron’s 
increasing focus on the “entrepreneurial” work of its employees (a term that was also 
closely aligned with the idea of “innovation”) practically constituted a degree of cultural 
production. 
Because of these affinities, the language in Enron’s marketing literature began to 
resemble the rhetorical style of “new economy” writers like Kevin Kelly, who declared in 
his book, New Rules for the New Economy, “networks, enhanced and multiplied by 
technology, penetrate our lives so deeply that ‘network’ has become the central metaphor 
around which our thinking and economy are organized.”
122
 Kelly’s book was almost 
apocalyptic in the changes that it described. Through his ten maxims, such as “Embrace 
the Swarm,” “Let Go at the Top,” and “No Harmony, All Flux,” Kelly put forth a vision 
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of the world that was radically unstable. In Kelly’s telling, the “new economy” had 
ushered in an era of constant change. For Kelly himself, the changes were largely to be 
welcomed and celebrated (though there were moments in the book where the author 
appeared to worry about the ills these changes might sweep in). It was both Kelly’s vision 
and the language that he used to describe it that Thrift perhaps has in mind when 
discussing the tropes and metaphors of the new economy. However, some of what Kelly 
described in his book also had more direct implications for “brain-intensive businesses.” 
In New Rules for the New Economy, Kelly declared that the new economy favored 
“intangible things” and that “the world of intangibles, of media, of software and of 
services – will soon command the world of the hard – the world of reality, of atoms, of 
objects, of steel and oil….”
123
 Of course, for Kelly, the intangibles that were foremost in 
his own mind were that of computer code and small slivers of silicon. However, the 
author did not simply limit himself to these phenomena. Rather, Kelly took a broader 
view of the landscape he was describing, stating that “the new economy deals in wispy 
entities such as information, relationships, copyright, entertainment, securities, and 
derivatives.”
124
 Of course, this wider sense of the new economy could easily include the 
businesses Enron had been engaged in since the early 1990s. Kelly might as well have 
had the Houston company in mind when he declared that the “U.S. economy is already 
demassifying.”
125
 What is more, much like Skilling’s focus on the workers Enron wanted, 
as well as the idea of intelligence being at the center of Enron’s evolving business model, 










Kelly used the brain as one of his central tropes, at times referring to the “deep cortex of 
the new economy.”
126
 Yet even beyond the stylistic similarities that Kelly’s book had 
with the ways in which Enron chose to represent itself for the remainder of its existence, 
the writer also betrayed a specific political economic philosophy. As he put it when 
describing “swarm power,” the best type of governance would be “minimal.”
127
 Instead, 
Kelly recommended letting “the network of objects govern itself as much as possible; we 
add government where needed.”
128
 Still later, the author declared that “the best systems 
have this living quality of few rules and near chaos.”
129
 Of course, in these moments, 
Kelly was not explicitly making statements about the role of government in economic 
regulation. More often, Kelly was describing some technological idea or what he 
regarded as an ideal structure (or lack of structure) for an organization. Still, the subtext 
of a turbulent world that resisted too much control was clear. In these moments, the 




No wonder, then, that Enron would come to adopt the rhetoric and 
representational modes of the new economy. In effect, the concept was a euphoric 
celebration of chaos and instability, the same qualities which had, since natural gas 
deregulation and the Gas Bank’s success earlier in the decade been at the core of its 
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operations. Indeed, the company’s push for electricity deregulation and even water 
privatization in the developing world could also be seen as attempts to profit from 
instability and even create unstable environments. What is more, the new economy’s 
emphasis on immaterial labor (“intangible things”) meshed well with Skilling’s insistence 
that the company would focus on “brain intensive businesses.” In short, ideologically, 
Enron was at home in the new economy.
131
 The company increasingly engaged in a 
cultural project – celebrating many of the core values of the new economy, and the 
symbolic analyst as a cultural ideal. 
This shift was noticeable in the change in the visual imagery the company used in 
its marketing literature. For instance, the covers of the company’s last three annual 
reports (1998-2000) reflected the new style. Images of young symbolic analysts on the 
phone or standing in front of computers replaced those of power plants or pipelines 
comfortably nestled among rolling green fields and pastures. Depictions of such tangible 
objects were relegated with increasing regularity to smaller plots of real estate on the 
page. The interiors of the 1998 report were equally striking. For example, one photograph 
depicted Lay and Skilling (in ties, but not jackets – an indication of how informal the 
company’s style was becoming) standing in front of the middle of a room (probably a 
trading floor) with young symbolic analysts at work in front of computers. The series of 
clocks and monitors behind the two executives in the image clearly implied an 
informational environment. It was also in this annual report that the company began using 
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the word “network” to describe itself – an idea that was featured even more prominently 
in the following year’s report. 
For example, the 1999 cover featured four people in a blank space, standing 
inside a box with smooth white edges. The rest of the page featured several arcing, 
elliptical lines. This visual motif, meant to symbolize the company’s “networks” 
connecting material assets and immaterial symbolic analysts across space and time, was 
persistent throughout the report. 
Similarly, the 2000 report’s cover also featured boxes with rounded edges. 
However, rather than a single box framing a specific image, each group of boxes had the 
effect of breaking up an image (usually a person) – as if that being were spread across 
several computer screens. The move itself was striking. The predominant visual imagery 
Enron was now using was comprised almost wholly of metaphors (when nodding towards 
representation) or entirely abstract, nonrepresentational design. This new visual style was 
a far cry from the trope of environmental stewardship that punctuated the company’s 
print presence in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
The change was equally dramatic in the company’s rhetoric. In linguistic echoes 
of the new graphic design, the 1999 and 2000 annual reports repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of “networks,” “innovation” and “creativity.” These terms were all direct 
parallels of the stock metaphors and “rhetorical flourishes” that Thrift identifies 




were responses to “a more turbulent and uncertain and insecure world.”
132
 Taken 
together, they were “based on the notion of constant adaptive movement.”
133
 In Enron’s 
case, they were full-throated endorsements of an unstable world. Rather than explain 
physical processes as it had in the past, the company was now emphasizing values such 
as “innovative” and “creativity.” Paradoxically, this shift exacerbated some of the 
problems of language and representation that had dogged the company since the creation 
of the Gas Bank. 
In a sharp contrast to the earlier letters to shareholders in the company’s annual 
reports, the 1999 letter’s tone became declarative and confrontational. After a few vague 
paragraphs about the nature of “networks,” the document launched into wild declarations 
about a “new economy,” proclaiming: “the rules have changed dramatically. What you 
own is not as important as what you know. Hard-wired businesses, such as energy and 
communications, have turned into knowledge-based industries that place a premium on 
creativity.”
134
 Here, many of the rhetorical motifs of the “new economy” were present, 
especially the idea of constant movement. Interestingly, here, that movement caused 
language to fail. The company, it seems, was beyond meaning.
135
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However, instead of worrying about the vagueness of language, the company 
found a unique solution, celebrating the inadequacy of language in describing what the 
company had become. As the 1999 Letter to Shareholders declared: “Enron is moving so 
fast that sometimes others have trouble defining us. But we know who we are. We are 
clearly a knowledge-based company….”
136
 Rather than regarding this “trouble” as an 
embarrassment, the document’s authors now seemed to disdain any readers who were 
confused about the company. Indeed, the assertion “we know who we are” was 
aggressive. Yet simultaneously, the passage was shot through with traces of the former 
handwringing and ambiguity. The statement: “we are clearly a knowledge-based 
company” was surely meant to convey the same contempt for misunderstanding readers. 
Yet the word “clearly” could also be read as a false bravado. Perhaps the company wasn’t 
so sure what it was.  
This same sense of flux and fluidity was clear in Enron’s self-definition in 2001. 
No longer a “vertically integrated clean energy company,” as it saw itself in the early 
1990s, the company was now an assemblage of “flexible networks” that could “deliver 
physical products at predictable prices.”
137
 “With our networks,” the company declared, 
“we can significantly expand our existing businesses while extending our services to new 
markets with enormous potential for growth.”
138
  Indeed, in the last year of the 
                                                 
136
 Enron, "Enron Annual Report 1999," (1999), 2. Indeed, the vague language would even prove to be a 
point of consternation for skeptical journalists. Fortune writer Bethany McLean would point to Enron’s 
opaque language in a critical article on the company. See Bethany McLean, "Is Enron Overpriced?," 
Fortune, March 5, 2001, 122-126, 123. 
137






company’s existence, Enron’s Letter to Shareholders reflected on the ways in which it 
had changed, stating, “We have metamorphosed from an asset-based pipeline and power 
generating company to a marketing and logistics company whose biggest assets are its 
well-established business approach and its innovative people.”
139
 Strikingly, the 
company’s letter emphasized an “approach” to business and a specific type of employee 
– the symbolic analyst. It was as if the company was sweeping away the last vestiges of 
the material world.  
The company even renamed the pipeline division. It was now called “Enron 
Transportation Services” to reflect “a cultural shift to add more innovative customer 
services to our efficient pipeline approach.”
140
 Here, the linguistic substitutions 
emphasized nebulous ideals (“innovative customer services”) over specific material 
processes. It is, of course, also significant that the letter described the change as a 
“cultural shift.” While this phrase referred to the company’s internal culture, it could 
easily have applied to the ways in which Enron was presenting itself to the outside world. 
While such name changes might not seem to have all that much import, in fact they 
indicated substantial ideological shifts happening within the company. As an Enron 
Business article put it, Enron Transportation Services now wanted “to be driven by 
customer needs and market demands, rather than the dictates of energy regulators.”
141
 Yet 
the name was, according to that business unit’s CEO, also meant to indicate a “renewed 
emphasis on being responsive to customer needs by moving faster, offering new products 
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and services and becoming more competitive.”
142
 Here, one could find a free market 
ethos (as evinced by the article’s hostility to “the dictates of energy regulators”), a move 
away from specific language, and a celebration of fast change and movement. 
Throughout these last years, in internal communications and external marketing efforts, 
Enron increasingly celebrated a world that was both immaterial and unstable. 
 
CULTURE WITHIN –CULTURE WITHOUT 
As Enron sought to enter the culture at large, the firm had a dual task. 
Understandably, even before Skilling’s arrival the company had been concerned about its 
corporate culture. However, in the late 1990s, the emphasis on Enron’s internal culture 
became far more prominent. Through a variety of outlets, the company trumpeted the 
“symbolic analyst” and the qualities he or she would possess. In particular, the company 
began envisioning the ideal Enron employee as “entrepreneurial,” “creative” and 
“innovative,” as well as risk-taking. Both internally and externally, the company 
aggressively promoted the idea.  
For example, in 2001, Enron Business began running a series of features about 
employees with unusual, risky pastimes. Titled “Extreme Enron,” the series told the 
stories of customer service directors who “encountered alligators that jumped as high as 
their heads, black bears that weighed in at 500 pounds,” as well as “countless water 






moccasins and panthers,” while searching for wild orchids during their vacations.
143
 
According to Sarah Palmer, the article’s author, other Enron employees spent their free 
time as hydroplane racers, mountain climbers, or, in the case of John Neslage, an “all—
around extremer.”
144
 However, these were hardly fluff pieces. On the contrary, these 
features were meant to show that “risk taking is an innate characteristic of Enron 
employees.”
145
 Later, books about Enron pointed to some of the dangerous trips that Jeff 
Skilling and other employees liked to take, often to ridicule the absurdity of the 
undertakings. Here, however, there was seriousness behind the “Extreme Enron” features. 
The company was promoting “risk taking” as a value. While Enron had a fraught 
relationship with risk (seeing it as both an opportunity and a threat), here, the idea that 
symbolic analysts would be risk takers was meant to be a positive value. As Caitlin 
Zaloom suggests, risk is practically an existential concern for financial traders, since they 
“manipulate risk to manage their identities and establish status in the eyes of their rivals. 
These practices encourage the production of subjects who can sustain themselves under 
high-stakes conditions and thereby draw profit from economic risk.”
146
 What is more, 
Zaloom argues that “the ascetic practices and social displays of virtue enacted” reflect “a 
capitalist ethic that centers on the mastery of the self under conditions of hazard and 
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 In other words, Enron Business articles like the “Extreme Enron” features 
were attempts to fashion subjects that would prove economically productive. 
At other points, Enron Business emphasized intellectual pretensions, specifically 
highlighting “innovation” as a value. An article titled “ECT Employees Innovate to 
Change the World,” for instance, pointed to a “campaign” to demonstrate that business 
unit’s commitment to the idea. The campaign was “designed to inspire ECT employees to 
even greater heights of creativity.”
148
 According to the article, the campaign featured 
“quotes from famous innovators” that included Frank Lloyd Wright, George Bernard 
Shaw, James Joyce and Albert Einstein. In events such as this, Enron was not only 
promoting the idea of innovation and creativity, but also aligning these ideals with high 
culture and intellectualism. Interestingly, many of these same ideas and values later 
appeared in the company’s external marketing.  
However, even as the company introduced a new advertising campaign in 2000, 
largely based on these values and the idea of both “innovation” and symbolic analysis, 
Enron still faced the problem of communicating what it was it actually did. In a 2000 
article in Enron Business on its ad campaign, the author opened with the problem of 
representation. As the author put it, “How do you describe a company like Enron?”
149
 
Interestingly, the company’s ad agency interviewed “Enron’s leading thinkers” about the 
company.
150
 Such references to “leading thinkers” and the like reflected the company’s 
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move towards operating in “brain-intensive businesses” and “intellectual capital.” The 
implication behind such sentiments again pointed to the company’s emphasis on the 
intellect. The symbolic analyst was center stage in the company’s mode of representing 
itself, and, increasingly, Enron sought to align specific political-economic ideals with a 
sense of intellectualism and “high culture.” This attempt at fusing the two was evident 
throughout the article discussing the company’s new advertising campaign.  
The campaign’s title and motif even reflected this shift. Titled “Ask Why?,” the 
message of the campaign was meant to be “as different and challenging as Enron 
itself.”
151
 The commercials themselves were often bizarre, perhaps a byproduct of the 
problems of visually representing “brain-intensive” work. In one commercial, a figure in 
a metal business suit wandered different parts of the world. The man, obviously 
encumbered by the suit (vaguely recalling the Tin Man in The Wizard of Oz), slowly 
moved through a series of spaces, such as busy street corners in cities like New York. 
The quick, frenetic movement around him offered a striking contrast to his slow, 
awkward gait. Periodically, an audible phrase would break away from a din of 
background chatter. As one voice (before cutting over to a close up of an older man with 
a serious visage) intoned: “We inherent some ideas that are unnecessary. We have to 
jettison that excess baggage in order to make progress.”
152
 After a few more seconds 
another voice declared, “People who have really creative ideas are people who keep 
asking ‘why?’” as the man in the cumbersome metal suit lumbered through other global, 
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 The final shot was a black screen with the words “ask why?” 
below the Enron logo. The Enron Business article explained to employees that the “the 
man in metal serves as a metaphor for the conventional constraints that block change.”
154
 
Another commercial that specifically promoted EnronOnline featured a mishmash 
of “realist” representation (various traders yelling “buy” and “sell” into phones) with 
metaphorical images such as three men in business suits wearing mouse-head masks 
moving slowly with seeing eye dogs and tapping sticks. In another scene in the 
commercial, a room full of symbolic analysts at computer desks all stood up on them, 
somewhat defiantly (even if the message itself was unclear). Throughout, Jeff Skilling’s 
voice could be heard over the entire commercial extolling the virtue of EnronOnline as a 




Perhaps the most direct commercial from the campaign was literally about the 
word “why,” which the voice-over proclaimed “was the voice of the nonconformist.”
156
 
Throughout, the television spot cut among a series of exciting, somewhat unrelated 
images, such as a space shuttle taking off, a statue of Gandhi, a photograph of Abraham 
Lincoln, a civil rights march, clips from other Enron commercials, and close ups of 
various people (including some children). The final image before the black “ask why” 
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screen was a Frank Gehry-designed Nationale-Nederlanden building in Prague. The 
building, which is also known as “Ginger and Fred” because its form suggests that it is 
“dancing” with the buildings around it, was a particularly striking image. In these 
commercials, Enron collapsed various strains together to come up with an exciting (if 
confusing) representation of specific ideological values. Here, of course, Enron was 
highlighting its own intellectual pretensions, aligning itself with “nonconformity” and a 
specific type of radicalism. Throughout the ad campaign, declarations that older ideas 
sometimes had to be “jettisoned” positioned the company as forward thinking. As the 
Enron Business article explained, the commercials were meant to “communicate the spirit 
of Enron, the drive that distinguishes it from every other energy company, indeed almost 
any other company in existence.”
157
  
Significantly, the commercials did not primarily emphasize specific services 
(though some, including the one for EnronOnline and another for weather derivatives, 
did), but rather a set of ideas and values. Much like the problems that the company had 
had since the introduction of the Gas Bank, it was difficult to communicate, name or 
otherwise represent what it was Enron actually did. Indeed, the Enron Business article did 
not attempt to correct this, but emphasized values, such as “innovation” and “creativity.” 
When the article’s author did discuss what it was that set Enron apart from every other 
company, it was not some specific service or even expertise, but “Enron’s restless 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and its ability to quickly grasp how most things can 
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 The article also noted that, in screening the campaign for 
executives that commercials appealed to them “intellectually” – another nod to the 
company’s commitment to “brain work.”
159
 Ultimately, the company’s hope was that the 
phrase “ask why” would “become the rallying cry of a new generation of business.”
160
 
Much like the visual and rhetorical style found in the late 1990s annual reports, these 
commercials were a part of what historian Eric Guthey calls “New Economy 
Romanticism,” which echoes “the very familiar narrative of American exceptionalism, 
which also celebrates the notion that radically atomistic individuals can achieve a clean 




These same ideas also found their way into other outlets. Just as the primary “Ask 
Why” television ad used the image of a Frank Gehry building, in 2001 Enron became a 
corporate patron of a Gehry retrospective at the Guggenheim museum in New York. 
While such arrangements are often typical for corporations (indeed, Hugo Boss was 
another exhibit sponsor), Enron’s approach clearly indicated an attempt to align itself 
with Gehry’s work. In a brief note in the exhibition book, Skilling wrote: “Enron shares 
Mr. Gehry’s ongoing search for the ‘moment of truth’ – the moment when the functional 
approach to a problem becomes infused with the artistry that provides a truly innovative 
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 In both the television commercials and Skilling’s comparison of his 
company to Gehry’s work, the company was conflating its own ideological commitment 
to “innovation” as well as “brain work” with high culture and intellectual dissent.  
However, the values expressed in these moments were not that far from ideas the 
company had touted for years. In the vision that Enron was offering, the ideas of 
nonconformity and intellectualism – of asking why – were ideologically connected to 
ideas of entrepreneurialism and creative destruction. Indeed, “innovative” had been a 
word that the company had used for years to describe itself, its employees and businesses, 
but now it truly celebrated the idea. The company was practically giddy when Fortune 
magazine continued to list it as the most “innovative” company in the United States. 
Indeed, throughout the late 1990s, Fortune remained one of Enron’s biggest 
supporters, repeatedly pointing to (and approving of) the company’s “innovative” culture 
and strategy. The first of these articles appeared in the magazine’s March 3, 1997 
“Secrets of America’s Most Admired Corporations: New Ideas, New Products” section. 
Though Enron was only one of the many businesses the article highlighted, the article’s 
author called attention to how much the company had changed over the course of the 
decade. What is more, the story’s treatment of the company firmly reflected the values of 
the “new economy.” Even Rich Kinder (who was later treated as a symbol of the steady 
world of the old pipeline industry) was quoted as saying that a good idea could, “like a 
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lighted match, easily [be] blown out by the cold winds of rigid management.”
163
 Such 
quotations offered direct reflections of what Guthey calls the “antimanagerial” rhetoric of 
the new economy. A bit later, Brian O’Reilly, the article’s author, attributed a good deal 
of Enron’s success to Ken Lay’s early efforts at deregulation in the natural gas 
industry.
164
 As O’Reilly put it, thumbing his nose at “the geniuses in Washington and in 
the utility businesses, Enron (presumably under Lay’s direction) “hired aggressive, well-
compensated traders and almost single-handedly began creating spot markets in gas.”
165
 
In this way, O’Reilly’s piece revealed the political-economic logic of the new economy 
and how well Enron fit in with this narrative. An absence of government oversight (the 
“geniuses” remark was dripping in sarcasm), as well as a staff of symbolic analysts who 
were given free reign, were uniformly positive developments. Still, the story did not 
completely ignore that material world. The accompanying image was a photograph of an 
Enron power plant under construction in China. Finally, O’Reilly established what would 
be a recurring theme in Fortune’s Enron coverage for the remainder of the twentieth 
century – pointing to the company’s rising stock price as evidence of its success.
166
 
The next time the publication dedicated a substantial amount of space to the 
company was just over a year later. Significantly, while Jeff Skilling did not receive 
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mention in O’Reilly’s article, this time journalist Erin Davies began her piece with the 
executive’s name.
167
 In some ways, Davies’s article was a curious mix in terms of 
defining the company. After noting some of the company’s recent financial woes (Enron 
reported over half a billion dollars in losses in the second quarter of 1997), Davies 
reasoned, “there are good reasons to take post-1997 Enron seriously.”
168
 Again 
highlighting the company’s commitment to “innovation” (particularly when discussing 
the firm’s trading operations), Davies hailed the company for creating “new businesses 
such as electricity trading, in which kilowatts are bought and sold like pork bellies.”
169
 
While this statement, coming at the end of the article, gestured toward the immaterial 
production and economic activity that increasingly defined the company’s operations, 
Davies still began her piece by referring to Enron as “the world’s leading integrated 
natural-gas and electricity giant,” calling to mind the company’s marketing strategy from 
the early 1990s.
170
 At least in terms of the business press, Enron was still at a crossroads 
and was, on some level, still defined by its vast pipeline network and cogeneration plants.  
By 2000, however, the company had become far more associated with the “new 
economy” (due in no small part to its own marketing and branding efforts). An 
illustration of this can be found in the January 24, 2000, issue of Fortune. The editors ran 
a story titled “Enron Takes Its Pipeline to the Net.” Significantly, the magazine placed the 
article in the “e-company” section. While the immediate occasion for the story was the 
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company’s (ultimately unsuccessful) foray into Internet bandwidth trading, the article 
called attention to Enron’s now-long-held “most innovative” designation. In an issue 
where many of the ads were firmly in what might be termed the “new economy style,” a 
story about a pipeline company moving into increasingly immaterial and ethereal 
businesses fit right in. The writer, David Kirkpatrick, called attention to some 
“entrepreneurial” people inside the company, as well as to Enron’s stock performance. 
Fortune repeated these themes in other articles that ran throughout the year.  
One in particular, “Taking Risk to the Marketplace,” took up the problem of 
protecting a “knowledge asset.”
171
 Given his emphasis on “brain intensive businesses,” it 
is fitting that Jeff Skilling emerged as the article’s centerpiece. A photograph of the 
executive featured him causally sitting on a desk with computers in the background, 
again implying the informational environment. In this piece the author, Thomas Stewart, 
focused on Skilling’s strategies for handling symbolic analysts. As Stewart saw it, Enron 
(under Skilling’s direction) had created a “flexible internal labor market” by rotating 
people without changing titles or salaries.
172
 In describing how “intellectual risks can be 
securitized – at least metaphorically – and managed as part of a portfolio,” both Skilling 
and Stewart revealed the basic ideological assumption underpinning the new economy, as 
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Finally, just a month later, Brian O’Reilly, again writing for Fortune, revealed 
how complete Enron’s image had transformed. In an article that later rankled the liberal 
journalist and cultural critic Thomas Frank (for comparing Enron to Elvis), O’Reilly used 
clichéd new economy terms such as “agent of change” and described the company’s 
stock performance as “Nasdaq-like.”
174
As these articles suggest, by the end of the 
century, Enron had succeeded in transforming its corporate image, at least in the business 
press. No longer a natural gas or pipeline company, Enron was, by 2000, associated with 
symbolic manipulation (as evidenced by a recurring visual motif of scores of young 
office workers sitting at computers), new economy speed and movement, as well as with 
deregulation and free markets. Terms such as “innovative,” which Enron had long used to 
describe itself, regularly appeared in business stories about the company. 
 
NEW ECONOMY MEDIA COVERAGE 
 Nor was this revamped image particular to Fortune. Other business journalists 
also began treating the company as if it were a “new economy” firm and often in terms 
that mimicked the company’s own marketing literature. BusinessWeek, for example, 
began including the company in “E.Biz” inserts in 2000 and 2001. One such 2001 article 
featured a photograph of Jeff Skilling sitting in front of Enron Tower. The executive’s 
golf shirt and jeans were a far cry from the formal suit he had preferred in earlier 
photographs. In language that mimicked Enron’s self-presentation, the author, Wendy 
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Zellner, described Skilling as “restless.”
175
 Even the article’s title, “From Sleepy Utility 
to Online Turbotrader,” suggested the rapid movement and flux that Enron (picking up 
from other “new economy” sources) had trumpeted in recent years. Just a year later, 
again as part of the “E.Biz” section, Zellner proclaimed that the culture Skilling had 
instilled at Enron was “perfectly suited to the Internet Age.”
176
 Once more, the article’s 
title, “Enron Electrified,” called to mind the excitement and instability of the “new 
economy.”
177
 While articles such as the two Zellner wrote occasionally pointed to some 
of the risks the company was taking (particularly the idea that Enron was moving so far 
afield from its origins in natural gas), they were primarily laudatory features offering 
little criticism. 
The visual imagery in these publications also bolstered the image the company had 
been using with increasing regularity throughout the 1990s. For example, in 2001, after the 
California energy crisis, BusinessWeek ran a cover story on the company discussing the 
issue and the fallout. While the debacle itself was still a hotly debated and controversial 
topic, the cover’s graphic offered a stunning visual representation of the company’s 
rhetoric of immateriality. Skilling loomed large in this image. Dressed in a black 
turtleneck, the executive appeared to channel the look of either a brooding intellectual or, 
perhaps, Apple founder Steve Jobs (another executive with intellectual pretensions). The 
figure extended his arm out towards the viewer, his palm open, revealing a small ball of 
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energy in his hand. This was hardly a celebration of the material, industrial processes that 
went into powering California’s electricity grid. Rather, it was Skilling the intellectual who 
held the power in his hand. 
 Still, these were business publications and, to large degree, Enron only became a 
nationally recognized name when it fell from grace. However, there were brief moments 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the company found a more general audience. 
While some stories, such as one in Newsweek in 1998, emphasized the company’s 
environmental image, others also picked up on the corporation’s attempt to rebrand itself 
as a new economy entity. In a 2000 story in Time magazine, journalist Frank Gibney Jr. 
described Enron as “a company that thrives on entrepreneurial defiance of convention” 
and characterized the Gas Bank as a stunning example of “business judo.”
178
 While, like 
many journalists, Gibney hedged somewhat, pointing out some of the risks the company 
was taking, as well as criticisms others had levied against it, his tone was generally 
positive. As Gibney put it, Enron was pushing ahead while “so many old-economy 
companies” appeared “helpless against the dizzying pace and technology of the digital 
age.”
179
 Gibney’s writing mirrored the image Enron had cultivated through its own 
marketing efforts. 
 By early 2001, Enron had, to a degree, succeeded in making itself a recognizable 
name with a specific image. The company, when it did appear in media coverage, was 
closely associated not with the power business (indeed, for journalists, the company’s 
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origins were primarily remarkable for the distance the company had traveled over the 
course of fifteen years), but with symbolic analysis and a turbulent, exciting world of new 
technologies. More than just a company, Enron, through its rhetoric, marketing and visual 
imagery had become a cultural celebrant of a world that was, while wild and unsettled, 
also full of promise. Indeed, the company’s slogan from 2001, “ask why,” suggested a 
new world in which brains and clever thinking could supersede the constraints of the old 
natural, material world. Of course, there were casualties in this formulation. The 
company’s longstanding (if self-serving) commitment to environmental stewardship was 
largely forgotten. What is more, the company actually relished the disruptive “creative 
destruction” that was implied by an entrepreneurial ethos and a commitment to 
“innovation.” Yet as thrilling and breathless as descriptions of the new economy were, 
the anxiety of a turbulent world and a style of work that could not produce anything 
tangible was always present in the same representations. Indeed, Enron had become so 
successful in aligning itself with these ideals that when the company collapsed in late 
2001, it would become the focal point for a wave of cultural production that seemed to 
protest these very same values. What is more, there was an inherent contradiction at the 
heart of the informational economy that Enron had involved itself in; while the company 
was dedicated to immaterial “brain-intensive” symbolic analysis, it could not avoid the 
“capital-intensive” and years’ long project of transforming Houston into a place in which 
symbolic analysts would thrive, and the company’s dedication to a neoliberal project and 




United States, linking both immaterial, informational work to material, tangible spaces 









“JUST THE BOOST DOWNTOWN HOUSTON NEEDED” – GEOGRAPHIC 
CHANGE AND THE INFORMATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
The idea that all of Enron’s abstract, symbolic analysis represented a move away 
from the material world was inherently contradictory. Despite the company’s rhetoric, 
Enron’s activities always had an intensely material component. Enron operated its 
pipelines right up until the end of its existence, and it engaged in numerous overseas 
development projects throughout the 1990s. In fact, the “brain intensive businesses” that 
excited Skilling, as well as the informational economy in general were always connected 
to the material world. As geographer Doreen Massey notes, cyberspace is not some 
region that is wholly disconnected from geographic place. Instead, for Massey,  
tales of cyberspace are belied by its own, very material, necessities. The 
devaluation of space and place which runs through this [cyberspace] literature is 
one aspect of a general shift by which “information” has been conceptualized as 
disembodied from materiality, one implication of which has been “a systematic 




However, as Massey notes: “The virtuality of cyberspace has its roots very firmly planted 
in the ground.”
2
 More specifically, any connection in cyberspace has “roots” in (at least) 
two different locations. This inescapable fact also means big changes for those locations. 
As early as 1989, Manuel Castells called attention to transformations required of social 
space to create a palatable “milieu” for knowledge work.
3
 Likewise, Massey argues that 
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“Just as the groundedness of virtuality ties it to a specific location so too spaces and 
places are altered in their physicality and in their meaning through their embeddedness in 
networks of communication. The ‘virtual’ world depends on and further configures the 
multiplicities of physical space.”
4
 These connections between immaterial, abstract 
symbolic manipulation and the material world, as well as the connections among places 
through cyberspace are crucial frameworks for understanding the profound spatial 
ramifications of Enron’s business operations beginning in the late 1990s. 
Ironically, at the very moment Enron was disavowing the material world, the 
company was forced into paying close attention to, as well as encouraging, geographic 
difference and transformation. Viewing the ways in which Enron’s “brain intensive 
businesses” affected different spaces around the country (and world) brings to light the 
contradiction in the supposed split between information and the material world. Enron’s 
neoliberal commitment to free markets, a prerequisite for the company’s shift towards 
symbolic analysis in the 1990s, necessitated geographic change. The company was 
literally trying to construct a wider space that gave its symbolic analysts the room they 
needed to perform their work. This preoccupation with space was evident in the 
company’s support of globalization as an economic ideal, its lobbying for domestic 
deregulation in individual states, and, finally, its attempts to refashion Houston’s 
downtown business district. 
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GLOBALIZATION AS SPATIAL MANIFESTO 
For a company that dealt increasingly in paper contracts, Enron also had to foster 
a deep sense of place in various spots around the country. However, such attention to 
specific locations was intended to be a stepping stone to far grander ambitions. 
Ultimately, the company’s vision was of a business environment in the United States that 
would be analogous to the market privatization it was encouraging abroad. In this 
manner, Enron’s activities can be seen as part of a wider neoliberal movement in the 
1990s which appeared under the popular term “globalization.” However, Enron was not 
simply using a business buzzword. The enthusiasm for economic globalization revealed 
the company’s “geographic imagination.” Throughout the 1990s, Ken Lay and Enron 
advocated for the homogenization the economic environments of different geographic 
locations throughout the world. As an examination of the company’s pronouncements 
about globalization reveal, geography was central to the company’s business strategies in 
a number of ways.  
 A commitment to neoliberalism was long a part of Enron’s world view. This 
vision of economic globalization was important enough to the company that a story on 
the World Trade Organization’s 1999 Seattle meeting Enron Business was labeled as an 
“Employee Suggested Article.”
5
 In Seattle, Lay described his “vision” of a “global 
economic future in which companies like Enron” would “compete in a ‘transparent’ free 
marketplace of goods, services and ideas, promising significant benefits to billions of 
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people around the globe.”
6
 The article, which called for “grass-roots support from Enron 
employees” in “dealing with Congress on trade matters,” expressed dismay over 
“barriers, subtle and overt, that restrict the free flow of services between providers like 
Enron and the nations that need and want them.”
7
 The article’s author called attention to 
the company’s involvement in trade reform so the world could be refashioned as a “level 
playing field on which companies can compete fairly.”
8
 Though Enron’s concerns were 
mostly about energy services, articles such as this one made it clear that Lay considered 
his company to be part of a “global trade agenda.”
9
 This stance meant that Enron and its 
managers would have to become increasingly involved in a political-economic project of 
policy reform. Lay himself, it appeared, never missed an opportunity to promote this 
“global trade agenda.” In a 1997 letter to Texas governor George W. Bush, the CEO 
wrote that he and his wife “attend the World Economic Forum most years.”
10
 At one 
point, Lay even went so far as to send Bush an article by The New York Times columnist 
Thomas Friedman about globalization. Lay’s enthusiasm for economic liberalization 
permeated the company. This commitment to globalization was so extensive that in April 
1999, the company’s Government Affairs department announced it would request 
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employees’ help in contacting “congressional representatives in support of specific trade 
issues as they arise.”
11
  
That same month, Lay sent a letter to each member of Congress supporting a host 
of international issues such as funding OPIC (The Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation) and the Ex-Im (Export-Import) Bank (both of which had benefited the 
company for years), as well as normalizing trade relations with China since the company 
believed “engagement in China, both commercial and diplomatic, is the most effective 
way for the U.S. to promote continued growth towards democratic ideals and free-market 
principles in China.”
12
 Interestingly, though Lay opened his letter by describing Enron as 
a “leading global energy company,” he also wrote that the company looked “forward to 
working with [the Congress] on domestic legislative issues important to Enron, including 
electricity restructuring, water issues, Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC) 
reauthorization, bankruptcy reform, trade and tax policy.”
13
 Significantly, the sentence 
linked the company’s overseas activities to its domestic business operations. Similarly, in 
1999, when Enron Business listed the Government Affairs group’s accomplishments, it 
included the “accelerated opening of the Pennsylvania market” and “significant progress 
of deregulation legislation in Texas, Ohio, Maryland, New Jersey and Nevada” alongside 
the “lifting of sanctions against India and Pakistan” and the “re-authorization of the U.S. 
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In these statements, Lay and the writers of Enron Business implied an ideal, 
economically unified world that allowed capital and trade to flow across wide spaces 
without hindrance. Lay’s vision, though, was hardly unique. Rather, the executive’s 
views were fairly standard for proponents of neoliberalism. As some geographers have 
noted, neoliberal advocates have always viewed “the world of market rules as a state of 
nature.”
15
 The idea of the market as a natural state also works to deemphasize geographic 
variation, since advocates see the market as working “according to immutable laws no 
matter where they are ‘unleashed.’”
16
 Given the ideology of a natural free market with 
universal laws, for a figure like Ken Lay it would make perfect sense that domestic 
deregulation should mirror international economic liberalization. For geographers Neil 




For optimists like Lay, the utopia of a thoroughly neoliberalized world (and 
nation) was all but inevitable – an attitude that informed the company’s Letter to 
Shareholders in its 1996 annual report.
18
 The letter’s tone was rapturous, offering a near-
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apocalyptic discussion of deregulation that bore many of the rhetorical and formal 
features of a manifesto. The literary critic Janet Lyons defines a manifesto as “draw[ing] 
from its constitutive discourses, which include, among others, the discourses of religious 
prophecy and chiliasm (or millennialism); the martial language of war or siege; and the 
forensic mode of persuasive rhetoric.”
19
 All these qualities could be found in Enron’s 
letter from 1996. After a few perfunctory paragraphs, the letter read: “In North America, 
the movement to deregulate the gas and electric utilities has begun. Deregulation is 
coming, inevitably and day by day.”
20
 From this point forward, the document’s author 
predicted that deregulation would be an ultimately benevolent force of creative 
destruction. The author wrote that “monopolies will be broken up – new markets will be 
liberated – and consumers will be able to reap benefits so big that they will actually 
improve the quality of life of individuals here and around the globe.”
21
 The author even 
referred to deregulation as “the force of the future,” endowing it with a terrible 
grandeur.
22
 Likewise, martial overtones could be found in statements such as: “In the 
U.S. we are moving forward in a state by state advance to support deregulation and 
quicken its pace.”
23
 Here, through the use of the militaristic language of an advancing 
army, Enron admitted its own actions in favor of deregulation, but also positioned that 
deregulation as inevitable. In addition to the combination of militaristic language and the 
more typical rhetoric of free markets, the last two paragraphs revealed the corporation’s 
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global view and ambition. Towards the letter’s end, its author declared, “In the industrial 
nations we continue to seize opportunities,” while announcing in the subsequent 
paragraph, “In the developing world we continue to move as markets open – and we 
continue to open them.”
24
 Much like the letter to Congress and Enron Business article 
from 1999, these two sentences linked the entire globe together in a single neoliberal 
project.  
The manifesto form was fitting. As Lyons notes, the genre expresses an 
unrealized vision, just as neoliberalism is always presented as an unrealized state. As 
Brenner and Theodore point out, there is a split between the neoliberal ideal of a smooth 
space that capital can flow through, and what they term “actually existing 
neoliberalism.”
25
 Brenner and Theodore argue that neoliberalized space resembles more 
of a patchwork of regulatory regimes than it does a space with a smooth, uniform 
character. Rather, they emphasize “the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal 
restructuring projects insofar as they have been produced within national, regional, and 
local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks” and highlight 
the “contextually specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and 
emergent neoliberal, market-oriented restructuring projects at a broad range of 
geographical scales.”
26
 From Lay’s public pronouncements, to the pages of Enron 
Business and the 1996 letter, such rhetoric was intended to smooth over these spatial 
realities – such as the need to court states individually.  
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This rhetorical fix, however, was only partially successful. Interestingly, cracks in 
Enron’s neoliberal rhetoric were always present. Specifically, an implicit threat of violent 
disruption lurked just beneath the sunny lines about freedom and choice. These 
competing impulses were produced by neoliberalism’s unfinished quality. In pursuit of 
the utopian, natural state of a world united by a single unregulated and free market, the 
company had to grudgingly acknowledge (and exploit) geographic difference – a 
contradiction that was most visible in Enron’s efforts in the 1990s at electricity 
deregulation in the United States.  
 
MAPS AND MILTARY CAMPAIGNS 
At least internally, the company’s rhetoric reflected the militaristic undertones of 
the 1996 letter. Gaynell Dochne’s Enron Business article detailing the company’s 
lobbying efforts on Capital Hill in 1996, “Enron Battles for Competition in Retail Power 
Market,” offered a striking example. Aligning itself with lobbying organizations such as 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and libertarian think tanks such as 
the Cato Institute, which supported free markets, Enron was, Dochne declared, in the 
“thick of the fight” in a “massive public relations and legislative battle” to “bring 
competition to the U.S. retail market for electricity, one of the last great monopolies.”
27
 
Displaying the sort of ardent faith in free markets Ken Lay had long held, Dochne quoted 
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Rob Bradley, an Enron employee, as saying: “The truth is on our side. The airline, 
trucking, railroad, natural gas and telecommunications industries already have been 
significantly restructured. As a result, prices have come down considerably for 
consumers, and we all stand to gain even more from electric restructuring.”
28
 Still, 
despite the story’s enthusiastic tone, Dochne noted the “battle” was “being fought on 
several fronts,” including both the federal and state levels.
29
 As one Enron executive 
noted, Enron (as well as its lobbying allies) would have to work on a “state-by-state 
basis.”
30
 Such comments pointed to the local work that would have to be involved in 
achieving the grand vision that Lay had put forward.  
Though in 1999 Steve Kean declared his Government Affairs unit “activists who 
drive change,” it would be a long fight for Enron Energy Services, the company’s 
electricity service department (which was headed by Lou Pai – later an infamous 
character in published Enron narratives).
31
 Even two years later, Enron Business was 
declaring that while Enron Energy Services had a “a national franchise in place,” it still 
had to “battl[e] state legislatures to open their markets to competition” so the business 
unit could create  “innovative products and services” for the “North American 
marketplace.”
32
 Significantly, in these instances, the rhetoric – “innovation” in particular 
– was the same Enron used when discussing its “brain intensive businesses.” This was 
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not for lack of a dictionary; Enron’s commitment to globalization and domestic neoliberal 
restructuring was meant to create an environment that would allow the company’s 
symbolic analysts to work unimpeded.  
In practical terms, this meant that throughout the late 1990s, Enron paid close 
attention to U.S. geography, a preoccupation that was evident throughout the pages of 
Enron Business. Articles about the status and pace of electric utility restructuring 
routinely featured maps revealing which states were moving toward deregulation, and 
even what level of deregulation that state was adopting. Such images gave the lie to the 
rhetoric of immanent and uniform change, instead echoing Brenner and Theodore’s point 
about the stop and go, spatially mixed reality of neoliberalism. Still, articles 
accompanying the maps implied a definitive movement toward Enron’s ultimate vision.  
In 1997, an article in Enron Business, “Beyond Electric Restructuring,” 
encapsulated these tensions. As to be expected, the article was largely triumphant, with 
author Teresa Hurst noting: “As restructuring and consumer choice move closer to 
reality, the electric power industry is poised for an explosion in innovative technology 
and services. Competition is expected to transform the power industry much the same 
way it has revolutionized the telecommunications business.”
33
 Interestingly, Hurst chose 
to refer to electric utilities en masse as “the nation’s last great monopoly.”
34
 Hurst also 
quoted Steve Kean (head of the company’s government affairs team) as saying, “the 
debate has already shifted from ‘if’ deregulation will occur to ‘when.’ And we’re now 
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Still, while this was heady stuff, Hurst and Kean could not ignore the split 
between vision and reality throughout the article. As Kean pointed out, from the 
company’s perspective, federal legislation was far more desirable, since “it would avert 
the creation of a ‘patchwork’ of systems that most likely will occur if the states 
implement retail choice without guidance from the federal government.”
36
 This same 
goal, of national unified space for electricity (and capital) was also reflected in a bill that 
“recognize[d] that electricity is interstate commerce – the nation is connected by an 
electricity grid that knows no state boundaries.”
37
 Elsewhere, Hurst’s story dutifully 
recounted the status of deregulation in the U.S., and revealed which states (eight, 
including California, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire) had “enacted 
laws that will give businesses and residents consumer choice in the near future”
38
 while 
other states had begun to formally explore the issue. Much like the maps in Enron 
Business, articles served as reminders that Enron’s neoliberal vision was not yet realized. 
The way the company dealt with individual states bore the traces of an uncomfortable 
split between neoliberalism’s ideal, global space and “actually existing neoliberalism.”  
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SPACE AND PLACE 
While a piecemeal approach to electricity deregulation was not, from the 
company’s point of view, ideal, Enron doggedly courted individual states and even 
townships in pursuit of its goals. In these instances, Enron moved away from the 
militaristic language of the 1996 letter and the abstract view of space found in the Enron 
Business maps. Here, the tension implicit in what Henri Lefebrve refers to as the “triad” 
of “perceived, conceived, and lived” space was present. The maps that appeared in the 
publication were examples of “representations of space” (or conceived space) that 
contained a “mixture of understanding and ideology.”
39
 For Lefebvre, this type of space 
is the space of “technocratic subdividers and social engineers.”
40
 Significantly, Lefebvre 
also connects abstract space to economic production. “Capitalism,” he contends, has 
“produced abstract space” that is “founded on the vast network of banks, business centres 
and major productive entities, as also on motorways, airports and information lattices.”
41
 
For Lefebvre (and geographers that have built on his work), capitalism has an intensely 
geographic logic. Space must be constructed and arranged in such a way that is 
conducive to capital flows. 
Though Lefebvre argues that conceived space is “the dominant space in any 
society,” it almost never exists in a pure state.
42
 Rather, it is bound up in a three-part 
dialectic with “perceived space” and, significantly, “lived space,” – a concept that is 
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analogous to humanist geographer Yi-Fu Tuan’s idea of “place.” Tuan conceives of place 
as far more subjective and experiential than space. For Tuan, a “sense of place” is a 
feeling of permanence and intimacy that develops over years. It is a “pause in movement” 
or a respite from the cool abstractions of conceived space.
43
 Building on Tuan’s 
definition, the geographer Tim Creswell has noted that while place can exist at a variety 
of scales, a sense of particularity is crucial to a sense of place.
44
 Though place is fluid and 
changes as people engage in “place-making activities,” places are ultimately locations 
that people invest with meaning.
45
 It was precisely this sense of place that Enron could 
not avoid even as the company tried to produce abstract, neoliberalized spaces. 
 
COURTING PLACE IN PURSUIT OF SPACE 
For example, in 1997, when Enron began selling electricity at the retail level in 
Peterborough, New Hampshire, it dispensed with grand pronouncements of a unified 
global space and instead courted the town through localized appeals. In an echo of 
Roland Marchand’s point about how large mid-century conglomerates adopted the 
rhetoric of the “good neighbor” in an effort to “humanize” their companies, Amy Lee, in 
her Enron Business article, attributed Enron’s success to fostering a local sense of 
place.
46
 As Lee put it:  
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The relationship that began with [Peterborough’s] selectmen is expanding daily to 
include increased interaction with the townspeople. Steve Lawrence, manager of 
Enron’s Peterborough office, and Maggie Ramos are helping to build the 
company’s image with local citizens and finding that success is really about 




This attention to locality was even repeated in the company’s ad campaign. A national 
print ad highlighting Peterborough featured a severe looking Mort Bader, a local resident, 
standing in front of a barn, evoking the state’s agrarian past. The advertisement’s text 
also reflected a local sense of place. “In a state whose motto is Live Free or Die,” the 
advertisement’s text began, “people didn’t like paying some of the highest energy rates in 
America. So they all got together and went shopping for a new energy company.” 
According to the ad copy, this “newfound freedom of choice” came when “Enron listened 
to the voice of the community and acted on what it heard.”
48
 In other words, the text 
claimed, the company had displayed a good deal of sensitivity to place. However, from 
there, the advertisement turned away from a particular sense of place and towards a much 
lager geographic area. The success in Peterborough, the ad concluded, was a portentous 
sign of good things to come, since “One day soon, those voices could span a nation.”
49
 
Here, Enron explicitly referenced New Hampshire’s state motto and connected it to the 
typical neoliberal paeans to consumer freedom of choice (via market competition). 
Peterborough stood for a model of what national neoliberalism could be. Still, this model 
could not be presented in any palatable manner without capitalizing on town’s local 
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qualities. In instances such as this, the connection between the local and global could not 
be separated – nor could Enron erase this attention to spatial difference. For all of this 
attention to local concerns, Peterborough was ultimately part of Enron’s global marketing 
push. 
 
DEREGULATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN THE LONE STAR STATE 
If the company’s marketing in Peterborough demonstrated that a local sense of 
place had to be considered in pursuit of pure, abstract neoliberalized space, in other 
instances, Enron actually exploited spatial difference in advancing its goals of a unified, 
global, neoliberal space. The company’s efforts in Texas offered a glimpse at this 
strategy. As to be expected, Texas was one state that jumped into the deregulation fray. 
An eerily prescient Enron Business article from 1999 updating employees about electric 
restructuring even featured a photograph of Texas governor George W. Bush signing a 
bill passing “electric restructuring legislation.”
50
 The cover story used much of the same 
language that other Enron Business articles (as well as the 1996 letter to shareholders) 
used in describing Bush’s action, calling it “one more step on the march to pry open an 
industry that has been protected from competition for over a century.”
51
 The article 
proclaimed that “customers in every part of the country, representing over half of the 
nation’s electricity demand, have now won the right to make their own choices.”
52
 
Although the law would not go into effect until 2002, the article’s author was quick to 
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point out Enron’s special connection with Texas. As Steve Kean was quoted as saying, 
“Not only is Texas Enron’s home state, but more electrons are sold here than in any other 
state, giving Enron enormous potential to grow our businesses.”
53
 As the article put it: 
“Texas in general and Houston in particular have become the home to many of the 
country’s non-regulated power marketing and energy service companies….”
54
 Here, then, 
was a signal victory for Enron – at once substantial and symbolic.  
Still, despite a deeply sympathetic executive in the governor’s mansion, electricity 
restructuring in Texas had been a long process of courting “consumer, large customer, 
and environmental groups; the municipal and cooperative-owned utilities; labor unions; 
other energy marketers; and even the monopoly incumbent utilities.”
55
 Despite this long 
list, the article failed to mention the extensive personal correspondence between Ken Lay 
and George W. Bush.
56
 Lay had begun writing to the governor on a regular basis 
concerning (among other issues) electricity deregulation in the state shortly after Bush 
took office. While sometimes this would include sending along promotional literature 
from special interest groups (of which Enron was a member), Lay also made repeated 
personal appeals to Bush on the subject. Much like the Peterborough advertisement, 
Lay’s letters called attention to a local sense of place. However, while the New 
Hampshire ad positioned neoliberal deregulation and restructuring as fulfilling a local 
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sense of place, in these letters, neoliberalism appeared as a menacing force that 
threatened the Lone Star State as a place. 
For instance, in February 1995, Lay wrote to Bush that “restricting important 
competitors from the wholesale power market harms the Texas economy by causing 
higher electric prices, less investment, and fewer jobs.” By contrast, Lay continued, 
“more competition, leading to lower electric rates, would benefit all Texans and help 
keep Texas business competitive in world markets.” These few sentences in the middle of 
the letter were striking in several respects. First, they exemplified the intense spatial logic 
of neoliberal restructuring. Texas, Lay insisted, had to start moving toward deregulation 
because not doing so could lead to “less investment,” the implication being that finance 
capital would flow to other, friendlier spaces.  What is more, Lay’s point that Texas had 
to be competitive in “world markets” reflected the rescaling of geographic relationships 
brought on by neoliberal reform in the same way the cozy, homey feel of the 
Peterborough ads were intended for a global audience.
 57
 
 If the threat of spatial competition was only implied in the February epistle, Lay 
was bolder about the dangers of failing to adopt his point of view a scant two months 
later. Writing to Bush, encouraging him to sign a bill into law (S.B. 373), Lay reassured 
him that the “historic legislation represents a major step towards competition in the 
electric business and will help keep the regulatory environment in Texas in step with that 
in the rest of the country.” Though Lay promised that like “every other industry, 
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competition will reward innovation and efficiency and keep electric prices low,” he also 
warned the governor that “Texas industry” needed to be “viable in the face of stiff 
national and international competition.” Again, rescaling was an issue, as was the 
demand that places become similar in an effort to attract capital. It was in this last 
statement that neoliberalism’s implied threat became ever more explicit. Texas simply 




 The following year, Lay’s (as well as Skilling’s) entreaties to Bush took on a new 
sense of urgency. As Lay wrote to Bush in May 1996, “Electric ‘customer choice’ is 
gaining momentum across the country, and we expect that proposals to implement retail 
competition in Texas will a major issue.” Significantly, Lay included a Houston Business 
Journal article about Enron’s move into the electricity market and even extended an 
invitation to the governor to visit “Enron’s Power trading floor in Houston.” As Lay 
added, “We would like to show you what the new electric industry looks like.”
59
 
 If that letter sounded a bit coy, Lay did not mince words two months later. As he 
put it, when it came to electric restructuring, Texas could not “afford to wait” since a 
“delay could diminish our state’s ability to compete for domestic and global business.” 
Texas now faced a choice, Lay reasoned. Adopting the stance of a concerned resident, he 
wrote:  “We will control our energy future and therefore our economic future, or others 
will realize the competitive advantages of the new system before we do.” While other 
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portions of the letter sounded a more optimistic note, the overall push of that passage was 
striking. Texas, according to Lay, had to remain competitive, and the only way to do this 
was through electricity deregulation. Of course, Lay was also sure to include bromides 
about letting market forces “work their magic” and (perhaps vaguely threateningly) 
professing that “there is not one cultural, economic or technical barrier that cannot easily 
be removed with a little teamwork among the stakeholders.” Indeed, that comment 




Still, Lay was sure to end his letter in no uncertain terms. As he warned Bush: 
“Recent changes in laws to promote cogeneration and the entry of wholesale producers 
into the marketplace have set forces of change into motion that will not stop.” Again 
casting himself as a concerned citizen, Lay wrote that “Our place in the new system will 
be decided by us, or for us. I want that decision to be made in Austin, not in some other 
state’s capital, or in Washington. I want Texas to assert its position as an energy leader.” 




As David Harvey argues, a fluid sort of capitalism (the neoliberal ideal) results in 
“coercion” because of “inter-place competition for capital investment and employment 
(accede to the capitalist’s demands or go out of business, create a ‘good business climate’ 
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 It is this sense of coercion that lurks behind the neoliberal rhetoric of 
“freedom,” and was, at times, more or less explicit in Enron’s case. Significantly, the 
threat played out in geographic terms. These menacing comments can be read as Enron 
taking the frustrating patchwork of regulatory regimes and leveraging them to its own 
advantage. Ironically, it was precisely the unfinished quality of neoliberalism that helped 
propel and accelerate its spread. The letters were examples of how neoliberalism is, as 
geographers Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell put it, a “strong discourse” that is “self-
actualizing.”
63
 In these letters, neoliberalism appeared as an “apparently disembodied” 
and “out there” force, even though Lay himself was actively working to neoliberalize 
space. 
Letters such as these were also intimately connected to Enron’s lobbying efforts, 
and pointed to another neoliberal contradiction. As much as Enron executives scoffed at 
the idea of government intrusion, pursuing a free market strategy meant that, on a 
practical level, the organization would become more and more embroiled in the 
legislative process, much in the same way many scholars now see neoliberalism as 
inherently a political process.
64
 Both the cases of Enron’s efforts in New Hampshire and 
Texas may have hinted at the different approaches Enron took in the 1990s in addressing 
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the unpleasant reality of a crazy quilt of regulatory environments that the maps repeatedly 
depicted. However, achievements in both states were small victories compared with the 
possibilities found in the Golden State. California, in fact, was on the company’s radar 
from a very early date since it represented such a huge market. 
 
CALIFORNIA 
Much like Enron’s actions in New Hampshire and Texas, the drama that unfolded 
between Enron and California as the company bought and sold energy in the state’s 
newly deregulated energy market in the late 1990s and the opening years of the twenty-
first century reveals the instability of space and place as categories under neoliberalism. 
From 1996 to early 2001 (before the company’s complete collapse), the traces of 
dynamic, relational, and multiple understandings of space and place were revealed in the 
relationship between the company and the state. As California moved towards 
deregulating its energy market in the mid 1990s, Enron was keen to take advantage of the 
development.  
California Bill 1890, which passed in 1996, helped establish the state’s newly 
deregulated power system. The most significant change was the creation of the California 
Power Exchange (CalPX) which required investor-owned utilities (IOUs) “to buy all of 





into long term, ‘bi-lateral’ contracts.”
65
 Much like the way FERC Order 436 introduced 
volatility into the natural gas industry by creating a spot market in the mid 1980s, 
California’s new system contained at least the potential for similar unpredictability. 
Though the market structure was not to be implemented for another two years, the 
company moved immediately to take advantage. Significantly, access to the Western 
states’ power grids (and California’s in particular) was the motivating force behind 
Enron’s merger with Portland General Electric (PGE) in 1996. An Enron Business article 
celebrating the merger even featured a photograph of Ken Lay and Ken Harrison (of 
PGE) cutting a cake in the shape of the continental United States with decorative power 
lines stuck in the frosting. Literally a map waiting to be carved up, the image served as a 
fitting metaphor for Enron’s approach to electricity marketing in the U.S. 
As (a likely scripted) quote from Lay in the press packet announcing the merger 
put it: “By combining the natural gas and electricity marketing and risk management 
expertise of Enron with the wholesale and retail electricity expertise of Portland General, 
along with its related assets and skilled employees, we are uniquely positioned to be the 
leader in the increasingly competitive natural gas and electricity marketplace.”
66
 Here, 
the merger (and the logic behind it) revealed Enron’s continued involvement in the 
material world. As the press release put it, the combined company now possessed “more 
than 5,900 megawatts of electric generating capacity worldwide and more than 37,000 
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miles of natural gas pipeline.”
67
 Though much of the press release highlighted Enron’s 
“risk management” and trading businesses, owning even more physical assets was key to 
Enron’s strategy of electricity retail and trading. The merger with Portland General 
Electric also included a decidedly spatial component. A map included in the press packet 
revealed power lines from Oregon snaking through the Western United States, and into 
California. These lines, and Enron’s West Coast trading operation in Portland, had dire 
consequences for the Golden State. 
The case of California echoed many of the national statements the company had 
made regarding electric restructuring, as well as revealing (again) how Enron had 
embroiled itself in local politics in pursuit of a globalized free market. Many of these 
issues came to the fore in a talk Lay gave at the Western Economic Association 
Conference in California in June 1998. As to be expected, Lay’s comments echoed the 
national, militaristic rhetoric of Enron’s campaign. Here, again, were pronouncements of 
a “battle of ideas.”
68
 This choice of words was significant, demonstrating that he regarded 
the company’s success in entering such markets as ideological victories. While he said 
that free market advocates were once “a lonely group,” he rejoiced in the fact that 
“Economists who opposed a common wisdom bent on guarding monopolies and were 
once considered ‘fringe’ are now mainstream.”
69
 Of course, the immediate cause of 
celebration for Lay was the turn of events in California. After applauding the “California 
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Public Utilities Commission for starting the march toward consumer choice and 
competition in electricity in 1994” and approving AB 1890 in 1996 that created a path 
toward energy deregulation, Lay declared that his company was “very excited about 
California.”
70
 This was, of course, because California represented a potentially huge 
market for the company. 
In addition to the company’s merger with Portland General, Enron acted in other 
ways in order to take advantage of the developments in California. One such move was 
the purchase of the Bentley Company in 1997, which a press release described as “one of 
the oldest and most respected firms in the west.”
71
 An Enron Business article from that 
same year touted the purchase of the Bentley Company as “gain[ing] a powerful ally in 
the battle to bring choice to electricity consumers.”
72
 This article’s coverage of the 
purchase also reflected Enron’s attention to a local sense of place in pursuit of a national 
deregulated environment. The article framed the acquisition as a coup for the company, 
since Bentley was an old, established California company and offered Enron “additional 
firepower in its campaign to capture a significant share of the industrial, commercial and 
institutional segments of the electricity market, first in California,” which was scheduled 
to be opened up “to full competition on Jan. 1, 1998, and eventually nationwide.”
73
 The 
comment was striking in the way it instantly linked deregulation in California to a 
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national project. Much as the use of Peterborough in Enron’s print advertisement implied, 
California’s uniqueness would ideally be a temporary condition. Deregulation in 
California was intended to be one step in a national project. The article quoted the 
president of Bentley as saying, “California is ground zero for deregulation.”
74
 Still, 
moving forward, Enron had to assert the idea of California’s uniqueness even as it 
viewed the state as only one (albeit major) front in its “campaign” for a nationally (and 
internationally) deregulated environment. In order to gain entry into the state, Enron 
actively encouraged the idea of California as a unique place. Unlike the menacing letters 
Lay sent to Bush, Enron’s initial approach to the Golden State suggested a power relation 
decidedly in favor of California. 
This power relation was most evident in several Enron press releases dating from 
the 1990s. Rather than placing demands on California, Enron promised to adapt itself in 
ways that would not alter California’s pre-existing sense of place. In this instance, the 
marketing strategy was not too much of stretch, allowing the company to draw on the 
environmental rhetoric it had used for years. For example, a 1997 release announcing a 
partnership between N.C.P.A. (the Northern California Power Agency) and the company 
quoted a new state law calling for energy that would maintain “California’s commitment 
to developing diverse, environmentally sensitive electricity sources.”
75
 Enron’s corporate 
message consistently referenced both the environment and the state’s uniqueness and by 
1999, Enron was making much more direct appeals to California as a particular place. 
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One press release highlighted a ”clean” power plant, Green Power I, that “was built to 
supply clean, renewable electrons for Southern California’s environmentally conscious 
electricity consumers.”
76
 The company even sponsored Earth Day events in 1999 and 
promised to build wind farms.
77
 A press release regarding Earth Day also called attention 
to the company’s thinking of California as a place. The release noted that Enron had 
contributed to parks and schools projects, and included a scripted quote from Ken Lay 
hailing Earth Day 1999 in California as “an impressive and inspiring example of how 
individuals, businesses, environmental agencies and communities can join together to 
restore and protect our natural resources.” Lay also asserted that environmental 
stewardship was “essential not only to the quality of life in our communities, but also to 
continued economic growth.”
78
 This press release used the first person plural (“our”) 
when referring to California’s environment. Such syntactic strategies sought to link 
Enron to local “communities.”
79
 While this fit well with the company’s older 
environmental image (the company sponsored Earth Day events in other locales 
including Houston), the company’s California celebrations specifically courted that state 
as a place. For example, in an Enron Business article about Earth Day in 1999, Jeff 
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Dasovich, an Enron employee based in San Francisco, was quoted as saying, “There are a 
whole lot of people in California who hadn’t heard of Enron before, but thank to Enron’s 
participation in Earth Day, they know who Enron is now, and they have a better 
understanding of our company, our values and the people who work here.”
80
 
This public relations strategy recalled a longer tradition in corporate public 
corporate communications. As Roland Marchand notes of the postwar corporation, 
“Given that one long-standing barrier to greater moral legitimacy for the giant 
corporation had been its immense size and seeming aloofness, no better counter image 
could be offered than that of a friendly neighbor and civic contributor located right 
nearby on Main Street.”
81
 Marchand argues that during the twentieth century, large and 
increasingly decentralized businesses attempted to ingratiate themselves to communities 
as “good neighbors” in order to “cast an aura of familiarity over ever-more-complex 
economic and spatial relationships.”
82
 This same attempt to produce a sense of closeness 
could be found throughout Enron’s public relations efforts in California. 
To at least some extent, Enron’s attempt to portray itself as (somewhat) 
Californian may have worked. Though many news stories referred to Houston as the 
company’s headquarters, others seemed to suggest that locating Enron was a more 
difficult task. For example, the company was one of three in an October 2000 story in 
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Escondido, California’s North County Times, titled “California Power Companies Report 
Sizzling Third Quarter.” One line in the article’s opening paragraph was telling: “Three 
of the companies that generate and sell electricity in California.”
83
 Here, Enron was 
described as “the world’s largest electricity company,” directly echoing the press 
release’s boilerplate. It is also worth noting that Duke Energy was referred to as 
“Houston-based,” suggesting that Enron was particularly successful in effacing its sense 
of place.
84
 Californians, it appeared, had basically accepted the company’s presence in 
their state. 
However, a sense of the temporary nature of the company’s investment in a local 
sense of place was always present. Even the 1999 Earth Day press release expressed a 
concept of space that was directly at odds with the “good neighbor” metaphor and that 
revealed Enron’s investment (both figurative and literal) in the annihilation of space and 
time. After testifying to a commitment to California, Ken Lay trumpeted the company’s 
global reach; though Enron was happy to contribute to California’s Earth Day 
celebrations, it was ultimately a worldwide business. This was also echoed in the 
“boilerplate” description of the company (the paragraph found at the end of each press 
release). It is worth quoting at length: 
Enron is one of the world’s leading integrated electricity and natural gas 
companies. The company, which owns approximately $30 billion in energy 
related assets, produces electricity and natural gas, develops, constructs and 
operates energy facilities worldwide and delivers physical commodities and risk 
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management and financial services to customers around the world. Enron’s 





While this passage mentioned physical structures, the emphasis was decidedly on the 
company’s lack of place and immateriality. As Enron itself had grown in scope (to the 
point of being global), its sense of place diminished proportionally. While its physical 
address (Houston, Texas) was not mentioned, its online address was. Though Enron made 
direct appeals to California as a place, the absence of Enron’s own locality pointed 
towards its adversarial view of space and distance. Massey notes that the narratives and 
rhetoric of cyberspace always involve “an assumption, not only of space as merely 
distance, but also of it as always a burden.”
86
 In this way, Enron’s attitude towards space 
directly paralleled its antipathy towards heavy assets. Both instances reflected its growing 
commitment to the postindustrial, immaterial labor of symbolic analysis. However, much 
like the company’s attempts to completely deny hard, material, industrial processes, the 
desire to annihilate space and time was ultimately elusive. For Massey, when it comes to 
“the communications revolution,” it is not a question of “whether space will be 
annihilated but what kinds of multiplicities (patterns of uniqueness) and relations will be 
co-constructed with these new kinds of spatial configurations.”
87
 This unavoidable and 
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potentially consequential linkage between information and place became painfully 
obvious as the state slide into crisis.  
 
THE CALIFORNIA ENERGY CRISIS AS MATERIAL REALITY 
Though at first California’s new electricity market appeared to run smoothly, in 
May of 2000, “spot prices began to rise notably.”
88
 Throughout that summer, the state 
declared a “Stage 3” emergency and, in an effort to conserve power, northern California 
experienced rolling blackouts starting on June 14th.
89
 The crisis continued throughout the 
year and reached a high point on April 26, 2001, when California declared a Stage 1 
emergency, meaning “power reserves were at or below 7.5 percent of demand.”
90
 It was 
also during this time that the CPUC began formally investigating power companies 
operating in the state. While not directed solely at Enron (indeed, the study found that 
several companies were engaging in dubious practices), trading strategies with titles such 
as “Fat Boy,” “Death Star,” and “Ricochet” came to light. The unfortunate names 
represented the most extreme instance of the instability that was the ultimate purpose 
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behind Enron’s attempt to neoliberalize space. Much like the other types of activities the 
company’s symbolic analysts were performing, trading electricity required an unstable 
economic environment. 
While testifying during Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling’s trial, Tim Belden, head of the 
West Coast trading desk (which was actually run out of Portland, Oregon, not Houston), 
highlighted the role of instability in Enron’s trading business. Belden and the rest of the 
one hundred person office were involved in “speculative trading.”
91
 As he described it, 
Enron’s West Coast energy trading profits were “completely dependent upon whether or 
not the prices went up or went down, depending on whether we bought or sold.”
92
 In fact, 
Belden specifically pointed to “volatility” as the means through which Enron could profit 
in the West Coast market.
93
 In 2000, there was, as he put it, “chaos” in California’s 
energy market (which Belden – along with other Enron executives – blamed on the way 
in which the state had organized that market).
94
 However, because Enron had been 
systematically working towards a vast, unified space that money and megawatts could 
flow through, “chaos in California created chaos in the entire western market.”
95
 At least 
in the short term, this was good for the company. As Belden put it: “The chaos drove 
high prices; and the high prices drove our profits.”
96
 Given this connection between 
instability and profit, which had been the company’s experience since natural gas 
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deregulation in 1985, Belden’s statement should not have been too surprising. However, 
in the case of California, the abstract symbolic analysis that was being performed in 
Portland – simply looking and reacting to numbers on a screen – resulted in disastrous 
consequences in the material world.  
In subsequent Enron narratives, the California episode was a prominent feature 
even though it was divorced from the immediate circumstances of the company’s 
collapse. Perhaps this was because it offered the most stunning example of the connection 
between symbolic analysis and the material world denied by the “new economy” rhetoric 
the company was routinely using by that point. Yet before these narratives ever appeared, 
many in California grasped this connection. In fact, the immediate outrage in the state 
took the form of explicitly pointing to this connection and highlighting both the material 
consequences of abstract knowledge work and Enron’s distance from California. 
 As the crisis unfolded with rising electricity prices and rolling blackouts, many 
Californians no longer saw energy deregulation and Enron as good things for the state, 
but rather as threats to California as a place. One example could be found in a letter to the 
San Diego Union-Tribune concerning the steep rise in electricity costs. William 
Brotherton, a San Diego resident, wrote that the city’s energy woes were “being exploited 
by large out-of-state utilities, such as Enron.”
97
 Another letter in the same paper revealed 
the deep anxiety over the effect: “Forget the ballpark. It’s not going to happen. Forget the 
downtown library; that’s history, too. Forget the new hotels, the booming tourism, the 
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growth and prosperity San Diegans have come to view as theirs by right. It’s over, 
folks.”
98
 That letter was full of anxiety and fears over what would happen to the city as a 
result of the energy crisis. Indeed, such letters were indicative of how Californians were 
beginning to perceive energy deregulation. In these representations, Enron was 
definitively (and threateningly) outside of California and actively reshaping the state.  
 Still, the geographic implications of symbolic analysis were rather muted in these 
letters (even if a geographic anxiety was present). By contrast, when California 
journalists covered Enron’s role in the energy crisis, the notion of disparate locations 
connected through symbolic manipulation and cyberspace quickly came to the fore. 
Californian journalists repeatedly emphasized Enron’s physical distance from the state. 
Writing for the San Francisco Chronicle, David Lazarus depicted Ken Lay as gazing “out 
from his plush, 50th-floor office” with “Houston’s downtown skyscrapers jutt[ing] like 
sharp teeth against the overcast sky.”
99
 Though the imagery of the skyline as a menacing 
set of jaws was unique to this article, this type of rhetorical move became increasingly 
common as the energy crisis in California grew. Simply put, Enron was explicitly 
resituated in Houston.  
A February 7, 2001, story in the San Jose Mercury News titled “Texas Energy 
Company Thrives in California’s Deregulated Atmosphere” was even more explicit about 
Enron’s location in Texas while simultaneously calling attention to its distance from 
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California. The story’s opening line, “Though it produces hardly any power for California 
consumers, a Texas energy company is thriving in a deregulated energy marketplace that 
it helped shape,” implied a split between the company and the state.
100
 The story’s author, 
Brandon Bailey, hinted that by virtue of its location outside of California, Enron lacked 
concern for the state. Highlighting the role of both symbolic manipulation and geographic 
distance, Bailey, wrote, “At the company’s 50-story Houston headquarters, Enron traders 
use sophisticated software to monitor supply and demand….”
101
 Significantly, this line 
used the detail of computers to link two distant geographic places. Yet rather than see 
these technologies and symbolic analysts as modern improvements, they were now 
unwelcome developments. These representations of Enron as rooted in a specific locality 
can be read as a direct rebuke to the company’s commitment to both neoliberal reform 
and symbolic analysis. In effect, this news coverage amounted to a vernacular articulation 
of Doreen Massey’s critique of cyberspace. As Massey notes, “the world of physical 
space and the world of electronically mediated connection do not exist as somehow two 
separate layers, one (in what is I suspect a common mind’s eye imagination) floating 
ethereally somewhere above the materiality of the other.”
102
 Indeed, Massey goes on to 
argue points of access to cyberspace are always rooted in a physical location. It was this 
connection that Californian journalists highlighted in references to the Houston skyline, 
Enron Tower, and even the corporation’s trading floor, the very moment when Enron 
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traders in Houston were, through this ostensibly “ethereal” world of cyberspace, having a 
direct, material impact on California.  
Enron’s placelessness took on a sinister character in these news stories. Though 
San Francisco Chronicle writer David Lazarus situated Enron in Houston, the threat of a 
“placeless” global capitalism also appeared in his article. In describing Enron’s trading 
floor, Lazarus wrote that, “Enron’s trading floors buzz all day long with frantic activity as 
[… ] employees scan banks of flat-panel displays in search of the best deals.”
103
 After 
describing this scene of symbolic analysts in an informational environment, he called 
attention to its geographic consequences, writing that “Kevin Presto, who oversees 
Enron’s East Coast power trades, called up the California market on his computer. With a 
few quick mouse clicks, he showed that Enron at that moment was buying power in the 
Golden State at $250 per megawatt hour and selling it at $275. 
104
 In the context of 
Lazarus’s article, the trader’s ability to buy and sell power on both coasts from a desk in 
Houston was not a cause for celebration, but rather one of dread. In this moment, the state 
lost almost any sense of materiality, and was instead reduced to a series of financial 
transactions on a computer screen. 
The spatial tension between the company and state found perhaps its fullest 
expression in Robert Salladay’s article for the San Francisco Chronicle, “California 
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Shivers – Texas Smirks.” Though the article humorously cataloged the long historical 
animosity between the two states, the last third was devoted to Ken Lay and Enron. Still, 
despite the overall humorous tone, notes of anxiety were present. Salladay even quoted a 
state senator as saying: “We really ought to be taking a hard look at how it is that 
California’s pocket has been emptied into the pockets of Texas and Southern 
Corporations.”
105
 As Salladay noted, the senator “nearly spit the word ‘Texas’ when she 
said it.”
106
 Here, place almost completely overtook Enron. Though this article was also 
concerned with George Bush, Enron no longer appeared as placeless, but one of several 
signifiers for Texas itself.
107
 A telling example of this was when Salladay wrote: 
“Kenneth Lay, a Texas buddy of Bush and chairman of the huge energy trader Enron, 
says California should be friendlier to his business.”
108
  
It was also in the height of this tension that the threatening side of neoliberal 
restructuring – which Lay had pointed to in his letters to Bush – overtook Enron’s 
supposed commitment to California. Gone were the pronouncements about consumer 
choice and freedom. What was left, however, was an aggressive stance. Just as Lay had 
written to Bush in the mid 1990s about the perils of regulation, in California, Lay began 
publicly voicing neoliberalism’s threats, rather than promises. No longer the “good 
neighbor,” Lay began to reflect Harvey’s observations about the pressures mobile 
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investment capital could put on a place. In discussing Enron’s refusal to bring turbines 
into the state, Lay was quoted in Salladay’s piece as saying: “If California makes it 
attractive to do business in their state, they’ve got a chance of some of those turbines 
coming to California.”
109
 Lay and Enron were no longer offering themselves as 
trustworthy custodians of California’s sense of place, but rather demanded California 
align itself with the company’s neoliberal agenda. 
Ultimately, though, the company never realized its goal of nationwide 
deregulation. As late as 2000, Enron Business still had to contend with the fact that “a 
map of the country looks like a crazy and fragmented quilt of fully deregulated, partially 
deregulated and wholly regulated energy markets.”
110
 Of course, the article was quick to 
follow this observation with the hopeful note, “As more states and countries move toward 
complete deregulation, additional market opportunities will present themselves.”
111
 
California’s well-publicized woes only made Enron’s struggle more difficult. In the wake 
of the California debacle, the company announced (in the pages of Enron Business) that it 
was engaging in a “focused, strategic campaign” in “four key battlegrounds” to “stabilize 
the fallout from California, promote competitive markets and improve public 
perceptions.”
112
 As this sidebar opined, “it would be disastrous for government 




  “EES Muscles in Big,” Enron Business, Vol. 6, 2000, 5. 
111
  Ibid. 
112
  “Advancing Electric Competition…Enron is Hot on the Campaign Trail to Affect Policy and Public 









 Yet California’s woes at Enron’s hand only point to one way in which symbolic 
analysis can have a profound impact on place. Just as Massey notes that both ends of a 
connection in cyberspace are transformed through that relationship, Houston itself – far 
from being the dreaded lair from whence Enron launched its attacks on California out of 
sheer spite – was a place that the company found (on some level) lacking and in need of 
profound change in the service of postindustrial production. This attitude mixed with 
stereotypically Texan hometown pride – perhaps an acknowledgement of how rooted 
Enron was in the region’s past. 
 
ENRON’S SUNBELT PAST 
For all of Enron’s attempts to transform both the United States and the rest of the 
world into a single unified and unregulated space so that the company’s traders could 
move electrons, electronic bits, natural gas and money around the globe, by virtue of its 
origins Enron was also tied to Houston’s past as well as the region’s traditional focus on 
energy. Despite this connection, if the organization was to achieve these goals, it required 
more than a regional city, as Houston – the so-called “Golden Buckle of the Sunbelt – 
was in many respects. Rather, the company, and Ken Lay in particular, sought to recast 
Houston as what urban theorist Sakia Sassen calls a “global city” as opposed to simply a 
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large metropolis (which Houston certainly was).
114
  
For Sassen and other urban theorists, economic globalization has changed the 
nature of cities. Cities become connected to different parts of a decentralized and 
transnational production process. Some cities turn to providing immaterial services such 
as banking and marketing that cater to “the needs and desires of the global elite.”
115
 In the 
1990s, Ken Lay sought to reposition Houston as a global city. However, this 
repositioning required a reworking of what Lefebvre calls “social space.” Lefebvre sees 
social space as “produced and reproduced in connection with the forces of production.”
116
 
For him, productive forces “are not taking over a pre-existing, empty or neutral space,” 
but enter into a dialectical relationship with other place-making forces.
117
 In effect, 
Houston’s social space would have to be remade to fit the needs of symbolic analysts and 
immaterial production. Since “global cities provide attractive places for service industries 
and their employees to work,” Houston’s social space had to resemble that of other global 
cities.
118
 These changes could be seen in large projects – creating a baseball field in 
downtown Houston for instance - as well as in subtler ways, such as the company’s 
increasing commitment to a cosmopolitan workforce.  
A quick glance at the branded items the company offered throughout the 1990s 
provides a clue as to the character of this project. For instance, the May 1993 issue of 
                                                 
114
  “World Cities/Global Cities,”  in Globalization: The Key Concepts, Annabelle Mooney and Betsey 
Evans, ed. (London: Routeldge, 2007), 247. 
115
  Ibid. 
116
  LeFebvre, The Production of Space, 77. 
117
  Ibid. 
118
  “World Cities/Global Cities,”  in Globalization: The Key Concepts, Annabelle Mooney and Betsey 





Enron Business’s back page featured a small number of branded items for sale. There, an 
employee could buy a foam and mesh hat with a “ca-MOO-flage” cowhide print. Just two 
years later, the publication’s back page offered a cap with an “Aztec” print. Though a 
minor change, the newer hat paralleled the company’s overall transformation. While the 
“ca-MOO-flage” print recalled both the Texas past and Houston’s blue collar heritage, 
the “Aztec” design looked beyond Houston’s past and geography, indicating a worldly 
attitude. The “ca-MOO-flage” hat instantly conjured Houston’s blue collar oil refining 
jobs that sprang up along the Buffalo Bayou. By contrast, the Aztec print hinted that the 
company was, by the mid 1990s, pushing at the edges of this decidedly Texan locale. 
This newer design reflected Lay’s and Enron’s vision (albeit on a small scale) for 
Houston - a vibrant, cosmopolitan place that, while still connected to the energy business, 
would have little in common with the hard, material fact of petrochemical processing that 
marked the area from the start of the twentieth century.  
The hats also revealed a tension at the core of Enron’s Houston experience. 
Undeniably, the company was a product of the energy industry that has been synonymous 
with the city since the start of the twentieth century. Despite briefly being headquartered 
in Omaha, Enron could scarcely have emerged from any other place, and in some ways 
the company’s managers never forgot it. For instance, the city’s long commitment to a 
business-friendly environment – typified by the 8F Crowd, a group of businessmen 
(mostly oil executives) who played a large role in civic affairs during the mid-twentieth 





company celebrated the city it was a part of – throwing company barbecues, involving its 
employees in numerous local charities, and running celebratory articles in Enron 
Business such as the one commemorating the centennial anniversary of discovering oil in 
nearby Spindle Top. Yet at the same time, the company sought to transform Houston. 
While it may have appeared that Lay was simply taking his place among a long line of 
business elites (largely connected to the petroleum industry), the character of the changes 
he was seeking amounted to a decisive break with Houston’s past. These two impulses – 
of continuity with and break from Houston’s past – appeared repeatedly throughout the 
1990s.  
 
HOUSTON’S PAST  
Houston has always been a city with a strong sense of place. Historians Martin 
Melosi and Joseph Pratt write that Houston is an “archetypal twentieth-century city, 
which came into its own with the popularization of the automobile.”
119
 Because of this 
the city’s geography “is multinodal, decentralized, and expansive” - spatial qualities that 
contributed to some of the city’s problems.
120
 After World War II, oil fueled a working 
class culture as refineries sprang up along the Buffalo Bayou. The absence of any 
significant public transportation along with a good deal of highway construction meant 
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that Houston became an extremely low-density area, exacerbating both racial and class 
segregation. By the 1960s, through both air conditioning and cars, rich whites “could 
avoid both the region’s climate and the city core” while “the lack of cars and adequate 
public transportation kept many residents of older neighborhoods from traveling to the 
outskirts of Houston.”
121
 Many professional workers used the city’s core primarily as a 
place of work. Even though, as Joe Feagin points out, Houston’s ties to an international 
economy began shortly after oil was discovered in 1901, for much of the twentieth 
century, the metropolis could hardly be described as cosmopolitan in character.
122
 Unlike, 
for instance, New York, with a city center that contains a vibrant cultural life and 
skyscrapers housing brainy pursuits such as finance, Houston’s spatial layout from the 




However, if, as Melosi and Pratt argue, Houston was an “archetypal twentieth 
century city,” it began to face a variety of challenges as that century neared its end. 
Though, as Barry Kaplan notes, Houston grew steadily in population and physical 
infrastructure during the postwar era, it was the 1973 oil shock that provided Houston 
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with a big boost throughout that decade.
124
 As the price of oil rose throughout the decade, 
so did the city’s fortunes. As political scientists Robert Thomas and Richard Murray note, 
Houston’s major industrial products “were several times more valuable than they had 
been a couple of years earlier.”
125
 Likewise, services related to petrochemicals were in 
demand during the 1970s. The second oil shock in 1979 caused another steep rise in oil 
prices, adding to Houston’s good fortune.
126
 
 Houston had been an industrial powerhouse since the end of World War II, but 
the collapse in the price of oil and natural gas in the 1980s revealed how tightly the city’s 
fate was tied to those specific commodities. Though the price of oil rose to $31.77 in 
1981, nearly ten times what it had been in 1971, the following year the price began to fall 
precipitously.
127
 By the end of 1986, the price of oil was less than twelve dollars a 
barrel.
128
 Sociologist Stephen Klineberg notes that before the bust, “Houston had been 
building and borrowing in the expectation of $50 oil.”
129
 The effects of such sudden and 
dramatic economic change were devastating. As Klineberg puts it, “One out of every 
seven jobs that were in Houston in 1982 had disappeared by early 1987, marking this as 
the worst regional downturn in any part of the country at any time since World War 
                                                 
124
  Barry J. Kaplan, “Houston: The Golden Buckle of the Sunbelt,” in Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth 
Since WWII, Ed. Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, (Austin: U of Texas P, 1983), 196-212, 198. 
125
  Robert D. Thomas and Richard W. Murray, Progrowth Politics: Change and Governance in Houston, 
(Berkeley: IGS Press, 1991), 49. 
126
  Ibid., 51. 
127
  Stephen L. Klineberg, “Houston’s Economic and Demographic Transformations: Findings from the 
expanded 2002 survey of Houston’s ethnic communities,” (Houston: Rice University, 2002), 4. 
128
  Ibid. 
129








During these hard times, several Enron principals, including Ken Lay and Jeff 
Skilling, were already residents of the city. As Skilling recalled during his trial testimony:  
by 1986 and 1987, Houston was in the midst of a really prolonged depression. 
And it was – we had the lowest – or highest vacancy rate of office buildings of 
anywhere in the country by, I think, twice as much or something. They used to 
call them shotgun buildings. You could shoot a shotgun through the office 




It is not insignificant that almost twenty years later Skilling could call to mind the image 
of empty office space downtown. Nor was his memory wrong. In the mid-1980s the 
vacant office space in Houston topped twenty five percent, up from about ten percent in 
1981.
132
 Arguably, the memory of a city at the mercy of the price of physical material 
helped propel Enron’s business activities in subsequent years. 
The economic depression did not just apply to eerily vacant office space, but also 
to the materiality of the petrochemical business. As Skilling again recalled during his 
trial: “They were stacking rigs, big drilling rigs. If you remember, you went out I-10 west 
of town, there were literally hundreds of acres that had, in some cases, brand new drilling 
rigs just sitting there rusting in the sun….”
133
 It is fitting that these images should come 
from Skilling, since he, more than anyone, was responsible for steering the company 
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away from the large, industrial world that the rusting drilling rigs represented. When the 
city began to recover, the experience of such hardship called for a need to transform the 
city’s economic base.  
Even though the city’s economy recovered by 1990, Houston was undergoing 
dramatic changes. First, Houston was becoming a far more ethnically diverse city, as the 
numbers of Asian and Latino residents grew (by the end of the century, Houston would 
be a “majority minority” city).
134
 Second, the city was well on its way to becoming a 
“knowledge-based economy.”
135
 As Thomas and Murray note, Houston’s economic 
recovery was “rooted in a postindustrial economy with the impetus for growth coming 
primarily from an expanding corporate sector, technologically intensive industries, and a 
growing service economy.”
136
 If these changes were unsettling for some, Enron was one 
company that welcomed them. Indeed, the company itself was moving into areas that 
could accurately be described as knowledge work and sought employees suited for this 
type of work. Additionally, the memory of a city and its business district in decline would 
inform many of Enron’s revitalization efforts in the 1990s. 
 
TRANSFORMING HOUSTON 
Indeed, as Houston began to change from a regional powerhouse with a large blue 
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collar industrial base into an international city, Enron sought to speed up and shape these 
changes, recasting Houston as a global center for knowledge work and symbolic analysis. 
In encouraging these changes, Enron, and its CEO Ken Lay in particular, adopted a 
neoliberal view of Houston, seeking to transform it into an “entrepreneurial city” that 
simultaneously possessed a “business friendly” environment and a high quality of life. 
The geographer Gordon MacLeod sees the entrepreneurial city as a municipality that 
organizes itself and city life with the primary aim of “reviving the competitive position” 
of the city through free market initiatives.
137
 During the 1990s, Enron’s involvement in 
Houston took on many forms, such as bringing the World Economic Forum to the city in 
1990, building onto the company’s headquarters in 1999, and involvement in charitable 
activities throughout the metropolis. Of course, one could argue that Lay was simply 
operating in the manner of the 8F Crowd. However, while it may be tempting to see 
Lay’s involvement in Houston’s civic affairs as quintessentially Houstonian (as journalist 
Robert Bryce did, casting him as a modern-day John Kirby), Ken Lay and Enron’s 
activities advanced a novel vision of a globalized Houston. Perhaps the earliest example 
of these activities could be found in Lay’s role in the 1990 World Economic Forum. 
While this meeting is generally held in Davos, Switzerland, that year Houston hosted the 
meeting, and Ken Lay (at the request of then-President George H.W. Bush) co-chaired 
the committee that organized the event. Significantly, President Bush described the forum 
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as “the first economic summit conference of the ‘post-postwar era.’”
138
 Though Bush was 
referring to a new political balance of power with the end of the Cold War, events like the 
World Economic Forum were also intended to usher in a global, neoliberal era. Indeed, as 
The Economist noted, the focus of the summit was also on liberal trade policies – the 
same type the company subsequently extolled throughout the decade. Still, Houston’s 
strong sense of place was not lost in this scene. The event organizers presented Houston 
as a unique and storied place as well as a city that was aligned with a new global, 
neoliberal political economy. Ken Lay steered Houston through a process of changing 
itself into a suitable host city while simultaneously accentuating a local sense of place.
139
  
When planning began in March, the local press was enthusiastic. One Houston 
Chronicle article noted that “local leaders [Lay among them] preparing for the 
international economic summit say they will strive to make Houston the world’s 
friendliest and cleanest major city.”
140
 Such sentiments were typical of the press coverage 
of the summit. In transforming Houston into such a friendly and clean place, event 
organizers also sought to enlist the area’s residents. As another article noted, “committee 
leaders called on area residents to acquaint themselves with statistics on Houston’s 
upward spiral and act as salesmen for the city as they greet journalists and others here for 
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 What is more, such boosterism also drew on Houston’s past. Lay, for 
instance, was heavily involved in securing the Kirby Mansion for the summit’s offices. 
Another Houston Chronicle article proudly noted, “the 36-room red brick was built in 
1926 by the late lumber/oil/railroad magnate John Henry Kirby.”
142
 Fittingly, The 
Houston Chronicle reported that at the start of the forum, “the flood gates opened with a 
‘y’all come’ invitation from co-chairman Ken Lay.”
143
  
Clearly, the 1990 World Economic Forum was a huge event for both Lay and 
Houston. While Lay would not host an event of that size again, the themes underscored in 
the press accounts of the World Economic Forum, as well as Lay’s own pronouncements 
about it – that Houston was becoming an exciting international city, reverberated 
throughout the rest of the decade. Simultaneously, Lay trumpeted Houston’s unique 
identity while the company’s community relations efforts were firmly directed at 
resituating the city in a global, economic context.
144
  
Even when the company was engaging in run of the mill activities, such as 
community-based charity work, there was always an undercurrent of neoliberal logic. For 
instance, during his trial, both Lay and his close confidante, Cindy Olson (who was head 
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of both community relations and human resources), pointed to the confluence of 
community work and the company’s strategy of recruiting symbolic analysts. This 
commitment to charity in and around Houston could also be found in the pages of Enron 
Business, particularly the “Enron Envolved” section. During his trial, Lay himself 
proclaimed, “I’ve always believed very strongly that businesses should give back to the 
communities where they do business, and the individuals working for those businesses 
should become active in those communities and help make them a better place to live and 
a better place in which to work.”
145
 As he noted, this desire sprang in part from his 
personal religious devotion. At the same time, Lay and Olson noted that such charitable 
activities could also work with more overt efforts at gentrifying parts of Houston. 
Cindy Olson, who also testified at the trial, noted that Lay put considerable 
emphasis on Enron employees contributing to local charity efforts. Even tracking Olson’s 
shifting job responsibilities reveals the company’s growing commitment to reshaping 
Houston as much as possible. Significantly, Olson was moved from working in Enron 
Capital and Trade to the head of community relations in 1997. As she noted during her 
trial testimony, by the end of her career at Enron, Olson was in charge of human 
resources, as well as “community resources and diversity.”
146
 While these three 
categories may at first seem unrelated, all three of them were intertwined with the 
company’s overall post-1997 strategy. As Olson put it, Ken Lay’s vision of the company 
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was “to get very involved in the Houston community and – and, as we created the Enron 
brand, to have that be a big piece of our brand.”
147
 Yet at the same time, as Lay put it, it 
was “not all philanthropy.”
148
 Rather, Lay sought to make the city an attractive place, not 
only to do business, but also a city that would attract highly educated symbolic analysts. 
During the trial, Olson connected projects such as a United Way campaign and the Enron 
Field baseball stadium. Olson’s points here are apt. Much like Enron’s charitable 
activities, the baseball stadium reflected the emerging vision of Houston as a global city. 
 
ENRON FIELD 
For a long time, the Astrodome had been synonymous with Houston and its 
Sunbelt characteristics. As American Studies scholar Ben Lisle argues, when the 
Astrodome was built in the 1960s, the massive stadium, located seven miles from 
downtown “expressed Houston’s explosive growth” as well as “its brazen new 
confidence.”
149
 Interestingly, the Astrodome was also embedded in Houston’s postwar 
freeways.
150
 The stadium was a near perfect analogy for the way in which the city as a 
whole was developing – with an emphasis on the outskirts and a disdain for the city’s 
inner core. By contrast, the stadium Enron had a hand in building, Enron Field, was 
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indicative of the city’s transformation. In 1996, Houston’s Major League baseball team, 
the Astros, considered leaving the city, prompting civic leaders to propose building a new 
stadium in an effort to halt the team’s flight. However, the new stadium would not merely 
be an update of the Astrodome, but would serve as another step in advancing Lay’s goal 
of ultimately transforming the city into a cosmopolitan metropolis.  
Much as he did when the city hosted the World Economic Forum at the beginning 
of the decade, Lay played a very prominent and public role in working to realize the 
baseball stadium. Indeed, throughout the year, Lay (and others) successfully campaigned 
in both public and private for a downtown stadium. Beginning in late August, The 
Houston Chronicle reported on efforts to bring the ballpark to downtown, often 
prominently featuring Lay. That summer, Ken Lay publically argued that locating the 




Houston was not the only city to hatch such a scheme. In the mid 1990s, ballparks 
were seen as the key to downtown revitalization.
152
 In Houston, the task was also a 
daunting one, requiring an influx of cash and lacking public support. Still, Lay was 
unflagging in his support, proclaiming: “It is important that the fourth-largest city in the 
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country, and what we think is a world-class city, have world-class professional athletics, 
just like it has world-class ballet and symphony and museums of fine arts and all the 
other things that make this a great city.”
153
 It was a sentiment that Lay and Enron later 
echoed internally. Significantly, the reason Lay provided was the need to reframe 
Houston as a “world-class” city.  
Still, the local media saw Lay and his allies as operating in a Houstonian tradition. 
Lay, The Houston Chronicle noted, made the declaration of elevating the city to “world-
class” status “after he met for lunch at the River Oaks Country Club on Tuesday with 
more than 15 high-ranking officials of large Houston companies.”
154
 This line effectively 
yanked the debate forming over the baseball stadium away from the neoliberal quality of 
life and economic rescaling that was behind Lay’s interest in keeping the Astros in 
Houston and reframed business elites’ interest in the stadium as typically Houstonian. 
Another Chronicle writer, Ed Fowler, mused that the idea to build a downtown ballpark 
had finally picked up speed because “the Big Cigars downtown were all at the summer 
places in Martha’s Vineyard until recently. Or maybe their wives made them go along on 




Perhaps this coverage served Lay well, since it at least partially obscured how 
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different the vision for the city would actually be. Though the ballpark faced an uphill 
battle in public support (by mid-September one poll indicated that only 38% of the city’s 
residents supported it), those with a public voice, such as the opinion pages of the 
Houston Chronicle, were enthusiastic.  Echoing Lay’s comments, the editorial board of 
the Chronicle, in support of a ballot proposition for bonds to help finance the stadium, 
compared the measure to other recent ballparks and wrote: “Where new downtown 
stadiums have been built to complement downtown development and entertainment 
concepts, the result has been increased and steady ballpark attendance, a revitalization of 
the area and hundreds of new business opportunities and successes for those 
communities.”
156
 As the head of Houston Sports Facility Partnership, created to realize 
the stadium, Lay dismissed the large amount of criticism against the plan as “the usual 
suspicious people nervous about business in general.”
157
 Ultimately, proponents of the 




Ground broke for the stadium in October, 1997. That month, Houston Chronicle 
writer John Williams appeared to think the ballpark was a sign that augured well for 
downtown. As he wrote in an article for the paper’s Sunday magazine, “Houston’s 
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decade-long-suffering downtown appears fully poised to rebound from the oil bust.”
159
 
Williams regarded the ballpark as a part of that general renaissance. Casting the 
revitalization in a global context, Williams wrote: “Though on the precipice of success, 
downtown Houston still needs much work before it enjoys a retail and entertainment 
revival that will give it the vitality many Houstonians want to show the rest of the 
world.”
160
 The article was filled with prominent Houstonians expressing their hopes and 
visions for a city preparing for the twenty-first century. Williams noted that in addition to 
the ballpark and rapidly filling skyscrapers, work at the street level was directed at 
cleaning up places like Main Street, which Williams described as “at best, shabby in 
stretches” and “at worst […] boarded up.”
161
 Of course, this meant that the future of the 
area’s homeless was suddenly uncertain as “plans for a pavilion for the homeless have 
not been completed because neighborhoods around downtown don’t want to attract street 
people.”
162
 Beyond the Astros’ new home, the writer drew attention to more than 1,500 
new “condominiums and apartments” that would soon be added to the area.  
Interestingly, Williams also connected downtown revitalization to Houston’s 
move toward knowledge work – the very type that became the source of woe for 
California in a few scant years. In an “era of deregulated energy,” Williams wrote, a 
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revitalized downtown would “serve as the world’s energy trading capital.”
163
 This 
distinction was crucial for Williams, who referenced “the not-so-distant days when some 
experts predicted downtown would never add another gleaming tower to its skyline.”
164
  
While by the time the article ran, “the city’s monumental skyscrapers” were “virtually 
filled,” Watson was careful to note that they were filled with companies that had 
“turn[ed] their head[s] from the days of $40-a-barrel oil and look[ed] toward an era of 
deregulated energy in which downtown [would] serve as the world’s energy trading 
capital.”
165
 Of course, Enron was by this point at the forefront of this specific economic 
activity. Lay himself repeatedly linked downtown revitalization to Houston’s 
transformation into a “knowledge economy.” As Williams noted, Lay’s argument for 
downtown development was “to attract top-notch workers and big business.”
166
 The 
article featured a long quotation from Lay comparing Houston to a range of international 
cities. Lay declared:  
We are the fourth-largest city in the United States; we are increasingly very much 
an international city. We are being compared with New York City and San 
Francisco and Los Angeles, and London and Paris and Hong Kong. As the world 
becomes more global, people become a lot more differentiating about the cities 
they want to go to.
167
  
Again, with this quotation, Lay linked the transformation of Houston’s downtown to the 
city’s ability to retain the type of workers Enron needed. Significantly, such downtown 
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revitalization was consistent with an overall neoliberalization of space. As geographer 
Neil Smith notes, late-style gentrification and revitalization is “expressive of the rescaling 
of the urban vis-à-vis national and global scales.”
168
 The “Golden Buckle of the Sunbelt” 
was redefining its relationship with the rest of the world. 
Enron’s internal communications echoed this logic when the ballpark was 
completed. In 2000, just three years after Williams’ Chronicle piece, the Astros played 
their first game in the ballpark, which now bore the name Enron Field. Both former and 
future presidents George Bush Sr. and Jr. attended the event. Predictably, Enron Business 
“covered” the event. The article’s title, “Just the boost downtown Houston needed,” 
highlighted the connection between Enron Field and that neighborhood. The author 
declared: 
The ballpark has ignited the imagination of Houstonians. Its design – a throwback 
to the days when baseball was played on intimate fields, not mammoth multi-
sport arenas – is inspiring developers to recreate the glory of downtown on a 
human scale. Modern condominiums hide behind historic facades. New dwellings 
echo the style of years ago. Construction is designed to invite both the resident 
and visitor to linger and unwind.
169
 
Significantly, the article called attention to the “human scale” of downtown, and even the 
ballpark. The project had been designed by the same firm as other recent baseball fields 
around the country.
170
 Much like other ballparks from that time, the field itself was 
intended to be “intimate,” despite such modern features as a retractable roof. The passage 
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also illustrated how much Houston’s downtown revitalization represented a break from 
Houston’s past, best symbolized by the Astrodome. 
A sidebar for the article touted other recent changes to Houston’s downtown, 
citing the ballpark as the transformation’s catalyst. Not only were construction projects 
underway; the article noted that over 150 new restaurants and clubs had opened in the 
area, the number of residents had tripled in less than two years, and property values were 
rising. In a word, gentrification had come to downtown Houston. Yet, the article also 
pointed out that this was not disinterested corporate philanthropy. Rather, Enron needed 
its employees “to live in a city as vital and exciting as Enron is itself.”
171
 As the article 
noted, Lay reasoned that “the best talent and the brightest people may not be happy or be 
stimulated in a city without a center or a vibrant soul.”
172
 In other words, Enron required 
very material changes to Houston as a place in order to create the room they needed in 
order to perform their immaterial work.  
The political economic implications behind these statements revealed a deep 
neoliberal logic of interurban competition and rescaling. Referring to David Harvey’s 
work, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell write that “urban entrepreneurial” activities, such as 
the “reproduction of cultural spectacles, enterprise zones, [and] waterfront developments” 
reflect “the powerful disciplinary effects of interurban competition.”
173
 Houston was no 
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longer just the golden buckle of the Sun Belt. Instead, Lay, Enron and others were 
working to recast Houston as a global center of abstract knowledge work. 
But downtown revitalization did not mean a complete erasure of the past. As 
David Harvey argues, some types of postmodern architecture emphasize local concerns. 
Specifically, he notes that postmodern urban design, “aims to be sensitive to vernacular 
traditions, local histories, particular wants, needs, and fancies….”
174
 Likewise, Enron 
Field and downtown’s new, ostensibly democratic scale and attention to local concerns fit 
this mold well. Interestingly, the “historic façades” also fit with Harvey’s point about 
postmodernism’s “penchant for historical quotation.”
175
 These details point to the fraught 
relationship Enron had with Houston’s past. At the very least, Enron’s focus on the 
downtown represented an ideological rejoinder to the spatially segregated city and the 
commuter ethos and design that characterized white collar workers’ experience of 
Houston for much of the twentieth century even as the new physical details of Enron 
Field celebrated that past. 
 
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE 
However, though the aim of the ballpark was to refashion Houston’s central 
business district on a “human scale,” remnants of the city’s modernist and imposing past 
remained. In these instances, Enron built upon them. For example, the region’s often 
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inhospitable weather led to the creation of a system of underground walkways, known as 
“The Tunnels.” 
Rather than walk above ground, pedestrians traverse long hallways that go on for 
city blocks, periodically opening up into food courts and so on. There was even an 
entrance to the system below the company’s headquarters, Enron Tower, at 1400 Smith 
Street. However, the number of amenities offered in the building itself rendered such 
excursions unnecessary. Indeed, features like the Tunnels were in keeping with the city’s 
overall anti-urban ethos.  
While the Tunnels literally connected 1400 Smith Street to the rest of Houston’s 
downtown, elsewhere Enron used modern architecture’s symbolic potential to emphasize 
the change that the company represented. Though Enron Tower was connected to the rest 
of the neighborhood through past developments like the Tunnels, the building itself, as 
well as the company’s additions to it, suggested Enron’s difference from the businesses 
surrounding it. Much like Frederic Jameson’s celebrated analysis of Los Angeles’s 
Westin Bonaventure Hotel, it seemed Enron Tower aspired to be a “total space” that was 
a “complete world.”
176
 Jameson’s reading of the Bonaventure’s “disjunction from the 
surrounding city,” a quality typical of “a certain number of other characteristic 
postmodern buildings” neatly described the relationship between Enron Tower and 
downtown Houston.
177
 Both the Bonaventure and Enron Tower had glass façades that 
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achieved a “peculiar and placeless dissociation” from their respective neighborhoods.
178
 
For Jameson, the relationship between such postmodern buildings and their surroundings 
was not integrative, but oppositional, with the buildings positioned as “equivalent[s] and 
replacement[s] or substitute[s]” for the city.
179
 Of course, Enron did not design 1400 
Smith Street. The skyscraper had been built in 1982, several years before the company’s 
existence. However, in the late 1990s and beginning of the twenty first century, Enron 
added onto the existing structure in ways that highlighted the building’s difference from 
the rest of downtown Houston. 
Specifically, Enron’s additions represented space-age updates to familiar 
structures in Houston's downtown. For example, when the company built a second 
building, Enron Center, across the street from 1400 Smith Street, the two buildings were 
connected by a circular, decidedly space-age walkway above the street.  Though such 
walkways had long been a feature of the city’s downtown, the aesthetic sensibility of the 
walkway that connected Enron Tower with the newer Enron Center seemed a deliberate 
attempt to refashion the downtown for a more globalized city and the informational 
economy. The elliptical layout suggested the fluidity and movement that characterized 
Enron’s self image in the late 1990s. While Houston has sometimes been called “Space 
City” because of NASA’s presence, and though the circular walkway recalled a 
midcentury design style that could even be found in the Astrodome, both Enron Center 
and the walkway attempted to locate high technology and knowledge work with the other 
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energy companies in the city's center, and not on the outskirts with the old stadium. The 
walkway was also an architectural compliment to the visual style Enron adopted in the 
1ate 1990s. Indeed, the figure the Enron buildings cut in the Houston sky, as well as the 
elliptical walkway, were practically architectural parallels to the design style of the 1999 
annual report. 
In this context, Enron Center and the walkway were veritable tributes to the 
company’s focus on symbolic analysis. A 1999 Enron Business article did not mince 
words regarding the import of the new structure. As the writer put it, “in addition to the 
tower, a seven-story base that spans a full city block will house four state-of-the-art 
trading floors with technical capacity that will rival the New York Stock Exchange.”
180
 
The accompanying photo depicted both Lay and Skilling in hard hats and wielding 
jackhammers. Both the quotation and photo revealed the tension at the heart of the move. 
The company’s ambitions and reference points were, by then, outside of Houston – 
looking again to more easily recognizably international cities like New York. A bit later, 
the article noted that the building was designed by Cesar Pelli, “an internationally 
renowned architect” who had “designed the world’s tallest building located in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia and a number of Houston-area buildings.”
181
 Here, again, the tension 
between Houston’s regional role and a wider global view was present. If, as Stuart Leslie 
contends, a building’s “façade announces the corporation’s civic aspirations,” then the 
additions to Enron’s headquarters suggested a new role for Houston in a global 
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 The building itself was meant to be massive. This was fitting, since Lay was 
quoted in the article as saying Enron’s Houston-based workforce would “swell by 20 to 
30 percent” by 2001.
183
 This is not an insignificant detail. In fact, Enron’s Houston-based 
workforce, the type of workers the company was looking to hire, practically demanded 
the sorts of changes to Houston that Enron sought. What is more, the space’s interiors 
were meant to rival other centers of knowledge work, not the sort of office tasks being 
performed by oil and gas executives in other skyscrapers down the block. 
 
DIVERSITY AS CORPORATE STRATEGY 
 Lay’s attempts to transform Houston were not only designed to transform the city 
into a global city of knowledge work. The additions to Enron Tower and the construction 
of Enron Field meshed well with the corporation’s keen interest in a diverse workforce. 
For the Houston energy company, the word “diversity” became a key term. Throughout 
the 1990s, Enron Business consistently ran articles praising diverse perspectives and 
insisted that a diverse set of employees translated to a competitive advantage. Of course, 
throughout the 1990s, the company also touted its global ambitions. These strains 
manifested themselves in images such as the one that graced the 1994 annual report 
cover, which featured a group of ethnically diverse children (as well as a few adults) 
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sitting in front of a statue of the globe from the 1964 World’s Fair in New York.  The 
globe represented Enron’s increasing global ambitions, but it is significant that the 
children were in the foreground. Their diverse faces offered a parallel to the changes 
taking place in Houston and emphasized how attention to diversity was part of the 
company’s business strategy. Simply put, Enron needed Houston to be a global city 
because the company required a global workforce. 
 Because of this need, the corporation went to great lengths throughout the 1990s 
to portray itself as a cosmopolitan organization. For example, in 1999, Enron Business 
ran an article celebrating Hispanic Heritage Month. Titled “Viva Diversity,” the feature 
opened with a brief scene in front of the company’s headquarters. As the article noted, 
the display was visible to both “hundreds of Enron employees (and curious passers 
by).”
184
 While the main attraction was food, the scene itself was far more involved, 
featuring “authentic Mexican cuisine from Taqueria del Sol and a Latin band, Groupo 
Batacha.”
185
 The article also cheerily reported that, “Brazilian dancers in colorful 
costumes added a festive touch to the celebration of a rich culture that has influenced 
more than 20 countries around the world.”
186
 The scene itself, then, looked beyond 
Houston and again tried to reframe the building and the company in a global context. Yet 
the scene was not simply a diversion for employees. The article took up the theme of 
“diversity” and connected it back to the company and its global ambitions. The article 
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even quoted Cindy Olson claiming that “as a global company with operations in more 
than 30 countries, Enron champions diversity of thinking, talents, educational 
background as well as race, culture and gender.”
187
 Here, it may be tempting to view 
Olson’s quote as a cynical reworking of a 1990s multicultural sensibility. Another article, 
“Enron Takes a Wider View on Diversity,” asserted that Enron’s “uniqueness” was why 
it was “the most innovative company in America,” and that “diversity among [the 
corporation’s] people create[d] new and different ideas, in turn creating business 
value.”
188
 This emphasis on “diversity” also found its way into Enron’s charitable 
activities in Houston. That same Enron Business story highlighted the Enron Economic 
Development Corporation, through which the corporation funded and advised minority-
owned small businesses throughout the city.
189
   
As William Leach pointed out in Country of Exiles (1999), such corporate 
cosmopolitanism was typical of the late 1990s.
190
 For example, Caitlin Zaloom has noted 
that in the 1990s, Perkins Silver, a London financial services company, “recruited 
educated professionals, including women and minorities” with a “working theory” that 
“posited that traders with these backgrounds and experiences […] would generate 
particular and profitable readings of the market.”
191
 As Zaloom points out, the logic 
behind this strategy was that diversity among employees would reveal “new angles for 
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 Likewise, Enron valued a diversity of backgrounds 
among its symbolic analysts - in short, a global workforce for a global environment – and 
needed a city that would accommodate these workers. Events such as Hispanic Heritage 
Month (which also included a display of artwork in the lobby of the building) were 
complimentary to the larger changes Enron sought in Houston. If the company was 
increasingly looking to hire an international body of symbolic analysts, the city itself 
would have to be pulled from its decidedly parochial roots and attitudes. Of course, by 
this point, the city was changing, and Enron and Ken Lay were some of the forces 
hastening the pace of change. 
 
JITTERS IN HOUSTON 
Lay was undoubtedly excited by such changes though the sharp break from the 
city’s past also produced strains of anxiety among some Houstonians. At times, these 
anxieties were not immediately visible. For example, the Houston journalist Mimi 
Schwartz wrote admiringly in Texas Monthly in 2001 about the “modern,” “international” 
and ethnically diverse scene at Enron’s headquarters. Tellingly, Schwartz began her piece 
by calling attention to the company’s physical spaces. For the journalist, Enron Tower 
registered a distinct difference from the other spaces and companies in the area. Unlike 
the offices of old Houston institutions, Schwartz wrote, “The Enron skyscraper near the 
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south end of Houston’s downtown feels like the international headquarters of the best and 
the brightest.”
193
 Schwartz even made the break explicit, writing that “the lobby in no 
way resembles the hushed, understated entryways of the old-fashioned oil companies, 
like Shell and Texaco nearby. Enron, in contrast, throbs with modernity.”
194
 Here, 
Schwartz registered the “new” Houston that Enron had sought to actively create. Not only 
did the scene appear far more “modern” to Schwartz, but it also seemed more 
“international.” As the writer noted, “The people hustling in and out of the elevators 
[were] black, white, brown; Asian, Middle Eastern, European, African, as well as 
American-born.”
195
 Here, the international group of young symbolic analysts provided 
the journalist with an image of the changes to Houston that Enron represented. These 
scenes suggested that the changes Lay sought while spearheading efforts such as bringing 
the Astros to downtown were being realized. Schwartz’s admiration, though, was hardly 
unqualified. 
While the article was filled with admiring passages (such as the opening), there 
were also moments when the journalist seemed unsure about the change Enron 
represented. Significantly, these uneasy moments were connected to downtown 
revitalization and the diversity of Enron’s workforce. For example, in describing the sort 
of knowledge worker that Enron began to attract (and that motivated the company’s 
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involvement in city affairs), Schwartz noted that “Skilling wanted smart people but not 
just any smart people. He wanted the smartest people from schools like Harvard, 
Stanford, and maybe, Rice.”
196
 Here, Schwartz drew attention to the origins of the 
knowledge workers that gave Enron’s headquarters an “international” feel. While the 
writer approved of the diversity the company represented, this passage also bristled 
slightly at the idea of importing workers from outside the state, as opposed to hiring from 
venerable state institutions like Texas A&M. 
To Schwartz, the presence of such bodies suggested a materialistic corruption of 
Houston’s values (never mind that Houston had long had a reputation of being a “glittery, 
often gaudy” paean to materialism).
197
  Schwartz’s unease was palpable when she wrote 
that “the starting salary” of these young international workers “was around $80,000. 
Maybe it wasn’t a fortune – yet – but the signing bonus, about $20,000, was more than 
enough for a lease on the obligatory Porsche Boxster or one of the lofts being renovated 
close to downtown. (Enron people didn’t live in far-flung suburbs. Suburbs were uncool 
and too far from the office.)"
198
 Here, Schwartz looked askance at both the conspicuous 
new symbolic analysts and Enron’s rejection of Houston’s past. Even preferring the city 
to the suburbs was worthy of criticism. Schwartz recast the downtown revitalization that 
won praise from both the Houston Chronicle and Enron Business as morally suspect. In 
this piece, Schwartz chose to frame revitalization as drastic change from Houston’s past 
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rather than a natural step for the “Free Enterprise City.”  
Such moments were striking in an article that largely emphasized how Enron’s 
business had been transformed from being, in Schwartz’s telling, populated by “cautious 
executives who dealt with tangible assets like pipelines” to an organization that now 
preferred “bold executives who dealt with intangible assets.” Still, despite the misgivings 
that the author had, she chose to close her piece with Skilling’s point of view, writing, 
“Houston, he promises, will become the world’s center of commodity trading….” Indeed, 
in the last paragraph of the article, Skilling himself made the connection between 
symbolic analysis and the changes to the region, saying “there are thousands of people 
running around the streets of Houston that get it.” Still, in the end, Schwartz’s piece was 
shot through with ambivalence regarding the changes that Enron was ushering in.  
Ironically, Schwartz’s article could not have had worse timing. By the end of the 
year, the company’s collapse had become a national news story and was (for a time) the 
largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. While it goes without saying that Enron and its 
collapse would have a special meaning for Houstonians and Texans, the collapse brought 
forth a confused response from the state’s liberals.
 199
 In the process of condemning the 
changes Enron introduced to both the energy business and to Houston, such writers 
inadvertently revealed a reflexively conservative brand of state pride. 
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One such author was Robert Bryce, a writer for the liberal publication, The Texas 
Observer, and, according to Molly Ivins, “the best Texas investigative reporter of his 
generation.”
200
 Bryce tackled Enron as the subject of his book, Pipe Dreams, in 2003. 
Paying particular attention to a sense of place, Bryce even began his treatment of Enron 
with a scene dripping with symbolism – following an aging, recently fired Enron 
employee as she tried her luck at a job fair at Enron Field shortly after the bankruptcy. 
What is more, Bryce attributed part of the fiasco to Houston’s traditional business culture 
and used a good amount of space early in the book to connect Enron to Houston’s past. 
Early chapters noted that the company first started by John Kirby eventually became 
Enron.  
Yet even though Bryce saw Lay as only the latest in a long line of Lone Star 
“energy baron[s] who willingly pulls his pants down,” the journalist could not help but 
admire Houston’s swagger, calling it a “frontier” city with a “fearless ‘can-do’ spirit” that 
was missing in “Northern cities.”
201
 By contrast, Houston was a “city of irrepressible 
optimists.”
202
 Yet if Bryce betrayed admiration for the wildcatting enthusiasm and eternal 
sense of renewal in Houston’s energy barons, he also saw some of Enron’s tragedy as the 
product of this same attitude. The journalist connected Houston to Enron by arguing that 
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the nefarious habits of “buying” politicians at the national level was simply an extension 
of Houston’s business culture.  
Still, as much as the author blamed the legacy of the 8F Crowd for Enron, he 
reserved most of his scorn for a different group of Enron workers. Specifically, Bryce 
took up the same issues that Schwartz had addressed in her piece regarding Enron’s 
symbolic analysts as suspect, and insisted (far more emphatically than Schwartz had) that 
the corrupting elements within the company were not native to Texas. In one passage, 
Bryce quoted a former employee as saying, “you had the old pipeliners and you had the 
New York-type financial traders.”
203
 A little later, Bryce again quoted the executive as 
saying “nothing mattered to the New York traders except the deal.”
204
 In these moments, 
the author betrayed a sense of pride related to place. At least some of the company’s bad 
practices, in this telling, came from outside the state. In other words, the transformation 
that Houston underwent in the 1990s – from “Golden Buckle of the Sunbelt” to global 
city – were changes for the worse. Though politically liberal, Bryce had, at least on some 
level, echoed traces of the same Texas nativism and a strain of anti-cosmopolitanism that 
Schwartz revealed in her suspicion of the international symbolic analysts who shunned 
the (largely white) Houston suburbs. 
Yet if Bryce ultimately laid the blame at the feet of symbolic analysts, Pipe 
Dreams was also filled with the physical markers of the changes to Houston these traders 
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had brought. Throughout the book Bryce mapped a moral geography of Houston, 
tracking the movement of many notorious Enron executives as they took up residence in 
or around Houston’s wealthy River Oaks neighborhood. The book itself even included a 
map, revealing the location of many of these places.
205
 Here, these houses permanently 
marked Houston’s landscape as sites of greed and crime. In effect, both Bryce and 
Schwartz were turning their backs on Houston as a global center of symbolic analysis and 
knowledge work. Yet both writers stopped short of looking back in a wave of nostalgia 
for Houston’s industrial past. For Bryce, at least some of Enron’s collapse could be seen 
as an extension of the city’s long-standing veneration of big business. 
Other Houstonians, though, did not hesitate in calling for a return to the city’s pre-
Enron days. 2006’s Enron – The Musical, which was written, produced, and financed by 
Houston humorist Mark Fraser, explicitly rejected the new Houston and instead longed 
for the less complicated days of a pre-bust and recovery Sunbelt city. In a reflection of 
how much Enron’s fall from grace resonated as a local issue, the script’s narrative had 
more to do with Houston than the country or the world. Fraser’s play revealed an outright 
hostility toward the transformations that had taken place in the city. Not only did Fraser 
view Enron’s collapse as disastrous for Houston, but he blamed the late-century changes 
that Enron exemplified and looked nostalgically back to the city’s mid-century industrial 
economy and regional identity.  
The musical’s storyline focused on a character named “Ex-Enron” (standing in as 
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an everyman for Houstonians and former employees) who related both his personal 
history, as well as the company’s. In an echo and extension of Schwartz’s asides, the 
script dealt with Houston’s transformation into a “knowledge economy” and reframed 
these changes as an insider/outsider tension with Houston and the northeast. In the play, 
Ex-Enron revealed that he started working for Houston Natural Gas in 1977, years before 
the company merged with another natural gas company to form Enron. This date is 
doubly significant in that it also predates the move to a “knowledge based economy” as 
well as an awareness of the demographic changes that had taken place in the region.  
Throughout, Fraser cast Ex-Enron as a representation of the company before the 
introduction of its trading and derivatives business, as well as the Gas Bank and 
EnronOnline. In other words, Ex-Enron was more “Houstonian” than employees who 
came in with Skilling. A telling line in the musical pointed to this when Ex-Enron 
described Jeff Skilling as a "snake oil salesman" and the people he hired as “a bunch of 
MBA snobs."
206
 At one point, Ex-Enron declared: "Skilling never got his hands dirty - 
and we are in the oil and gas business!"
207
 In these moments, Fraser was looking beyond 
the changes taking place in Houston (which Enron was at the forefront of), back to the 
economic modes of production that enabled the region’s mid-century growth. In the end, 
the narrative clearly implied that even though Ex-Enron had lost his retirement, he and 
the city were better off without Enron and knowledge work. Fittingly, the staging of the 
play itself was very much a local undertaking. The cast was comprised of six unpaid 
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community theater actors and one pianist; the play itself was held in a church.  
In Fraser’s formulation, there was no equivocation or sense that Houston’s 
business culture might be at the very least partially to blame for Enron, such as Bryce 
indicated. Instead, symbolic analysts were the culprits. By contrast, there was something 
almost noble about the gas and oil business before it had been subsumed under the logic 
of the informational economy. Originally produced in December of 2006, the production 
was forced to share the stage decorations with a Christmas pageant that was running 
concurrently. While the authors were able to use half of the stage sparsely, treating it as a 
blank space where the audience could imagine Enron’s offices or the halls of Congress, 
the production also had to address the presence of a Christmas tree and living room sofa 
and chairs that made up the second half of the stage. The solution Fraser came up with 
was striking. The playwright used the set as an inspiration for a narrative framework 
whereby Ex-Enron and his wife hosted old friends around the holidays. The actor would 
even don a cardigan sweater for these scenes. This picture of domesticity and hominess 
was a direct rebuke to Houston’s internationalization and urban revitalization. These were 
scenes of suburban calm, recalling the decentralized commuting Houston of the 
automobile and Astrodome. In this way, Enron – The Musical longed for the restoration 
of a city and way of life that was, by that point, a part of the distant past. 
But of course, Houston had been transformed by Enron. The company’s remnants 
are still scattered across the city. Shortly after the collapse, Enron Field was renamed 





front of 1400 Smith Street, but the company’s additions to its former headquarters 
(including the second tower and circular walkway hovering over the street between the 
two buildings) are still present. The buildings are now occupied by Chevron, an oil 
company with direct ties to Houston’s past. However, Enron’s fall from grace was not a 
source of anxiety for Houston alone. Rather, many of the fears these Houston writers 
betrayed also played out on a national level as Americans used Enron’s collapse as an 













Enron ended the twentieth century as an emblem of the “new economy,” but it 
would not maintain this position for long. Jeff Skilling once described the company’s 
stock as “kind of the ultimate score card.”
1
 If one takes Skilling’s proposition at face 
value, Enron was not doing well in 2001. Though Enron’s stock was $82 towards the end 
of January, a month later it had fallen to just over $73.
2
 The day after the company filed 
for bankruptcy on December 2nd, the stock’s price was a mere forty cents.
3
 A number of 
events that year precipitated this final injury. For example, Skilling abruptly resigned in 
August, fueling both investors’ ire and media speculation. Ken Lay would subsequently 
return to his former position as CEO, but his tenure was ultimately brief. Shortly after he 
stepped back into that role, Sherron Watkins, an accountant with Enron, wrote an 
anonymous memo to Lay detailing financial problems with the company; she had 
recently been transferred to work for Andy Fastow’s unit and had come across the 
fraudulent Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) the CFO had created. The company’s 
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problems would soon be well-known, unfolding in the pages of publications such as The 
Wall Street Journal and The New York Times.
4
  
Beginning in the fall of 2001, the pace of events was startling. On October 16th, 
Enron announced large losses of just over a billion dollars, spurring the first of many 
critical Wall Street Journal reports on the company’s financial health. After determining 
that the SPEs Fastow had created were not legitimate, on November 8th, the company 
issued a restatement of its finances for the years 1997 through 2001. The financial 
community reacted badly. The stock price dropped quickly and the company’s debt rating 
was downgraded to a level where it was no longer considered investment worthy. Fastow 
was ousted and attention turned to the accounting firm Arthur Andersen and its conflict 
of interest in offering Enron both consulting and accounting services. Like Enron, Arthur 
Andersen did not survive the scandal.
5
 In a last ditch effort to keep operating, Enron 
attempted to merge with Dynegy, another Houston energy company, but the deal fell 
apart after more documents surfaced, revealing that Enron’s financial situation was even 
worse than earlier reported; some contracts contained provisions demanding immediate 
repayment of loans if Enron’s stock price or debt bond rating dropped below a specific 
point (which it already had). Suddenly, Enron was obligated to pay off more debt, but the 
company was quickly running out of money.  
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Though it took a little while for the general news media to pick up on the story, 
certain details, such as widespread document shredding at Arthur Andersen, revelations 
that employees were unable to access their 401Ks to sell the rapidly declining stock (even 
as Skilling and Lay had sold enormous amounts), and Ken Lay’s close relationship with 
President Bush, added to interest in the company’s collapse. During this time, the 
majority of Enron employees lost their jobs. When the company finally filed for 
bankruptcy, it was the largest in U.S. history. By January of 2002, the story seemed to 
grow even more salacious. Cliff Baxter, a former Enron executive (with a history of 
depression) committed suicide, fueling conspiracy theories. Pretty soon, Enron executives 
were testifying before congressional panels and television cameras showed executives in 
suits, ties, and handcuffs. Public reaction, though, was hardly univocal, with some reports 
focusing on the company’s unsavory political connections instead of its type of business. 
Yet many people sought to widen the interpretive scope of Enron’s significance. For 
instance, Rosalie Genova has demonstrated that despite the appearance of “remarkably 
varied” Enron narratives, the company’s demise grafted easily onto long held anxieties 




However, a single, specific strand that ran through the initial coverage 
surrounding Enron indicated a larger anxiety, and one that was primarily expressed 
through a preoccupation with language. While ostensibly about Enron, early newspaper 
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and magazine articles were also expressions of a general mistrust of meaning, symbolic 
analysis and the informational economy.  
This anxiety over the type of economic activity Enron exemplified, marked by 
dramatic increases and changes in the amount, flow and nature of information and work, 
was lurking in many of the cultural texts that emerged in the wake of the company’s 
failure. As the Enron narrative began to take shape in a number of newspapers and 
magazines, and was later codified in an avalanche of books and films, fears began to 
emerge of a world where information had become so complex that meaning itself was 
threatened and nothing of monetary or moral worth was created. Most of this anxiety was 
never fully or explicitly articulated, but was present in traces and asides where language 
failed and signification began to slip. 
Though Enron’s fall from grace was, for many in the United States, the first they 
had ever heard of the company, it proved to be a huge media story. Given the enormously 
complicated nature of what Enron was doing at the time of its demise, its popularity as a 
news story was startling. Less surprising was how quickly the particular details of 
Enron’s business dropped from view. Instead, Americans began to use Enron as a 
convenient symbol for all the uncertainties that had accompanied the rise of the 
informational economy. One hallmark of what Harvey regards as postmodernity, is a 
financial system “so complicated that it surpasse[d] most people’s understanding.”
 7
 
Indeed, many of the changes in both social and economic life that Harvey points to in 
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aftermath of the Fordist collapse in 1973 were similar to the innovations in the natural 
gas industry that Enron had trumpeted throughout the 1990s. In reacting to Enron’s 
collapse, journalists, authors and other cultural producers were reacting to a miniaturized 
version of the transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation. 
 




   
Though the 1990s experienced one of the longest bull markets in U.S. history, by 
the start of the new century, a nervous undercurrent began to creep into discussions about 
the economy, particularly the “new economy” of Internet stocks. March 10, 2000, was a 
high watermark for the NASDAQ stock index, which had been practically synonymous 
with the decade’s technological innovations. During that day, the NASDAQ reached a 
record of 5132.52.
8
 Yet that same day, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was at a level 
of 9928.82, even though it had started the year above 1100.
9
 These contradictory numbers 
only began to hint at the economic anxiety just beneath the surface during the 1990s.  
Indeed, anthropologist Karen Ho points out that although the 1990s have been called “the 
greatest economy boom in U.S. history,” the decade was also one of “record 
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downsizings,” suggesting a far more ambiguous economic scene.
10
 Still, as financial 
historian Charles Geisst notes, the “climb” of the Dow Jones was dramatic throughout 
that decade.
11
 However, though “television business news programs celebrated each new 
milestone,” each new mark was accompanied by “skepticism” that “began to build as the 
12,000 mark was approached.”
12
  
“Skepticism” was probably too mild a term. As early as February 2000, financial 
magazines were beginning to write about the prospect of economic collapse.
13
 In part, 
this worry was due to the wild swings of the stock market as well as a string of dotcom 
failures.
14
 By April 14, 2000, the NASDAQ had dropped to 3321.29.
15
 These financial 
and economic jitters found their way onto the cover of Newsweek a short while later. The 
magazine’s cover featured two Alka-seltzer tablets fizzing in a glass of water and the 
subtitle “Sobering up about the New Economy,” describing it in the table of contents as 
the “Malox Market.”
16
 The article itself mentioned that the NASDAQ’s drop had been 
greater than the 1929 market crash, morbidly joking that “If you could hurt yourself 
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jumping out of one-story buildings, Silicon Valley parking lots would have been littered 
with the bodies of techies despairing over their vaporized stock options.”
17
 The piece 
focused on “new economy” companies, the very type that Enron emulated in practice and 
pronouncement. The author, Allan Sloan, specifically noted that many of these 
companies had “high concepts but little else.”
18
 By the following year, confidence in the 
“new economy” was badly shaken.  
In the first few days of 2001, InternetWeek ran an article titled “Enjoy the 
Recession of ’01 and You’ll Feel Better – Really,” arguing that some companies would 
emerge stronger than before.
19
 The NASDAQ was at 2781.30 towards the end of the 
month and the Christian Science Monitor noted that “as the calendar flipped to 2001, the 
nation’s central bankers” were worrying about a recession.
20
  
In broad terms, this meant that the much vaunted “new economy” was coming 
under fire, with many of the complaints couched in the same terms and language that 
would eventually be used to condemn Enron. One prominent example was management 
scholar Michael Porter’s article for the Harvard Business Review in March 2001. Though 
he conceded that the Internet was an important development, Porter, a respected voice in 
his field, pointed to several worrisome components of the “new economy,” including 
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(presciently) creative accounting approaches and “confusing market signals.”
21
 Instead, 
Porter argued that “the creation of true economic value” was “the final arbiter of business 
success.”
22
 An accompanying small inset titled “Words for the Unwise: The Internet’s 
Destructive Lexicon” also highlighted the new economy’s language problems. Here, he 
wrote that “the misguided approach to competition that characterizes business on the 
Internet has even been embedded in the language used to discuss it.”
23
 The author 
worried that “murky” terms such as “business model” could become invitations to “faulty 
thinking and self-delusion” and that “words in the Internet lexicon also have unfortunate 
consequences.”
24
 Porter’s critique of the “new economy” was significant in two respects. 
First, it focused on both aggressive accounting practices and the vagaries of language that 
would come to characterize early panics over Enron. Second, it prompted a response 
from champions of the new economy.  
Business 2.0 mentioned Porter’s assessment and, as a mild rebuff, offered up the 
cover story to their August/September 2001 issue, “The Revolution Lives.” The article’s 
author, Jerry Useem, tried to strike something of a middle ground, but for a publication 
that had previously been given over to techno-utopian flights of fancy, the humor and 
concession of certain points both masked and revealed an anxiety that the new economic 
order had not actually come to pass. Though ostensibly lighthearted, Useem’s defensive 
asides belied fears in the business community that the digital, knowledge-based economy 
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was sputtering. Interestingly, towards the end of the article, the author pointed to Enron 
and Jeff Skilling as examples of a fundamental, revolutionary change, proclaiming that in 
Enron’s headquarters, “glimmers of a possible future are emerging.”
 25
  Skilling himself 
was even one of three men featured on the magazine’s cover.
 
 
Ironically, that same month Skilling left the company, sparking some in the press 
to question Enron’s state of affairs. Though he cited personal reasons for leaving, the 
announcement caused a small flurry in the financial and energy trade press.
26
 Earlier in 
the year, Skilling had called a stock analyst an “asshole” during a conference call, raising 
eyebrows about the CEO’s mental state.
27
 Perhaps most provocatively, John Emshwiller 
of the Wall Street Journal reported that one reason for Skilling’s exit was the declining 
stock price.
28
 Yet even his departure was also intertwined with growing doubts about the 
“new economy.” InternetWeek, for example, claimed that Enron’s woes were caused by 




By the end of the twentieth century, many of the dotcoms that had been hailed as 
revolutionary no longer existed. Some Americans had begun to view many of these now-
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defunct companies as shams from the start – or, at best, stupid ideas (e.g. - Pets.com).
30
 
However, others were not ready to let go of the technological euphoria of the previous 
decade. Curiously, Enron began to emerge as a company that was part of the “real” new 
economy – and not a failed dotcom.  
 
“VAGUE, GRANDOISE TERMS” – ENRON AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF 
LANGUAGE 
 
However, even at the height of media enthusiasm for the company, some business 
journalists had been critical of the company. Peter Eavis, a writer for the financial 
website, TheStreet.com, had been a consistent critic for some time. Jonathan Weil’s 
article in the September 20, 2000, Texas edition of the Wall Street Journal, titled “Energy 
Traders Cite Gains, But Some Math is Missing,” was especially prescient.
31
 Not solely 
focused on Enron, Weil took issue with a number of energy trading companies’ 
accounting practices, specifically “mark-to-market” accounting and the practice of 
claiming “unrealized gains.”
32
 Significantly, Weil pointed out that even though Enron 
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However, the most prominent critical voice appeared in Fortune in March of 
2001. Journalist Bethany McLean’s article, titled “Is Enron Overpriced,” was a pointed 
critique of the company at a time when other media outlets – especially in the business 
and technology press (such as the Business 2.0 article, published that same month) – were 
hailing Enron as a triumph of the new economy’s “knowledge work” in a field that was 
typified by large industrial processes. Since its appearance, McLean’s article has come to 
play an important role in most popular narratives about the company and McLean herself 
became the first of several journalists who would assume a heroic role in Enron’s story.  
 The article’s later notoriety was due in part to Jeff Skilling and Andy Fastow’s 
reactions to the very prospect of a critical news story about the company. In her retelling 
(in the film documentary, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room), McLean’s initial 
contacts with Enron executives were hostile.
34
 Jim Chanos, a “short seller,” told the 
journalist that he found Enron’s financial statements perplexing and thought it was not a 
good investment (at the time, this was a minority opinion). McLean was similarly 
flummoxed by the company’s financial information and decided it would be a good 
subject for a Fortune article. As part of her research for the article, she contacted Jeff 
Skilling, who was both evasive and confrontational (apparently calling the journalist 










  The next day, Andy Fastow and another executive flew to New York to 
meet with McLean. In her retelling, at the end of the meeting, Fastow lingered and asked 
her not to write anything bad about him.
36
 Even though the circumstances surrounding 




Still, the article was significant. It was here that McLean anticipated many of the 
criticisms and anxieties about postindustrialism and the informational economy that 
surfaced in later Enron narratives. The article’s main point was that the company’s 
financial statements and businesses were extremely complex and difficult to understand. 
Still, the full page photograph accompanying the article recalled many of the images that 
business publications (as well as the company itself) had used since 1997, depicting 
action on Enron’s trading floor. The bodies of the traders moving about were slightly 
blurred, suggesting motion and high energy. In the foreground, one young trader sat in 
front of five large computer screens, each displaying different pieces of information. As 
Caitlin Zaloom points out, such flickering images on computer terminals are abstractions 
of the market itself, a physical space transposed into pieces of information - charts, line 
graphs, scrolling numbers and so forth.
38
 Information itself dominated the scene.
39
 The 
accompanying caption also pointed to the company’s ultimate transformation: “Some 
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people liken Enron, with its massive trading operation, to a Wall Street securities firm.”
40
 
However, instead of signifying the triumph of “brain intensive businesses,” the article’s 
subtitle - “It’s in a bunch of complex businesses. Its financial statements are nearly 
impenetrable. So why is Enron trading at such a huge multiple?” – framed the image in a 
negative light.
41
 Indeed, there was a direct connection between the overwhelming amount 
of abstract data in the photograph and the statement that Enron’s businesses were 
“complex” and its statements “impenetrable.”  
That the company’s operations had become too complex was a criticism running 
throughout McLean’s article. She pointed out Enron’s arrogance early on in the article 
and quipped that even though the company’s stock price was trading at a very high level, 
“Enron has an even higher opinion of itself.”
42
 From this point, the journalist moved 
quickly to highlight the incomprehensibility of the company’s practices. After noting that 
Enron “has been steadily selling off its old-economy iron and steel assets,” she wrote that 
Enron’s new business was usually described in “vague, grandiose terms like the 
‘financialization of energy.’”
43
 A little later, she complained that “describing what Enron 
does isn’t easy, because what it does is mind-numblingly complex.”
44
 These passages 
contained the first rumbling of the anxieties that Enron’s collapse eventually unleashed. 
They registered the shift that Enron had taken, from an “old-economy” company with 
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large, material assets (physical, tangible things) to the “financialization of energy” – a 
strange phrase that signaled the triumph of immaterial abstraction.  
While the 1999 letter to shareholders had boasted the failure of language, here the 
journalist was uneasy about it. For McLean, this “vague” phrase rendered the business 
nearly impossible to describe. At the precise moment that information and symbols 
assumed dominion over the material world, language failed.
45
 The description of the 
company’s operations as “mind-numbingly complex” further connected the vagueness of 
language to the increasing intricate manipulations of information. It was this very 
complexity that caused this loss of meaning. At the same time, McLean also rejected 
Skilling’s emphasis on “brain intensive businesses.” She paraphrased Fastow as saying 
that the company still, at the end of the day, delivered natural gas, a physical commodity, 
and mentioned that “in order to facilitate its plan to trade excess bandwidth capacity, 
Enron is constructing its own network.”
46
 Indeed, these details underscored the central 
contradiction of the informational economy – such traffic in information could only be 
facilitated by large material objects and spaces. Though it was muted, McLean’s article 
hinted at tensions that would later rise to the surface, in effect making Enron a convenient 
site for some to voice anxiety about the post-1973 informational economy just below the 
technological euphoria of the previous decade.  
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Still, it would be wrong to imply that McLean’s Fortune article sparked a wave of 
skepticism about Enron or postindustrialism in general. In the months following, the 
article was essentially ignored, and Enron, as a news story, more or less disappeared from 
Fortune’s pages, beyond the typical coverage it had received up until that point.
47
 Panics 
over 9/11 and terrorism, obviously, became the major news story in September. Still, this 
does not mean Enron had completely disappeared from the news. Indeed, news coverage 
would prove to be integral to Enron’s downfall. Specifically, two Wall Street Journal 
reporters, John Emshwiller and Rebecca Smith, wrote a series of damaging news stories 
after Enron began revealing its financial woes in conference calls with analysts and 
issuing a number of documents, such as financial statements. Much like McLean’s 
Fortune article, Emshwiller and Smith’s reports were viewed in later accounts as integral 
to a loss of confidence in the company. Though they drew on information that was not 
available to McLean earlier that year, some of the anxieties in her Fortune article could 
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“I THINK WE HAVE A CROSSED LINE” – ENRON REPORTING LOSSES, 
REPORTING ON ENRON’S LOSSES 
 
The bad news that Enron provided came on October 16, 2001, when the Houston 
company released its third quarter earnings. Shortly after beginning a conference call 
with financial analysts and reporters, Ken Lay noted that the company would record 
“nonrecurring charges of slightly over a billion dollars” before going on to discuss a 
number of bright spots.
48
 Towards the end of the scripted portion of the call, Lay 
dissected the sources of the “nonrecurring charge” and revealed that $544 million came 
from losses associated with shutting down the Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) that 
Fastow had created over the last several years, referring to them as “certain structured 
finance arrangements with a previously-disclosed entity.”
49
 He went on to announce that 
“in connection with the early termination” of the SPEs “shareholders’ equity” would “be 
reduced by approximately $1.2 billion.”
50
 This section of the call would prove to be the 
focal point of the Wall Street Journal coverage that led to further revelations and, finally, 
the company’s bankruptcy. Far from the fawning pieces of previous years, the Journal’s 
October coverage of the company was tantamount to a revolution in attitudes towards 
Enron. 
This was but a small portion of the overall conversation. If the call could be 
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said to have a theme at all, it would be clarity. As Lay put it early on in the conversation, 
“We are committed to making the results of our core energy business more transparent to 
investors and not clouded by non-core activities.”
51
 At the conclusion of his remarks, 
many of which highlighted material, physical objects such as pipelines and power plants, 
Lay told his listeners, “We hope our expanded disclosures help you to understand our 
operations.”
52
 Shortly after the call was opened up to questions, some (though not all) 
analysts expressed concern over the losses that Enron had reported.  
Ironically, and perhaps reflecting how difficult clarity could be in the 
informational economy, the question and answer session was momentarily interrupted by 
crossed wires. The call’s operator cut in on Ken Lay in the middle of a sentence, leading 
to the following exchange: 
 Operator: Sir, are you there? 
 Kenneth Lay: Hello? 
 Operator: Yes, sir. Are you there? 
 Kenneth Lay: Yeah. 
 Operator: Yes. You were calling in reference to the Duke Energy call? 
 Kenneth Lay: No. Operator? 
 Operator: Yes … 
 Carl Krist: I think we have a crossed line. 
Kenneth Lay: We have a crossed line here. This is the Enron third quarter  
call. 
Male: Is the Enron operator on? 
Operator: Yes, sir, I am on. Just one moment, we will isolate the incident.  
One moment, please. 
Kenneth Lay: Now, if you’d like us to talk about Duke, we’ll do that too. 
Carl Krist: Well, Ken, I think you’ve helped me with some flavor, and I 
appreciate it. Best of luck. 








Kenneth Lay: Well, the only point I was going to make finishing that up, 




Unidentified Male: Yes sir. 
Kenneth Lay: Ah, Next question. 
Operator: Thank you, gentlemen. We’ll now move on to Anatol Feygin 
with JP Morgan. 
Kenneth Lay: Anatol? 
Operator: One moment, please. 
Kenneth Lay: Maybe he got on the Duke call. 
Anatol Feygin: Hello, operator? 
Operator: Mr. Feygin, your line is now open. Please go ahead. 
Anatol Feygin: Can you hear me, operator? 




Of course, when the Wall Street Journal reported on the results of the call, and when 
authors would recount the earnings statement in books, they neglected to mention this 
exchange. It was just “noise” after all, but it also vividly demonstrated how disorienting 
the informational economy and its modes of communication could be. In retrospect, 
Lay’s quick statement about “previously-disclosed entities,” “shareholder reduction” and 
“nonrecurring charges” would be the moment that set the course for Enron’s downfall. It 
was also the catalyst for the damning Wall Street Journal coverage that appeared later 
that month. 
Co-authored by John Emshwiller and Rebecca Smith, the Wall Street Journal 
pieces were relatively dry in tone, but the very first one, which ran the following day 
(October 17, 2001), reiterated several of McLean’s points. The article’s second line read: 
“The loss highlights the risks the onetime highflier has taken in transforming itself from a 
pipeline company into a behemoth that trades everything from electricity to weather 








 Ostensibly, these articles focused on the now-infamous sea of partnerships 
CFO Andy Fastow created in order to keep losses and risk off Enron’s balance sheet, but 
resonated beyond the immediate fraud. Not only did these news stories reveal how 
swiftly Enron’s stock price declined, but, as they unfurled, they charted an erosion of 
confidence in the company. Of course, in the context of these articles, the authors were 
referring to “investor confidence,” but there was still a connection with this specific loss 
of confidence and a general postindustrial anxiety. For example, on October 23
rd
 the 
reporters wrote: “Analysts also voiced concerns yesterday about possible other bad news 
lurking amid Enron’s vast and extremely complex operations.”
55
 This moment harkened 
back to McLean’s criticisms that Enron, by moving away from its old pipeline business 
and into something resembling financial trading, had become difficult to understand by 
virtue of the complex symbolic manipulation that now characterized its business. This 
theme became even more pronounced in an article published the next day, where the 
reporters described an exchange between an analyst and Ken Lay:  
During the conference call, analysts – even some who have been longtime 
Enron fans – challenged executives about the Fastow partnership arrangement and 
the company’s often opaque financial reports. “There’s the appearance you are 
hiding something,” said Goldman Sachs analyst David Fleischer. “You need to do 
everything in your power to demonstrate to investors that your dealings are above 
board.” 
Mr. Lay responded, “We’re trying to be as transparent as we can.”
56
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This last quote closed the article in a stunning fashion. Not only did it represent a fuller 
articulation of the anxiety over information, but it also hinted that the anxiety had 
actually spread to the company itself. Lay’s comment was full of doubt and worry that his 
symbolic analysts could not fully interpret the information they had produced. In the days 
and weeks that followed, Lay would actually use the defense that he didn’t understand 
what was happening at his company. In essence, Enron’s business had become in large 
part immaterial and increasingly difficult to understand.    
Yet this immateriality began to have real effects. On October 25
th
, the Wall Street 
Journal reported an analyst recommending a “sell” on Enron’s stock “because of 
uncertainties about the company’s extremely complex financial structure.”
57
 In a way, 
this quote stood in as a synchedoche for the larger sense of loss of confidence. 
Significantly, it also connected the actions of recommending a “sell” with the anxiety 
over how complicated Enron’s financial structures and information-related businesses 
practices had become. By the end of the month, Moody’s, the credit rating agency, had 
downgraded the company’s rating.  
While such an action may have been long overdue, the potential ramifications 
revealed how the informational economy had scrambled the line between perception and 
reality. As Emshwiller and Smith reported that Enron’s credit rating was to fall below 
investment grade, the company might default on billions of dollars worth of loans and 
                                                 
57
 John R. Emshwiller and Rebecca Smith, "Enron Replaces Fastow as Finance Chief," Wall Street Journal, 




“force it under the terms of various financial agreements to issue millions of shares of 
stock to holders of that debt, which would dilute the value of existing shares.”
58
 Here, 
even as credit rating agencies attempted to arrive at an accurate representation, such a 
move threatened to further destabilize the situation. The prospect of such a cause and 
effect was both ironic and unsettling. On October 31, the reporters were blunt about the 
predicament, wondering in the lede paragraph: “…in the topsy-turvy world of Enron, 
what constitutes logic anymore?”
59
 To be sure, this line was meant, at least to a degree, to 
be tongue and cheek, but it also pointed to a core anxiety about Enron’s predicament. 
This sense of unease was not limited to the financial press alone. The exasperation 
and uncertainty of the Wall Street Journal stories were echoed in Enron’s November 8th 
earnings restatement. This document was of singular importance, since it provided a 
clearer picture of the company’s true financial health, accelerating what some writers 
later referred to as its “death spiral.” The document’s origins also reflected how complex 
manipulating information had become. For years, Enron had been using Special Purpose 
Entities (SPEs) – corporations, partnerships or other methods of corporate organization 
that can be used to hold assets and be treated as completely different entities from the 
company itself. However, the rules governing these entities require that SPEs need to 
have at least three percent of outside equity at risk. After a review of the extraordinarily 
complex SPEs Fastow and Enron had created, Arthur Andersen and Enron decided that 
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they did not meet these requirements. As an internal investigation of the company later 
revealed, the problems with the SPEs at the outset were the result of accounting errors.
60
 
The debt sacked away in these SPEs would have to be reported. Consequently, Enron 
provided a financial restatement for the company from 1997 to 2001. As to be expected, 
the restatement plainly demonstrated that Enron had not been nearly as profitable as it 
had appeared to be over the past five years. After listing the revised numbers, the 
document described the nature of the deals and how they were devised.  
However, there was a pervasive sense of uncertainty in this document. Rather 
than declarative statements, sentences began with phrases such as “Enron now believes” 
and qualifiers like “to the extent information is available.”
61
 In one particularly telling 
passage, the statement read: “While the information provided herein reflects Enron’s 
current understanding of the relevant facts, it is possible that the Special Committee’s 
review will identify additional or different information concerning these matters.”
62
 Some 
of this equivocal tone was attributable to the fact that Fastow had actually been bilking 
Enron while managing these SPEs. Indeed, a lot of people inside Enron were learning 
many of these facts for the first time. However, Fastow’s blatant obfuscation alone could 
not account for the uncertainty. Rather, the document’s tone revealed the tenuous grasp 
the company itself had on its own activities. The unease about complexity and 
meaninglessness that had gripped journalists was also affecting Enron’s managers. 
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A POSTMODERN MORAL PANIC 
 
In some ways, the complexity of Enron’s businesses, as well as the growing sense 
that the company had failed because of information running amuck, was reflected in the 
range of responses once the company became a general news story. However, unlike the 
business press, no single theme emerged in the popular press. Instead, such news articles, 
letters to the editor and so forth contained a tangle of moral judgments, references to the 
American past (such as Watergate and 1998’s Long Term Capital Management financial 
meltdown), hostility towards intellectual sophistry, a distrust of politicians, disease 
metaphors, fears over a loss of meaning, folksy aphorisms and a panicked insistence on 
the power of objective truth. In all, journalists and others struggled to find modes of 
thought and representation in response to Enron’s failure. These confused strands often 
appeared in the same articles as contradictory sentiments; at once blasting the company 
as sophisticated crooks who duped unsuspecting Americans, and condemning a morally 
lax culture all too willing to go along with such obvious hucksterism.  
Much like the Wall Street Journal coverage, major national news outlets such as 
the New York Times and Washington Post were quick to emphasize the idea of 
complexity and meaningless information, but also imposed a moral levy on the entire 
affair. One early example was a question and answer column in the New York Times’s 
business section. Here, Floyd Norris, the article’s author, chastised Enron’s opaque 




focus of journalists’ ire, he complained that even the financial restatement did “not 
provide enough information to understand the arrangements completely.”
63
 Such a 
criticism was relatively narrow, but Norris immediately broadened its scope, writing that 
“many investors and analysts were not curious about” about the deals “when everything 
seemed to be going well.”
64
 Here, the writer hinted at an ethical judgment levied at 
American business culture. It was a judgment the writer expanded in the ensuing months. 
Norris recast Enron’s failure as damning evidence of a mode of production predicated on 
a willing suspension of truth and collective greed. On November 16th, Norris ended his 
story ominously:  
Enron’s financial statements were, as Mr. Lay conceded this week, 
“opaque and difficult to understand.” Investors and analysts knew they did 
not know what was going on. They bought anyway. 
Enron was viewed as a company that always made its numbers. An 
old-line gas pipeline company had been transformed into a brilliant trader 
that could apply its magic around the world. Investors did not care how 




Not only had an issue of social morality snuck into questions surrounding Enron, but 
there was also a creeping unease with the malleability of information that Enron had 
trumpeted in previous years. Enron’s “financialization of energy” was now seen as 
fraudulent, but a fraud that many, according to Norris, had gone along with. The stern 
ending served as a call for returning to an objective truth. Notably, Norris implicitly 
connected this idea of truth to material production (and away from symbolic 
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manipulation). Still, it would be wrong to claim that Norris, writing from the Times’s 
business desk, was offering a social or cultural critique. Rather, the writer limited his 
objections to the business community.  
 However, there were others who did extend these complaints beyond the 
immediate context of analysts and investors. One example appeared in a damning letter to 
the editor published with the heading, “A Culture of Lying.” Here, the letter writer 
claimed:  
 Adam Lashinsky ("Bankrupt Analysis," Op-Ed, Nov. 30) asserts that the 
Enron debacle is emblematic of the wider problem of a loss of objectivity on Wall 
Street. Why stop there? Perhaps the loss of objectivity on Wall Street indicates an 
even wider problem: a culture that places very little value on truth. 
As long as stock prices rise and money flows easily, we are all too willing to 
ignore measures of real value.  
 Why let truth stand in the way of making a million dollars? 
Now that the charade is coming to an end, we will, it is hoped, start to re-
examine our own attitudes and come to terms with the loss of objectivity that, to 
one degree or another, has infected us all.
66
 
Here, the writer, much like Norris, made the connection between greed and a loss of 
objective truth.
67
 Similarly, Daniel Freedenberg, the letter’s author, also linked truth to 
material production. Though it was not directly stated, Freedenberg’s juxtaposition of 
stock prices and flowing money with “measures of real value” offered a rejoinder to 
symbolic manipulation. Freedenberg worried that there was no longer a connection 
between stock prices and a material value possessing an inherent, inarguable worth. 
Finally, the tone in this letter also hinted at a moral panic, one that other journalists and 
pundits began to echo. 
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 For example, two days later, in an op-ed piece, The New York Times columnist 
Richard Cohen imagined a conversation about Enron with his dead grandfather. Cohen’s 
vaguely Capra-esque column laid the blame on U.S. society as a whole, expanding the 
critique found in both business stories, like Norris’s and McLean’s, and letters such as 
Daniel Freedenberg’s. The column pitted Cohen, here the defender of a sophisticated but 
fallen American culture, against the folksy wisdom of a less educated, plain spoken 
grandfather. In the column, when Cohen tried to explain Enron’s business, the apparition 
retorted: “It sold smoke. […] It sold the Brooklyn Bridge over and over again. It sold the 
uptown version of dream sheets and prayer handkerchiefs, only it used brokers and banks 
and not guys in fedoras and shiny suits. A bunch of con men.”
68
 In this fictional 
exchange, Cohen began by adopting a tone of condescension, insisting that Enron wasn’t 
all bad, but the ghost had none of it: “Is that how you college people talk? They lied.”
69
 
Of course, it was no small thing that the grandfather classified derivative investments as 
“lies.” The column took up the theme of the informational economy’s corruption and 
found its roots in language itself. The accounting statements that had become a problem 
for so many were not merely confusing; they were dishonest. The grandfather’s 
apparition was more virtuous than Cohen because his use of language – his plain spoken-
ness – was unsophisticated. Despite (presumably) lacking a formal education, he was able 
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to get to an objective truth, the heart of the matter, much faster. Here, the line between 
sophistication and sophistry blurred.
70
 
 Yet even when the debacle wasn’t framed in such explicit terms, others reacted to 
the story with alarm. Some, such as economic journalist Robert Samuelson, focused on 
the manipulation of information as a systemic threat to capitalism as a whole. In a 
December 2001 column for The Washington Post, Samuelson wrote that:  
The collapse of the energy company Enron has inevitably become a metaphor for 
many of the sins of modern capitalism. It may be, but the story is more 
complicated than a simple tale of victims and villains. Capitalism derives its 
strength from the power of self-interest and the ingenuity of the human spirit. But 
its weaknesses also stem from human nature, which can convert the quest for 
riches into self-deception and dishonesty.
71
  
Samuelson worried that Americans were now living in a time where “creative obscurity” 
had “become commonplace” and chided readers that in order “To work well, capitalism 
needs accurate information.”
72
 Here, Samuelson was pointing toward the central role of 
information that economists have always regarded as crucial. However, Samuelson did 
not offer a critique of capitalism as a system, but rather condemned a degraded society 
that had threatened a system that was, on some level, inherently moral. Still, the writer 
had identified one of the most vulnerable points in the informational economy. What, 
after all, would happen to a system that required good information when the mode of 
production emphasized, valorized and encouraged the manipulation of information?  
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Samuelson’s point about information was mild compared to others who began to 
worry that reality itself was threatened by the postindustrial, informational economy. In a 
January 2002 Sunday “Outlook” piece in The Washington Post, Lanny Davis proved to 
be a prescient, if grim, interpreter of Enron’s problems. Davis used Enron as a metaphor 
for the economy and culture as a whole, accurately noting that “Enron’s demise” would 
“be little more than a blip,” economically, but also insisting that the reasons behind the 
collapse were of the utmost importance.
73
 Much like McLean and others, Davis noted 
that Enron was a company that foolishly “didn't focus on selling real products to 
consumers with real profit margins. Rather, Enron was essentially a broker: It bought, 
resold and invested in commodities futures contracts, gambling on future prices and 
market conditions.”
74
 Though Davis did not focus on language, this concern was present 
in biting asides. After noting that Enron traded weather derivatives, he added the 
parenthetical: “(whatever that means).” However, Davis deviated from the prevailing 
conclusion offered by financial journalists when he pointed out that Enron’s growth and 
success had been “based on perception rather than reality.”
75
 Of course, much like 
Samuelson’s argument about information, Davis was, to an extent, offering an old point 
about stock bubbles. Yet Davis also went further, arguing that such bubbles had become 
far more dangerous, writing that: “if you live by the perception and the illusion of 
growth, then you die by it once reality sets in. Being ‘asset lite’ meant that once Enron's 
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numbers and disclosures became suspect, there was no foundation of hard assets -- real 
products with real value -- to fall back on.”
76
  
Though in this comment Davis was referring explicitly to Enron, ultimately the 
writer’s concern was that the split with the material world (in which, in this somewhat 
unsophisticated analysis, objects had an intrinsic value) was now complete. As Davis 
concluded, “With millions of Americans now invested in the stock market, this is no 
longer a concern limited to financial elites. We cannot afford to preserve a system in 
which perception is more important than reality.”
77
 Interestingly, Davis also gloomily 
assumed that his call was likely to go unheeded. Here, he took the loss of meaning that 
McLean and others only identified and drew it out to its logical end, where the production 
of ever more sophisticated pieces of information not only obscured the truth, but actually 
threatened reality. This is not to say that Davis felt the matter was entirely hopeless. 
Rather, the essay retreated into a solace of sorts, insisting that some other entity would 
step in to provide the services that Enron had been providing (and thereby betraying an 
ultimate faith in capitalism as a system).
78
 Furthermore, as powerful and dangerous as 
immaterial production was, Davis reasoned that it ran up against the physical world, 
writing, “Speculators in Enron's ‘weather derivatives’ may have lost some money, but 
that's not likely to have much effect on whether it rains or shines each day.”
79
 This was a 
forceful insistence on the power of a material world. For all of Enron’s manipulation and 






 This is another theme that occurs again and again – a failure, ultimately, to condemn the system as a 






language, it could not transcend such hard realities. However, some who read this column 
even expressed doubts about this silver lining. 
 One letter to the editor appeared to find comfort in the Davis piece, writing: “The 
good news is that the collapse of Enron [editorial, Jan. 6] is not likely to jolt the 
economy, because Enron didn't really produce anything.”
80
  However, and perhaps 
betraying a fear that the informational economy could have very serious and huge effects, 
the letter’s writer also stated: “California is wise to ask whether its recent energy crisis 
was real or partly the effect of one of Enron's shell games.”
81
 This comment was full of 
apprehension toward the “world making” power of the informational economy.
82
 Both 
Davis’s editorial and the response to it gestured toward a glaring inconsistency at the 
heart of the informational economy: the contradictory interplay between materiality and 
immateriality and which force had more agency.  
These newspaper columns (and readers’ responses) revealed how quickly Enron 
became a vehicle for thinking about problems with and anxieties about the informational 
economy. Particular details of the case might have been too complex for many to 
understand, but the financial journalists’ anxious tone had been rearticulated as serious 
moral and existential questions. Still, the details themselves were extraordinarily complex 
(of course, this was precisely McLean’s original complaint.) National newspapers were 
hardly the forum for a nuanced discussion of these anxieties and questions, and these 
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anxieties and questions only rarely became explicit. Rather, weekly news magazines, and 
later books and films, began to develop the vocabulary, tropes and metaphors, as well as 
lines of argument, that other cultural producers would use to give voice to and try to 
come to terms with postindustrial anxiety.  
Eventually, the story came under the province of general publications such as 
Time and Newsweek. Not only did these magazines take up the same themes of 
uncontained information, but they also began to add a political element to the story.
83
 
Curiously, both publications were slow to pick up as Enron as newsworthy.  Newsweek’s 
first piece, “Lights Out for Enron,” which was relatively brief, focused on hubris and the 
irony of Enron’s push for deregulation (and the idea that the “mercilessness of the 
markets” was what ruined the company).
84
 However, most of the early coverage from the 
two news weeklies echoed the themes that originated with McLean’s piece from March 
2001.  
The stories that appeared in the pages of Time and Newsweek (as well as others) 
began adding further layers of anxiety. Again, at the root of all of these jitters was a sense 
of an overly complex business, or way of doing business, that came with a number of 
frightening implications. One theme that quickly emerged was contagion. For example, in 
Time’s piece, “Power Failure,” Daniel Kadlec wrote:  
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Only months earlier, Enron was considered one of the most innovative U.S. 
companies, having brought new-economy tools such as Internet trading and 
sophisticated hedging strategies to the old business of matching producers and 
consumers of electricity, oil, natural gas – and eventually some 800 other 
commodities and services. Its operations directly or indirectly touch almost every 




The promise of globalization and the information age, the notion of interconnectedness 
that had been so celebrated earlier, now became something of an existential threat.
86
 In 
January 2002, McLean authored another short piece for Fortune titled “The Disease! It’s 
Spreading!”
87
 Accompanying this title was an illustration of a man with Enron’s logo on 
his back facing three people in hazmat suits backing away. This sentiment, as well as the 
Time article, belied the profound uneasiness that began to emerge in the Enron story. 
Though they were not explicitly connected to issues of information, these stories revealed 
how what had once been a virtue was now being expressed in anxious terms, and how 
Enron was becoming a vehicle for that expression. 
The next wave of print media attention, especially Newsweek’s “Digging into the 
Deal That Broke Enron” on December 11, 2001, also traded on the instabilities of 
postindustrialism. Early on, this article stated: “The company, which used complexity to 
its advantage on the way up, became a victim of its own complex dealmaking on the way 
down. A Newsweek examination of Enron’s filings shows that the company’s fatal 
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mistake was an unintended byproduct of one such deal.”
88
 Sloan, again writing for 
Newsweek, was surely trafficking in some degree of schadenfreude in reporting how 
Enron had stumbled (a sentiment that was shared by others, owing largely to the 
company’s arrogant posturing throughout its heyday). Nonetheless, the statement also 
reflected an uneasiness towards complicated symbolic manipulation (one that would 
become increasingly pronounced as time moved on). Here, “complexity” itself was the 
culprit, and the implication was not that Enron was a case of outright fraud, but that the 
symbolic analysts at Enron were not fully in control of information itself.  
Curiously, the tension between materiality and immateriality was manifest in 
some of Sloan’s words. The comparison between sturdy, reliable machines and the 
fleeting quality of the business that Enron had morphed into (Sloan later referred to it as 
“financial gymnastics”) cropped up repeatedly.
89
 
As such articles revealed, when the Enron scandal erupted, it unleashed a long-
simmering unease about the informational economy. The scandal was a crisis of meaning 
and whether or not reality itself had become infinitely malleable. However, in these 
stories and texts this issue appeared only in traces – often complaints and sarcastic asides 
about “vague” phrases or a lack of industrial processes. Yet one little-seen article 
explicitly classified the Enron affair as “postmodern.” 
Appearing in The Navigator - a periodical published by the the Atlas Society, an 
organization dedicated to Objectivism, Ayn Rand’s philosophy – as well as on the 
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society’s website in May 2002, Roger Donway’s article, “The Collapse of a Postmodern 
Corporation,” blamed the affair on a “failure of postmodern corporate values.”
90
 Donway 
defined postmodernism as a system of thought that posited no “external reality” and that 
the “nature of reality simply is what people believe and say it is.”
91
 For him, the “goal” of 
postmodernism was to construct a “shared narrative that supports the group’s desires and 
activities.”
92
 Donway also chastised Enron – and Fastow in particular – for engaging in 
“postmodern accounting,” retelling the story of a somewhat infamous encounter between 
Fastow and credit rating agencies where the CFO asserted that: “If the agencies changed 
Enron's ratings, Enron would be able to strengthen its finances, which would justify the 
higher rating. In short: if everyone would agree on a narrative that was supportive of 
Enron, reality would snap into line.”
93
 Donway even claimed that the Special Purpose 
Entities at the root of the collapse were “set up principally to affect what Enron could say 
about itself, and what others—such as investment advisors and bond-rating agencies—
would then say in turn.”
94
 As impoverished as Donway’s definition of “postmodernism” 
was, the article at least named the complaint that had run throughout the real-time 
response to the collapse. Ultimately, he was concerned with the split between 
representation and reality. In writing, surely with contempt, “that postmodernists don't 
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use words like ‘truth,’” Donway echoed the aggrieved letter writer who worried that 
American culture placed “very little value on truth.”
95
  
Though Donway used the term “postmodernism,” the writer’s concerns bore a 
closer resemblance to David Harvey’s characterization of postmodernity. Identifying the 
term with a post-Fordist regime of spatially separated and flexible labor, Harvey also sees 
the “primacy of the sign” in the marketplace as one of postmodernity’s hallmarks. 
However, this “primacy of the sign” introduced a new set of problems. As Nigel Dodd, 
writing about a “postmodern economy,” puts it: “The notion that information is simply 
‘transmitted’ and ‘received,’ as if its meaning remains constant and unimpaired 
throughout, is unsustainable.”
96
 Complaints such as Donway’s registered a malleability of 
value and a prominence of signs that, for Harvey and others, typifies postmodernity.  
Still, this disavowal from conservative quarters might have been surprising, since 
Enron’s push for deregulation during good times dovetailed nicely with Ayn Rand’s own 
pronounced antipathy toward government interference with commerce. However, in 
another way, it was fitting that the Atlas Society should publish this criticism given 
Rand’s philosophical impatience with what she regarded as sloppy, incoherent thinking 
and use of language. As she wrote in Atlas Shrugged, “reality is final, that A is A and that 
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truth is true;” a succinct summary of the primary charge against the company that 




“AN EXTREMELY COMPLICATED SET OF TRANSACTIONS” - THE 
POWERS REPORT AND POSTSTRUCTURAL FINANCE 
 
It was no wonder Rand’s devotees were so quick to condemn Enron.
 98
 The logic 
of language games that Rand categorically rejected was roughly analogous to the 
convoluted financial logic that Enron had been using. To be sure, on some level, Enron 
actually trumpeted this logic. The “vague phrase,” “the financialization of energy” 
betrayed this ethos. When business journalists and concerned letter writers, as well as 
Ayn Rand acolytes, focused on language and Enron, it was because language offered a 
way for those without training in finance or accounting to offer detailed and specific 
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complaints about the informational economy. By focusing on the lack of meaning in 
vague phrases that were difficult to understand, American journalists and their readers 
were using Enron as a way to protest the split between information and physical 
processes that seemed to accompany economic production at the end of the twentieth 
century as well as its attendant loss of meaning. Because these writers were using 
language as a substitute for numbers, such criticism of Enron came to resemble both the 
logic of and complaints about poststructural views of language.  
The British novelist John Lanchester was one figure who explicitly made this 
connection. Writing about the 2008 financial crisis, Lanchester reasoned that “Finance, 
like other forms of human behavior, underwent a change in the twentieth century, a shift 
equivalent to the emergence of modernism in the arts – a break with common sense, a 
turn toward self-referentiality and abstraction, and notions that couldn’t be explained in 
workaday English.”
99
 This was not simply a clever metaphor. Rather, Lanchester saw a 
deep logical affinity between the world of financial derivatives and poststructuralist 
theory. “Value, in the realm of finance capital,” he wrote:  
parallels the elusive nature of meaning in deconstructionism. According to 
Jacques Derrida, the doyen of the school, meaning can never be precisely located; 
instead, it is always ‘deferred,’ moved elsewhere, located in other meanings, 
which refer and defer to other meanings—a snake permanently and necessarily 




Here, Lanchester referred to the French thinker’s idea of differánce. 
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In Derrida’s conception of differánce, meaning itself is never truly present, but is 
always deferred, or contingent on particular configurations of signifiers. Writing 
constitutes a signifying chain where each link pushes the possibility of meaning along to 
the next link. Yet each individual link is empty of any solid meaning (for semioticians, 
signification is established through differences from other signifiers).
101
 The referent 
itself never enters into the equation, but is always outside of language. As Derrida 
contends, “the center of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total 
form.”
102
 In terms of language, however, that center – a referent – can never really be 
present, but “since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), 
the totality has its center elsewhere.”
103
 For Derrida, this has profound implications since 
there is no center, but a “sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-
substitutions came into play. This is the moment when language invaded the universal 
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became 
discourse.”
104
 Writing for Derrida is an interplay between presence and absence with 
“meaning” as something that was always just beyond grasp – words constantly refer to 
each other without ever reaching a final meaning. In this light, the preoccupation with 
language that appeared in complaints about Enron did not seem like some pointless 
diversion. 
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Of course, I am not suggesting that Enron’s employees were combing through the 
French philosopher’s works for business strategies, nor am I suggesting that journalists 
such as Bethany McLean or Alan Sloan had someone like Derrida in mind when 
complaining about Enron’s language games and business model. Rather, I am suggesting 
that Derrida’s theories of language and meaning provided an apt analogy for Enron’s 
practices and ultimate collapse, and that the traces of an anxiety over a loss of meaning 
were located in the preoccupation with language in journalistic coverage of the scandal. 
Likewise, Enron’s “financialization of energy” had entailed removing substance 
and entering into an endless game – financial products and contracts, such as derivatives, 
that refer to each other more than they do to anything material. The company’s business 
had more to do with the “play of signification” than it did with the natural gas pipelines 
and sites of industry. One might say that in its disdain for material assets and processes, 
Enron’s business activity had become poststructural. The “center” was outside – the 
actual power plants, natural gas and pipelines mattered less than contracts associated with 
these objects. Since the mid-1990s, symbolic analysts in Houston had been playing with 
signifiers, with their actual referents receding from view. As the 1999 Letter to 
Shareholders declared: “What you own is not as important as what you know. Hard-wired 
businesses, such as energy and communications, have turned into knowledge-based 
industries that place a premium on creativity.”
105
 Such thinking had been Enron’s 
triumph, but it was also its downfall.  
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The SPEs that eventually led to the company’s collapse followed a similar logic. 
Karyn Ball is one scholar who has made this connection, referring to “Enron executives' 
cynical and destructive ‘poststructuralization’ of its profits, assets, and debts as sliding 
signifiers that defer referential closure.”
106
  In writing about this connection, Ball even 
jokes that “it is as if Jeffrey Skilling and Enron's chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow, 
along with his collaborators, Michael Kopper and Ben Glisan, strategically mobilized the 
logic of differánce when they orchestrated splinter partnerships to which they sold and 
resold assets.”
107
 In this analogy, Fastow’s veritable webs of SPEs attempted to defer, 
redefine or suspend economic realities, such as risk, loss and debt through the logic of 
language games – complex financial transactions that involved the shuttling back and 
forth of stocks, derivative options and contracts. Though these practices are sometimes 
called “structured finance,” the whole operation was poststructural.  
On one level, it would be easy to dismiss the SPEs as fraud. Indeed, more than 
any other business activity, these “vehicles” (as they are sometimes called) were at the 
center of criminal investigations and congressional hearings. Enron itself, in an effort to 
regain confidence and trust, created a special committee to investigate the entities that 
was headed by William Powers (then dean of the law school at the University of Texas at 
Austin). The committee’s findings (commonly referred to as the “Powers Report”) were 
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released in early 2002. The report offered a number of details on the SPEs that Enron had 
used throughout the late 1990s. However, 1997 had been the pivotal year for Enron, 
when the company began creating these “vehicles” at an increasing rate. The transactions 
themselves were extremely complicated. So, too, were the rules. For example, the 
committee was unable to determine if the illegitimacy of SPEs (since they lacked genuine 
outside equity at risk) was intentional fraud or an honest mistake.  
Testifying before congress, Powers himself described what the committee 
uncovered as “appalling.”
108
 Indeed, the document detailed Fastow’s swindling 
(essentially a fraud inside the larger scandal) and faulted Enron for omitting important 
details in its initial disclosures of the SPEs (which appear to violate SEC regulations).
109
 
However, the Powers Report also highlighted the poststructural logic that had come to 
define Enron.
110
 As William Powers put it: “Enron purported to enter into certain hedging 
transactions in order to avoid recognizing losses from these investments. […] These 
hedges were not real economic hedges. They just affected Enron’s earnings statements by 
allowing Enron to avoid reporting losses on its investments.”
111
 The point was to defer 
the meaning and implications of certain transactions and, through the process of financial 
techniques, endlessly defer other factors such as risk. As the report noted: “The 
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transactions may have looked superficially like economic hedges,” but the reality was 
different.
112
 Enron had become so intertwined with these companies that, “if the value of 
the investments fell at the same time as the value of Enron stock fell, the SPEs would be 
unable to meet their obligations and the ‘hedges’ would fail.”
113
 In effect, Enron had 
“hedged” with itself (prompting the financial restatements).
114
 The Powers Report offered 
detailed information on the SPEs, including how they were formed, their structure, and 
their transactions. The report also offered a full account of Fastow’s role in the SPEs.  
 
STRUCTURAL OR POSTSTRUCTUAL FINANCE 
A closer look at one SPE, LJM1, demonstrates how closely they resembled 
poststructuralist logic. Though not the first of these deals, it proved to be the model for 
many of the subsequent SPEs. The deal’s origins dated to 1998, when Enron bought 
equity (an ownership stake) in a company called Rhythms NetConnections. As with other 
technology companies in the late 1990s, the stock price rose dramatically upon going 
public in 1999. However, Skilling was apparently concerned about the volatility of the 
stock. This was a particular problem, since Enron was contractually bound to hold its 
stake in the company for a specific amount of time. To minimize any potential loss, Andy 
Fastow created LJM1 in an attempt to hedge the initial holding. Though there were two 
genuinely outside investors, LJM1 was “capitalized” primarily with shares of Enron stock 
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that it was obligated to hold for four years, but it could use the stock to secure a loan. 
Then, Enron also created another SPE, LJM Swap Sub. LJM1 transferred cash and Enron 
stock to LJM Swap Sub (even though this SPE was supposed to be an “outside” 
participant in the hedge). Next, Enron and LJM Swap Sub entered into a derivative 
contract called a “put option” that gave Enron the power to require LJM Swap Sub to buy 
the shares of Rhythms NetConnections from Enron at an agreed upon price per share in 
June, 2004. Theoretically, Enron’s initial investment was “hedged,” meaning its risk was 
minimized by limiting the amount of money it stood to lose if Rhythms NetConnections’ 
stock dropped. However, the Powers Report determined that the hedge was not real, since 
LJM Swap Sub’s ability to buy the Rhythms NetConnections shares should Enron 
exercise its option was dependent on the value of Enron’s stock remaining high (since 
this was LJM Swap Sub’s “capital.”) As the report concluded, Enron was hedging with 
itself – the center was outside. Rather than true economic exchange, the entire structure 
was basically a set of nonexistent companies trafficking in completely immaterial things 
– stocks, agreements to buy stocks, etc. If the above paragraph seems convoluted, it is 
because its subject matter was – even with the omission of finer details, such as 
promissory notes, and special terms and prices of stocks. As immaterial as money itself 
had become, the stuff moving back and forth in this instance was even less substantial – a 
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Fastow set up a signifying chain of different (and, for all intents and purposes, 
nonexistent) companies that kept “transferring” risk. In the end, what he had created was 
a massive structure (hence the term “structured finance”).  Yet as one of the diagrams 
from the Powers Report demonstrated, any “center” or material process in Fastow’s deals 
had been completely overshadowed by a self-referential system. Here, these companies 
were engaging in essentially poststructural activity as the inherent meaning or purpose of 
each entity became tied to a new one that supposedly invested in it. In fact, all the boxes 
in the image except two (ERNB and Campsie) represented entities that Enron and Andy 
Fastow created. In this sense, Donway’s observation that Fastow’s partnerships were 
basically language games was accurate. Yet even this was not the most complicated SPE 
and structured finance deal that Enron created. As Enron’s problems grew, the SPEs 
became more and more baroque. Indeed, the words “complex” and “complicated” 
appeared in the Powers Report with startling frequency.
116
 
However, if the problem was unique to Enron, it would have hardly warranted the 
reaction it got from the press. Rather, some of the news coverage suggested that Enron 
and the SPEs were not exceptions, but gross exaggerations of something far more basic 
about the informational economy. As some of the responses to Enron hinted, the 
company was not unique, just extreme. Such complaints about vague, meaningless 
phrases were nearly existential reservations and worries about a mode of economic 
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production without ultimate, concrete meaning or finality. In writing about the 
informational economy, Mark Poster notes: “it becomes increasingly difficult, or even 
pointless” to “distinguish a ‘real’ existing ‘behind’ the flow of signifiers.”
117
 After all, 
what is “symbolic manipulation” other than language games and strategy without 
finality? As the report noted, “the structure was unstable….”
118
  
The preoccupation with words and meaningless phrases in the news coverage 
anxiously conjured up a world devoid of ultimate meaning but filled with signifiers that 
referred to each other but nothing concrete. Indeed, some of the exasperation these 
magazine and newspaper articles exhibited towards Enron, its deals and use of language 
was comparable to the exasperation some experienced when encountering Derrida’s 
work. The “brain-intensive businesses” that had amounted to “business judo” just a few 
years before now stood as empty sophistry. Lacking the technical knowledge needed to 
critique the financial instruments themselves, journalists and letter writers went after the 
same logical structures in a forum that was more readily accessible. Perhaps Enron struck 
such a nerve because it revealed how tenuous the system had become. 
 
NARRATING THE COLLAPSE 
 Despite the enormous amount of press and media attention the company’s 
immediate downfall generated, it gradually slowed (to a few brief periods of moderate 
                                                 
117
 Mark Poster, “Words Without Things: The Mode of Information,” The Humanities as Social 
Technology, (Summer, 1990): 62-77, 73. 
118
 William Powers et al., “Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of 




coverage around the criminal trials and the stray news story). Though Enron disappeared 
from the pages of newspapers and magazines, beginning in 2003, a spate of books began 
to appear authored by a wide range of people, such as “whistleblower” Sherron Watkins, 
Bethany McLean (writing with Peter Elkind, another Fortune reporter), former Enron 
employee Brian Cruver, and the Wall Street Journal’s  Emshwiller and Smith. In rushing 
out books about the company’s fall, all of these authors were following an older 
publishing tradition. 
For instance, throughout the 1980s, tell-all books quickly followed business 
scandals. Titles such as The Predators’ Ball (1988), Barbarians at the Gate (1990) and 
Den of Thieves (1991) chronicled financial misdeeds, like insider trading, and infamous 
figures like Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky. Still other books, most famously Michael 
Lewis’s Liar’s Poker (1989), recounted the outrageous behavior of Wall Street traders 
and salesmen. Similarly, in the 1990s, When Genius Failed (1998) and F.I.A.S.C.O. 
(1998) detailed financial disasters like the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management 
and the misuse of derivatives. These books were so numerous they practically constituted 
their own genre, complete with its own conventions, such as a simultaneous repulsion 
from and fascination with their subjects’ extravagance and misbehavior, moral 
condemnation, and plot lines that sometimes borrowed from more familiar stories, such 
as Horatio Alger-esque tales of rags to riches. 
Yet even in this field, Enron was exceptional. There were so many books about 




author was able to differentiate his or her tome from the others.
119
 These books were not 
intended to stand the test of time. Rather, the speed with which they were written and 
published suggested a fast attempt to capitalize on the public’s fascination with Enron. To 
a degree, it seems as though publishers’ instincts were right. Though several titles did 
make appearances on the New York Times best sellers’ list, they were brief compared to 
the time they spent on Businessweek’s book lists. Three Enron narratives, Power Failure, 
24 Days, and The Smartest Guys in the Room, were all on that publication’s best seller 
list in 2003 and 2004.
120
 What is more, Businessweek spent a good amount of time 
reviewing these works. The attention from that magazine suggested that these books were 
particularly popular among white collar workers, including other symbolic analysts. 
Many of these authors expressed the same anxiety over the postindustrial world 
and informational economy that was present in early news reports. However, with more 
time having elapsed since the initial revelations, and more space for ruminations, these 
books, at least in part, extended anxieties about the malleability of information, the 
location of morality and ethics, and the unclear line between perception and reality. Many 
of these authors also began to worry about the volume of information in a postindustrial 
world. This anxiety moved in different directions. While some authors began to worry 
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that the amount of information opened the door to a wave of scandals and conspiracies, 
others worried that the level of information would simply render the data meaningless. 
Some of the earliest books to appear were various first-hand accounts from those who 
had been somehow involved in Enron’s collapse or in uncovering the scandal. As to be 
expected, all of these authors performed a critical job function in the informational 
economy. The authors of 24 Days, Power Failure, and Anatomy of Greed tried to guide 
readers through what could have been a calamitous collapse of the informational 
economy and, in two cases, attempted to reassure the audience that the economic order 
under which they lived was not dysfunctional. Yet each attempt was ultimately 
unsatisfactory as the text became mired in the subject matter’s complexity, calling to 








 Out of the books that appeared in the years following Enron’s collapse, 24 Days 
boasted one of the closest connections to the media coverage. Written by Rebecca Smith 
and John Emshwiller, the two Wall Street Journal reporters who covered the 
corporation’s collapse, the book purported to tell the inside story of how the reporters 
broke the scandal. The book’s structure and tropes strongly resembled those in All The 
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President’s Men. Taking Woodward and Bernstein as their models, Smith and 
Emshwiller depicted themselves as beat reporters just on the cusp of uncovering 
unseemly misdeeds. However, the Wall Street Journal reporters found themselves 
dealing with a scandal much different from Watergate. 
In 24 Days, the protagonists spent an enormous amount of time deciphering 
documents and uncovering the scandal not by secretly meeting with shady informants, as 
is the case in All The President’s Men, but rather by sifting through mountains of mostly 
public information. For example, when Woodward and Bernstein’s legendary source, 
Deep Throat, first entered that book, he “didn’t want to use the phone even to set up the 
meetings. He suggested that Woodward open the drapes in his apartment as a signal. 
Deep Throat could check each day; if the drapes were open, the two would meet that 
night.”
122
 In this passage, Deep Throat was cloaked in secrecy, and was useful to the two 
reporters because of the amount of inside information he was able to confirm and 
provide. Likewise, Rebecca Smith and John Emshwiller, the two Wall Street Journal 
reporters, were also tipped off early by an informant who confirmed their suspicions. 
Throughout these early pages of 24 Days, the reporters referred to this informant as “our 
mutual friend.” In both books, the informant offered cryptic confirmations for the 
reporters, legitimating the importance of the story. In Smith and Emshwiller’s case, they 
wrote that their unnamed informer “knew enough to convince the reporters that they had 
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barely scratched the surface in their first story.”
123
 The presence of a mysterious 
informant was not the only similarity. Both texts were given over to dramatic scenes in 
the newsroom, where reporters and editors argued over the precise phrasing of words. In 
this sense, both books were also meditations over the linguistic and narrative 
representations of their respective scandals as much as they were concerned with the 
scandals themselves – a feature other narrative accounts of Enron would not be able to 
avoid. This was fitting, particularly in the case of 24 Days. The reporters themselves 
could be read as symbolic analysts, sifting through mounds of information, searching for 
the truth. The reporters then had to interpret this information and present it in another 
forum. 
Yet as much as 24 Days echoed All The President’s Men, it also deviated from it 
in interesting ways. In a sharp difference from the dramatic meetings with Deep Throat in 
All The President’s Men, Smith and Emshwiller uncovered the Enron scandal primarily 
“through the magic of computer database search engines.”
124
 In such passages, Smith and 
Emshwiller presented readers with an immaterial thriller. Tension was built through 
startling revelations in the footnotes of publically circulated documents and conference 
calls.  
The first example of this preoccupation with documents and information appeared 
early in the book. In looking into a few documents (again, by going through databases) 
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on the occasion of Skilling’s resignation in August of 2001, Emshwiller found a reference 
to the Special Purpose Entities. The reporter was intrigued, noting that he “couldn’t make 
out exactly what the deals were, cloaked as they were in a bewildering string of words” 
including phrases like “‘share settled costless collar arrangements’, ‘combined notional 
value’, and the ‘contingent nature of existing restricted forward contracts.’”
125
 This 
passage resembled earlier news stories in the way it quickly came to focus on language 
that did not communicate anything. Yet the passage went on to make an additional 
statement about the informational economy. Rather than uncovering a conspiracy through 
discovering secrets, Emshwiller was interpreting information that was available to almost 
anyone with a computer. Throughout the first part of this book, as the two reporters 
researched Enron during the summer of 2001, their methods of discovery fell almost 
entirely within the realm of symbolic analysis. Apart from sifting through databases, 
when they made phone calls, they were often talking to other symbolic analysts, such as 
public relations executives and stock analysts.
126
  
Whether through disembodied voices on conference calls, two reporters writing 
news stories, sending and receiving emails and interpreting information, all of the 
“action” in 24 Days was the performance of symbolic analysis.
127
 Likewise, most of what 
they uncovered during this section was essentially symbolic manipulation. For example, 
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in discussing EnronOnline, they wrote that Enron had possibly engaged in “wash” trades, 
where: “Party A would sell X amount to Party B, who would then sell the same amount 
back to Party A at the same price. While the two transactions wouldn’t produce any 
profits, they would inflate each party’s trading, making them look busier.”
128
 These 
“wash” trades are another example of the split between perception and reality that 
worried many of those who were writing about Enron.  
There were also echoes of Reich’s observation that symbolic analysts could be 
engaged in either positive or destructive behavior. This malevolent form of symbolic 
analysis became most apparent in the book’s second section, which detailed the actual 
series of news stories in October and November of 2001. In a dramatic fashion, this 
section presented the informational economy as one where the manipulation of 
information could have profound consequences. The authors pitted different symbolic 
analysts against each other using various symbols as their tools. This conflict was also 
apparent in the illustration that opened that section of that book. This illustration charted 
Enron’s declining stock price against the appearance of Smith and Emshwiller’s reports. 
With its jagged lines and exploding bullet points, the image suggested a dynamism and 
instability at the heart of postindustrial production and symbolic manipulation. As these 
different pieces of information (e.g. – news stories and stock prices) interacted with one 
another, what had earlier been a smooth “flow of signifiers” (to borrow Poster’s phrase) 
crashed in a spectacular fashion. Even beyond the two types of information depicted in 
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the chart, throughout the second section of 24 Days, different types of information and 
symbols interacted with one another; not only news stories and stock prices, but also 
credit ratings and analyst recommendations.  
Much like the news stories themselves, in 24 Days the reporters here focused on 
Enron’s confusing use of language. In the reporters’ telling, just after the company 
released its earnings statement (the one that resulted in its downfall), Smith read over the 
offending passage and thought to herself: “What the heck was that?”
129
 She reread the 
phrase: “Structured finance arrangements with a previously disclosed entity.”
130
 Yet the 
passage still did not clarify anything for the reporter, who wondered, “What did it 
mean?”
131
 As she combed through the document, trying to learn more about the $544 
million loss, she only found “gibberish.”
132
 Again, the text returned to language that 
failed to produce meaning.  Of course, Enron had grappled with the inadequacy of 
language in representing its businesses throughout the 1990s. Here, however, the failure 
of language was cause for concern.
133
 
As the story erupted in 24 Days, Smith and Emshwiller offered readers several 
scenes that dramatized this confusion. One of these moments was a conference call Ken 
Lay had with analysts and reporters, a prominent episode that found its way into the 
actual Journal reports. The once-suave Lay badly bungled the call – which was intended 
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to clarify and explain. As the reporters wrote: “For years, almost everyone listening on 
that phone call had been ignorant to one degree or another about the inner workings of 
Enron. Company officials had used that lack of knowledge” and “played it like a musical 
instrument.”
134
 But this time, “bland reassurances and promises of great things to come 
were no longer enough. Faith was being replaced by doubt. And doubt could be deadly 
for a company that lived off credit.”
135
 For the informational economy and a bunch of 
symbolic analysts connected to one another through telephone wires, this was a tense 
scene. References to Ken Lay’s “verbal calisthenics” (echoing Sloan’s description of 
“financial gymnastics” in Newsweek) had to stand in for actual physical activity.
136
 Here, 
the journalists almost inadvertently framed the informational economy as a system that 
relied on ignorance. 
However, the passage also depicted other symbolic analysts springing into action. 
The call’s most significant result was Prudential analyst Carol Coale letting “fly the rarest 
of Wall Street birds, a ‘sell’ recommendation, on Enron stock.”
137
 As Smith and 
Emshwiller went on to write, “Coale told Emshwiller that her sell recommendation was 
the final chapter of a long-running drama of ups and downs with Enron. In 1994, she’d 
dropped her rating on the company to a ‘hold’ from a ‘buy’ and held it there for years.”
138
 
The rest of the paragraph similarly detailed years of Coale reclassifying Enron’s stock. 
The “drama” here was little more than the movement of words. Yet in the context of 24 
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Days, the downgrade had huge consequences. Enron, the analysts and the reporters were 
caught up in negotiations over language and signifiers, much as the illustration suggested. 
Meaning here was relational, but not without consequence.  
Strikingly, anxiety was not limited to Enron in 24 Days. As the reporters wrote: 
“Smith had encountered concerns that spread beyond Enron. The stocks of other big 
energy companies were beginning to fall as investors worried […] Some analysts worried 
that the company could take down a big chunk of the energy markets.”
139
 In such 
moments, Smith and Emshwiller offered the same criticisms and reflected the anxieties of 
the informational economy that emerged in the news coverage of Enron’s fall. In the 
world that 24 Days presented, the boundary between perception and reality was 
unclear.
140
 If the text presented the two reporters as heroic (or at least protagonists), it is 
because they revealed a “truth” by sifting through a torrent if information and exposing 
the poststructural nature of Enron’s schemes. Yet the reporters stopped short of a larger 
critique of late capitalism. Towards the end of the book, Smith, attempting to attach some 
final meaning to the affair, wrote: “Wall Street, that citadel of a freewheeling capitalism 
that was often perceived as amoral, had shown a surprising streak of Puritanical outrage 
about Enron’s dishonesty.”
141
 She even found Enron’s collapse “uplifting, in an odd way” 
because of the stock market’s reaction. By Smith’s reasoning:  
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At every step of the way, as the story had unfolded, the market had reacted 
and people had stepped forward with information, looking for no more 
reward than the satisfaction of seeing the truth come out. People’s basic 





Though she ruefully speculated that Wall Street would lose its moral outrage the moment 
stock prices recovered, Smith pointed to the stock market as an instrument of justice and 
truth. It was the market itself that punished Enron with each new revelation, even though 
it was the same entity that called forth the world of signifiers and symbols that Enron 
trafficked in for so long. In pointing to the market as an instrument that would ultimately 
prove intolerant to falsehoods since it depended on accurate information, Smith 




 This reliance on Wall Street to provide morality was only the most extreme and 
contradictory example of how Smith and Emshwiller ended 24 Days with attempt after 
attempt to ascribe some larger significance to the company. Towards the book’s final 
pages, the reporters provided a number of comparisons and references to the American 
past. As Smith wrote, Enron had “become synonymous with duplicity and avarice, just as 
the names Tammany Hall and Teapot Dome, in an earlier era, came to mean political 




 This reliance on the market as an arbiter of objective truth and morality is not unique to Smith and 
Emshwiller. Thomas Frank has identified this sentiment as “market populism” throughout the 1990s in his 
book, One Market Under God. However, the idea that markets contain the seeds of objective truth is at 
least as old as classical economics. Adam Smith’s notion of “natural” prices posits that merchants can only 
keep prices inflated for so long before the truth is revealed and the price of a commodity floats back down 






 She also quoted Teddy Roosevelt, writing: “Americans only learn from 
catastrophe and not from experience.”
145
 Emshwiller, for his part, appeared to take away 
a very different lesson: “Being honest is usually better than being smart.”
146
 All of these 
attempts to attach a meaning to (and thereby contain) Enron – looking to its falling stock 
price as an ethical or objective barometer, reaching to the American past for analogies 
and a distrust of intelligence per se – were reflected in other Enron narratives. 
 As with 24 Days, these narratives and the tropes that closed the text can be read as 
anxious attempts to make sense of the informational economy. Rosalie Genova has 
demonstrated how important narratives were for various audiences in making sense of 
Enron’s collapse. If, as literary critic Peter Brooks and others suggest, narrative is a basic 
way of ordering and making sense of events, then the books and films that followed 
Enron’s collapse were responses to the anxieties about what was happening to reality and 
the truth could be found in the media coverage.
147
 Indeed, other narratives grabbed hold 
of the tropes in fictional representations of American business and the market as a way to 
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INSIDERS ON THE OUTSIDE 
 Out of all of these authors, after Emshwiller and Smith, Sherron Watkins, who 
later became known as the “whistleblower,” could claim the closest proximity to the 
scandal. Her book, Power Failure, which was co-authored with the Houston journalist 
Mimi Schwartz, detailed Watkins’ experiences while working for Enron (like Smith and 
Emshwiller’s account, it was also written in the third person). While certainly providing 
an account of Watkins’ own personal narrative, however, the text could hardly claim 
“insider” status. Much like 24 Days, the narrative quickly became intertextual, as 
Watkins and Schwartz commented on public documents and events. Similarly, the 
account of rank-and-file Enron employee Brian Cruver, Anatomy of Greed, also claimed 
“insider” status but revealed little new information (at least Watkins could lay claim to 
being a significant part of the larger story). In short, as both Watkins and Cruver 
navigated their way through the company, they dramatized what it meant to be a 
symbolic analyst. Power Failure, for example, was peppered with tales of in-fighting and 
backstabbing among Enron executives. 
 However, much as Smith and Emshwiller insisted on the morality of the market, 
Schwartz and Watkins in Power Failure tried to mark moral boundaries. Of course, 
Watkins could claim to be on higher ground. After all, it was she who wrote the memo to 
Ken Lay (that document was more or less the dramatic climax in this text).
148
 However, 
Schwartz (the book’s primary author) established Watkins’s virtue primarily by 
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distancing her from other symbolic analysts and the informational economy as a whole. 
Power Failure began with Watkins’s enchantment with Enron. Early on, the two authors 
wrote that “If you were in the world of finance or the world of energy, you heard about 
the kinds of things they were doing and wanted to be a part of reinventing the future.”
149
 
Yet soon enough, Watkins found herself bewildered by the way Enron did business, 




Belying the same reactionary streak that appeared in Schwartz’s 2001 Texas 
Monthly article, Power Failure located the boundary between righteousness and moral 
turpitude along the fault line of materiality and immateriality. As Watkins moved around 
inside the company, she was shifted from Enron’s international wing (which the authors 
depicted as the victim of Jeff Skilling’s personal rivalry with Rebecca Mark, the head of 
Enron’s international development) to Broadband (which was ultimately a failure). 
Though Broadband was considered to be one of the fashionable units to work for, 
Watkins expressed apprehension. At a wine and cheese party, she ran into a friend (also 
new to the division) who lamented that she had originally come to Enron to bring “power 
to Third World countries” and make a “contribution to society” even though the move 
would be better for her career.
151
   
Throughout, Schwartz and Watkins commented on a style of business that was 
quickly spinning out of control. The authors even claimed that the 1990s as a whole was 
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a decade characterized by denial. Much like other narratives, their’s used Enron to arrive 
at insights about U.S. culture as a whole, writing: “The mid to late 1990s promised to be 
the era of the New Paradigm, when people were convinced that the rules of business, and 
even American life, were being rewritten” and that Bill Clinton was a “master of denial” 
who presented himself as “the youthful president of new ideas, presiding over the 
booming economy.”
152
 Enron, in other words, was not an isolated case. Rather, Watkins’s 
experiences at Enron stood as commentary on all of these themes – the denial and 
ultimate sham that was the “New Paradigm.”  
As evidence of that era’s moral emptiness, the two authors detailed every excess 
in the company. Some of the excesses Power Failure highlighted were the same litany of 
sexual misconduct that other authors (and movies) offered. However, such blatantly bad 
behavior appeared alongside far less scandalous fare. Objects held up for scorn included 
domestic partner benefits, money towards college text books, and childcare before the 
authors turned to more extravagant perks, such as an on site gym,  and finally asked with 
a heavy dose of sarcasm: “Didn’t have time to pick up your dry cleaning or take your dog 
to the vet? No problem – the Enron Concierge could do it. If you were smart enough and 
tough enough to work at Enron, you deserved to live like last year’s Oscar winner.”
153
 In 
the process of lambasting such perks, the two authors also took a strange turn, writing 
that Enron was “eerily evocative of many affluent, late-nineties parents who refused to 
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discipline their children because it crushed their creativity and spontaneity.”
154
 Here, 
Schwartz and Watkins equated creativity with sophistry and viewed almost any reference 
to intellectualism and creativity in general as suspect, much like the curmudgeonly ghost 
in Cohen’s column. For instance, the authors critiqued Andy Fastow’s penchant for 
buying art.
155
 Similarly, in the middle of a section listing off various Enron excesses, they 
complained that Fastow and his wife began collecting art and “loaning pieces to the 
Menil Museum, long a bastion of the city’s most rarefied tastes.”
156
 Perhaps the two were 
right in condemning the Fastows’ lack of interest in social change, but including their 
interest in art in this list also hinted at a suspicion regarding most intellectual endeavors 
that appeared in Power Failure. 
However, they reserved most of their ire for Fastow and his intricately structured 
finance deals. As the book told it, after struggling to find her place in the company, 
Watkins finally came to work for the CFO and was able to examine the SPEs in detail. 
Schwartz wrote that the deals “made Sherron Watkins nervous. But when those working 
for him balked at his schemes, Fastow complained that they weren’t creative enough. 
‘You’re thinking like an accountant,’ he’d say to Sherron Watkins. ‘You’re thinking like 
a lawyer,’ he’d tell attorney Kristina Mordaunt. ‘You have to learn to think outside the 
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 Here, again, Schwartz and Watkins revealed a generalized suspicion of 
knowledge work, pointing to Fastow’s schemes as the paradigmatic example of symbolic 
analysis. 
The final break for Watkins came when, worried that the company would 
collapse, she put her concerns in writing. Much as Smith and Emshwiller dramatized the 
creation of their news stories, Schwartz and Watkins spent a good deal of time focusing 
on the three memos she wrote to Ken Lay in an effort to head off Enron’s problems. To 
an extent (much like the book in general), this section lingered on the memos in an 
attempt to open up a space between Watkins and the rest of the company. Just as Smith 
and Emshwiller called attention to the process of writing in 24 Days, Watkins agonized 
over every word in her memo. Here, Schwartz and Watkins offered up their own 
interpretation of the original memo, as well as dramatically recounting Watkins’s late 
night editing and handwringing. The accountant found “herself waking up at 2 A.M., 
revisiting her worries and rehearsing her description of them to Lay. She typed, cut, 
pasted and inserted short, simpler words.”
158
 Yet it was during this chapter that Power 
Failure also touched on several images that invoked the stable, material world that Enron 
had forsaken. After writing her original memo, Watkins attended a company meeting 
(which Lay presided over) and looked out across the crowd, thinking about “employees 
with kids to educate, with sick parents or ailing spouses, people with house payments and 
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bills to pay. Enron made its billions on volatility, but now they wanted stability […].”
159
 
Though Watkins could hardly be considered an economic leftist, in these lines, she and 
Schwartz offered a critique of some of the instability that had been ushered in by 
neoliberal deregulation. 
Once Watkins herself entered the story that was playing out on the national stage 
and news media, Power Failure began to mirror the “action” in 24 Days. In both 
instances, the wave of Journal stories dictated events. During this period (October and 
November of 2001), Watkins watched in shock (her disillusionment growing, even 
though Schwartz was quick to describe her as a loyal employee nearly to the end) as Ken 
Lay fell back on public relations tactics to deal with the issues. Following Skilling’s 
abrupt departure and the looming accounting problems, Schwartz wrote: “Ken Lay’s 
response to Enron’s problems – the declining stock price, the expanding spread on bond 
debt, the departure of major executives – was rooted in his unshakable faith in the power 
of appearances.”
160
 As Watkins saw it, these moves failed him as the neat interplay 
between perception and reality came to a halt. In discussing the financial restatements, 
Schwartz and Watkins wrote that “The question for Enron, as always, was how to present 
the news.”
161
 Here, the immateriality at the root of Enron’s “brain intensive businesses” 
precipitated the company’s collapse. Precisely because Enron was overly concerned with 
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representation and perception, instead of concrete businesses, it would not be able to 
recover.  
As if to make the connection between public relations smoke and mirrors and 
Enron’s post-1997 businesses, the authors renewed their discussion of Enron’s 
partnerships.  This section highlighted the complexity of the deals, as well as the flurry of 
memos among Enron, the law firm Vinson and Elkins, and Arthur Andersen employees. 
Again, Schwartz and Watkins turned to the trope of perception versus reality. For 
example, lawyers at Vinson and Elkins became concerned with “potential bad 
cosmetics.”
162
 As Schwartz quoted a memo (and not without some degree of irony), the 
lawyers were not so much concerned with the legality of the transactions (they apparently 
thought that Enron’s accounting with regards to some of the Special Purpose Entities 
were technically okay), but rather that “the transactions involving Condor/Whitewing and 
Raptor could be portrayed very poorly if subjected to a Wall Street Journal exposé or 
class action lawsuit.”
163
 Naturally, what followed in the next pages of Power Failure was 
the series of Journal stories themselves. However, Power Failure then took a strange 
turn. Throughout, Schwartz and Watkins had worked to draw distinctions between 
perception and reality that had begun to blur at Enron, as well as to narrate how Watkins 
herself became clear about such distinctions (the last line in the book read, “she had no 
more illusions”.)
164
 However, large passages toward the end offered commentary on 
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media treatment and how representations of Enron (particularly in the Wall Street 
Journal) resulted in the company’s collapse.  
For example, Schwartz charted an evolution of Enron’s media portrayal, claiming 
that Enron, once it passed into the press in general, became an “all-American morality 
play.”
165
 After comparing the media interest to OJ Simpson’s trial, the Monica Lewinsky 
affair and other spectacles, the two noted that Enron offered a gaggle of clear cut 
“villains,” while also claiming (in terms that were perhaps too grandiose) that after 
Watkins’ memos became public, she “made the great American transition from 
anonymous American to national folk hero.”
166
 Yet in the middle of this hyperbole, the 
authors noted: 
As the revelations continued, the only asset Enron had left was its notably fluid 
identity. In the hands of the media, this identity became a metaphor for all the ills 
of the last decade – the illusory tech bubble, the silly excesses […] In short, Enron 





Here, as in 24 Days, Schwartz and Watkins struggled to find a broader meaning for 
Enron beyond the scandal itself, but arrived at a different set of conclusions. While Smith 
and Emshwiller found some solace in the stock market’s punishment for Enron’s wrongs, 
Schwartz and Watkins did not hedge their condemnation for capitalism as a whole in the 
1990s.  
Finally, in an attempt to exonerate herself, Watkins attached the three memos she 
authored, as well as a diagram of Fastow’s deals and, much like 24 Days, a graph 
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tracking Enron’s declining stock. Here, the documents themselves were offered up in 
juxtaposition to one another. Next to the deeply confusing and possibly fraudulent 
financial complexities of the Special Purpose Entities, the relatively plainspoken Watkins 
memos represented truth to power (or even truth in general).  
 Similarly, in Anatomy of Greed, Brian Cruver charted his initial enthusiasm for 
and subsequent disillusionment with Enron.
168
 Much like Watkins, Cruver attempted to 
distance himself from the company as a whole throughout the text. Cruver’s narrative 
was interesting in that unlike Smith and Emshwiller, and Sherron Watkins, he was a bit 
player in Enron’s story. His only claim to fame was a brief fifteen minutes when he tried 
(and failed) to sell internal company documents on eBay (the site apparently became 
worried about legal ramifications and ended the auction). Later, his book became the 
basis for a made-for-television movie.  
When it was first published, Anatomy of Greed was not received well. Unlike 24 
Days, and Power Failure, Anatomy of Greed did not appear on either the New York Times 
or Businessweek best seller list. Publisher’s Weekly, for one, gave it a very poor review 
and was equivocal about sales prospects.
169
 Indeed, Cruver’s experience with Enron was 
extremely limited. He worked at the company for less than a year, and a good portion of 
the text dealt with him after he had been laid off, but was still receiving a paycheck in the 
midst of internal chaos.  
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However, it was his rank and file status that made Anatomy of Greed interesting. 
To an even larger degree than Watkins (for whom the stakes were much higher), Cruver’s 
narrative dramatized daily life for a symbolic analyst. Despite these differences, Cruver 
still used several tropes that appeared in other narratives, such as the movement of the 
company’s stock price, and, much like Smith and Emshwiller, an informant (Mr. Blue), 
who periodically met with Cruver and provided him with information he would not 
otherwise possess. The way Cruver structured the book also operated, on some level, as a 
parody of business and career advice books such as Tom Peter’s Circle of Innovation 
from 1997. Sections are titled “How to Conquer Corporate America, Rule #...” and the 
text periodically slipped into lists of bullet points.  
Throughout, Cruver was the ultimate symbolic analyst, claiming that Enron “was 
running on a platform of intellectual capital.”
170
 The unit that hired him, bankruptcy 
derivatives, had nothing to do with energy. As he wrote: “Enron was becoming the model 
of the new economy. […] the Enron business was no longer about energy; it was all 
about risk and the control of risk. It was expanding into new markets, it was 
commoditizing everything, and it was starting to move at the speed of electrons.”
171
 In 
short, Cruver’s unit was one example of the near utopian enthusiasm for immateriality 
that Enron displayed in the letters to the shareholders in 1999 and 2000. In his telling, 
Cruver was initially entranced by Enron’s bold declarations. For example, as Cruver read 
the 2000 letter to shareholders, he saw that Enron’s “message was about the future. As I 
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read it, I sat back in my chair and visualized Enron’s blue ink spilling across a map of the 
world, until every continent was covered.”
172
 Presumably, such a reaction would have 
been the letter’s desired effect. Cruver’s vision was a good summary of Enron’s attempts 
to eradicate spatial difference. 
Yet just as Enron’s “brain intensive businesses” were ultimately reliant on the 
transformation of physical spaces (such as downtown Houston), the material world was 
always present in Anatomy of Greed. For all of the immaterial work that Cruver engaged 
in, his writing suggested a preoccupation with the physical spaces that Enron employees 
inhabited. For example, in writing about his workspace, he recalled that:  
The desks were in long rows, with a person seated every four feet on either side. 
The only thing that kept you from staring at the person across from you was the 
eye-level mounted flat-screen computer monitors. They were like a status symbol. 
The more flat screens you had, the more critical your need for information. I had 




It was here that Cruver recounted the action that took place throughout the company’s 
actual spaces (the buzz of activity that Cruver described here was exactly the same that 
Lay and Skilling invited George Bush to come and see when he was governor).  
Yet as much as Cruver lingered on these physical spaces, he also commented on 
the interplay of perception and reality. However, to an even larger degree than other 
texts, Anatomy of Greed could not entirely leave behind the material world. Here, the 
“perception versus reality” trope was literally embodied in his friend and public relations 
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 As Cruver wrote during an early meeting with her, “Almost 
as important as learning the business itself was learning how to talk about it. The reality, 
as I quickly found, was that perception led the way.”
175
 As the line between the two ideas 
rapidly blurred, Perry acted as his guide. However, much in the same way 24 Days and 
Power Failure stepped back from a generally systemic critique of late capitalism, 
throughout Anatomy of Greed, Cruver’s asides betrayed an ultimate faith in that 
economic system. For example, in his discussion of the California energy crisis, Cruver 
shied away from a wholesale critique of neoliberalism, writing that “The deregulation 
Enron believed in was vastly different from the California version” and even proclaimed:  
Everyone at Enron knew that our company would be much better off if California 
was successfully deregulated. Deregulation was the key to Enron’s future across 
the United States. To have California’s effort backfire, while masquerading as 
deregulation, was actually a massive blow to Enron’s national potential. 
The free-market theory, the supply-and-demand issues, the benefits of 




The political economic ideology that accompanied Enron’s cultural work died hard. In 
these passages, Cruver appeared to uncritically adopt many of the assumptions that Enron 
operated under. 
However, as the scandal erupted, Cruver’s writing offered yet another 
dramatization of the informational economy, and, in particular, the plight of the symbolic 
analyst. Just as Smith and Emshwiller dramatized their own positions as symbolic 
analysts, Cruver purported to be befuddled by the amount of information that resulted 
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from Enron’s financial disclosures and the Wall Street Journal reports. In describing the 
October 16
th
 conference call, Cruver stated: “As usual, it was information overload. The 
numbers were spilling across my computer screen, echoing across the trading floor, and 
popping up on CNBC.”
177
 In this passage, the author focused on the environment inside 
Enron – emphasizing the role of information. However, once Enron announced the bad 
news, Cruver, as well as his friends, found that their roles as symbolic analysts became 
challenged. Specifically, the author was not entirely sure what to do with the company’s 
stock price (even though, as if to attach some sort of meaning to it, he almost 
compulsively listed its opening and closing prices, as well as its trading volume 
throughout the book). One trope that ran throughout the book was an ongoing 
conversation with his friend, Brian Bickers, a stock analyst in New York (indeed, much 
of the dialogue in Anatomy of Greed took place over the phone). As the Journal 
continued to publish the Enron articles throughout October and November, Cruver and 
Bickers had a hard time deciding where the “floor” for Enron’s stock price would be 
(apparently this was a game many at Enron played during this period). Much like the 
authors of 24 Days and Power Failure, Cruver was unable to tell his story without 
spending a good deal of time discussing issues of representation. Similarly, Cruver’s 
narrative also became intertextual – quoting from public documents, such as Enron press 
releases and news stories, as well as company memos and emails. Yet even in these 
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moments, Cruver could not help but return to Enron’s physical spaces for solace. As he 
put it:  
It was hard to think that Enron could really just disappear. I couldn’t help but 
think this was a different situation from that dotcom hype-driven drool. We had 
two enormous towers standing at the leading edge of the world’s energy corridor. 
I saw thousands of employees, futuristic technology, and a history of dominance 
in the gas and power markets. This wasn’t a garage full of Web designers, trying 




Cruver was agog at Enron’s misfortunes precisely because of its geographic location and 
its physical manifestations. Finally, of course, Cruver did come to accept Enron’s 
collapse, noting that “the numbers are all related; if one is wrong, they are all wrong.”
179
 
Much like Power Failure, Cruver also reproduced one of the deal diagrams from the 
Powers Report. As Cruver learned for himself, and through conversations with “Mr. 
Blue,” Enron’s immaterial business was ultimately untenable. Though the ideas were not 
nearly as well developed as they were in 24 Days or Power Failure, the similarities 
Anatomy of Greed shared with these two books revealed how all of these authors 
struggled with the tensions and contradictions of the informational economy that Enron’s 
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Because Enron unfolded in the news media, and because some of these books 
were authored by people who played key roles in the revelations, there was always the 
moment in the narrative when the scandal emerged as a news story and the author moved 
from storyteller to media critic. In order to tell their stories, these authors necessarily 
ended their accounts in a complex negotiation between the event and the representation 
of that event. These books were inherently intertextual, constantly referring to other 
accounts of the same events. As much as many of these authors criticized Enron, business 
and the entire nation for mistaking or willfully ignoring the line between representation 
and the real, the final chapters in many of these texts wound up preoccupied with 
representation. In their failure to move away from smoke and mirrors and locate a moral 
center and concrete truth, these authors underscored many of the contradictions of the 
informational economy. As Fredric Jameson puts it, such postmodern products are 
“realist” in the sense that they deal with the “realism of the image.”
180
 That the authors of 
Enron narratives would focus intently on the power of image and representation was a 
“symptom of the very system it represents in the first place.”
181
 The inability to move 
away from questions of representation served to underscore how prominent 
representation had become in the informational economy. 
As Jameson argues:  
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The recent business failures like Enron seem to suggest that the value of a given 
stock cannot long be separated from the profitability of the firm it is supposed to 
‘represent’ or express, but I think they demonstrate the opposite, that 
semiautonomous status with respect to its nominal company and that, in any case, 
postmodern “profitability” is a new category, dependent on all kinds of conditions 




These various reactions and articulations hinted at the unease with the informational 
economy that had been dormant for so long. 
It was this decidedly postmodern character that linked these texts to the initial 
newspaper coverage. At least one former employee vividly recalled his last day, leaving 
the office with news helicopters overhead and a line of camera crews across the street; 
the creation of the these images and representations was happening in real time.
183
 Both 
the news stories and the immediate spate of insider accounts that flooded the market were 
attempts to grapple with some of the anxieties of the informational economy. Enron’s 
collapse revealed a poststructural logic to its business, and the news coverage and outrage 
that immediately followed revelations of the company’s shabby financial condition gave 
rise to anxiety over this type of logic and an insistence that some moral, objective truth 
was both possible and necessary. However, the reaction also revealed a darker side to this 
public anxiety, which later appeared as intolerance for “knowledge work” of any kind 
(or, at its most extreme, intellectual endeavor of any sort), while at the same time 
betraying a reliance on the work tools of the symbolic analyst.  
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Of course, these attempts to sort through the malleable nature of meaning and 
significance in search of something concrete were not the only reactions to Enron’s 
collapse. As the early aughts rolled on, Enron, for all its complexity, became a subject for 
writers and filmmakers who were not business columnists or former employees. The 
company’s connections to political figures such as the Bushes, and the growing 
popularity of genres such as political documentary, ensured that that the company would 






“AN IMMENSE THICKET OF INFORMATION” – ENRON NARRATIVES AND 
THE PROBLEM OF MEANING, 2003-2005 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 13, 2005, Ken Lay stood in front of an audience at the Houston 
Forum, a city organization that arranged talks by prominent figures such as former 
President George H.W. Bush and Ralph Nader. “Most of what was and is still being said, 
heard or read,” about Enron, Lay declared, “was and still is either grossly exaggerated, 
distorted, or just flat out false. But a time of political and public hysteria is not a ripe 
environment for truth.”
1
 It should come as no surprise that this was a central concern for 
him. By 2005, Enron executives were already spending time in jail and Lay’s own trial 
was set to begin the following year. Arthur Andersen no longer existed as a direct result 
of its involvement with Enron, and, as he noted in his address to the Houston Forum, Lay 
himself was potentially facing a prison sentence of 175 years.
2
 Much of the speech, 
which the embattled executive had originally entitled “Living in the Crosshairs of the 
U.S. Criminal Justice System” before settling on the slightly less hysterical “Guilty, Until 
Proven Innocent,” was given over to a legal defense of his own involvement in the 
company, as well as dark warnings about “criminalizing” certain types of “business 
activities.” Despite his dire situation, toward the end of his remarks, Lay professed that 
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“truth is the great rock.”
3
 Lay may not have been a disinterested subject, but he was not 
alone in seeking some sort of “truth” about Enron.  
Perhaps more than any other year since the firm’s collapse, 2005 saw the 
appearance of substantial attempts to arrive at some “truth” about Enron. However, this 
was not an easy task; the details of the case were complicated. Lay even mocked the 
efforts of the government task force investigating him as having the “complicated” task 
of finding “crimes where they do not exist.”
4
 In remarks that were self-serving though 
illuminating nonetheless, Lay noted, “Those with a public voice were telling stories they 
wanted to tell and the people were reading and hearing the stories that they wanted to 
hear – stories of powerful, greedy and soulless executives eager to trample on anyone and 
everyone to achieve their ruthless and immoral goals.”
5
 The executive clearly had 
politicians and prosecutors in mind as he spoke these words, though other “public 
voices,” such as those of writers and filmmakers, were also beginning to tell stories about 
Enron. But what stories were being told about the company? Who was telling them, and 
for what reasons? And, finally, what, if any, “truths” or meaning could be gleaned from 
these narratives? The documents themselves did not provide easy answers.  
In his Houston Forum speech, Lay had worried about demagoguery aimed at his 
old company, and, to be sure, there was a great deal of it to go around. This change in 
tone was a startling contrast to the apprehensiveness that permeated media coverage 
earlier in the decade. Business narratives like Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind’s The 
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Smartest Guys in the Room (2003), Kurt Eichenwald’s Conspiracy of Fools (2005), and, 
most notably, Alex Gibney’s film documentary, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room 
(2005), evinced an outrage more than anxiety. Still, contrary to Lay’s assertion that the 
Enron narratives were overly simplistic morality tales that ignored facts, some of the 
most prominent Enron narratives were almost hopelessly conflicted. Scholar Rosalie 
Genova points out that in some quarters, (most notably the halls of Congress), Enron was 
reduced to a simple tale of right and wrong.
6
 However, as much as Ken Lay in his 
Houston Forum address worried over people reading and hearing the stories that they 
wanted to hear about Enron, the narratives that emerged were far more complex.  
If the initial panic surrounding Enron’s collapse, as well as the books and TV 
movies that date from 2002 and 2003, revealed an anxiety about the informational 
economy, other books and movies (most of which appeared in 2003 and 2005) performed 
a different type of cultural work. Rather than anxious panic over the informational 
economy or a rush to give an insider account, these works represented thorough attempts 
to make sense of the collapse and arrive at some definitive conclusion about its 
significance.
7
 However, these extended treatments of the company and its collapse relied 
on older cultural and literary tropes to make sense of events. Yet such older cultural 
referents were not up to the task. Rather, in each instance complexities and ambiguities 
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inherent to the informational economy frustrated any final sense of meaning or clear 
critique. 
 
THE MORAL ARC OF THE INFORMATIONAL ECONOMY AS SEEN ON TV 
 
The simplest narratives attempted to reduce Enron to a simplistic morality play. 
For instance, in 2003 Cruver’s Anatomy of Greed found an afterlife when it was adapted 
for a made-for-TV movie, The Crooked E: The Unshredded Truth about Enron. Rather 
than delve into the particulars of post-Fordism, the made-for-TV movie offered a far 
more straightforward morality play about what could happen to individuals in the 
informational economy. As Cruver himself noted, screenwriter Stephen Mazur and 
director Penelope Spheeris (who was known for directing the music documentary series 
The Decline of Western Civilization and the comedy Wayne’s World) took many liberties 
in adapting the book. One notable addition was a running subplot where the character 
Brian Cruver (played by actor Christian Kane) has marital problems – an element that 
was almost wholly absent in Anatomy of Greed. Because of such embellishments, the 
film was shot through with the traces of older cultural narratives and ideas already in 
circulation that were then grafted onto the informational economy. 
Indeed, the hastily assembled television movie lifted some of the basic plot points 
and tropes from earlier Hollywood depictions of high finance, such as Wall Street and 
The Boiler Room and superimposed them onto Cruver’s narrative. Despite such artistic 




the movies as a faithful rendering of the scandal. Other writers scoffed at The Crooked 
E’s cheap production values and cliché-ridden dialogue. Some former Enron workers also 
had problems with Spheeris’s treatment of the company. Former female employees, for 




Despite such flaws, the made-for-TV version was notable for its moral coherence, 
distilling all the ills of late capitalism down to a single, contradictory phrase: “virtual 
assets.” These two words appeared again and again in the film and seemed to suggest that 
the whole of the informational economy was corrupt. The condemnation of this type of 
work appeared through the fictional Brian Cruver’s seduction by Enron, even as it 
threatened his engagement to Courtney (played by Shannon Elizabeth), who hailed from 
rural Texas. In this geography, there were echoes of the ways some Texas writers had 
blamed Enron on Northeastern influences. Though the fictional Brian Cruver was also 
from Texas, Courtney’s rural roots stood in for physical labor, a moral type of work that 
ultimately helped to ground Brian. 
Courtney’s wisdom appeared early in the film, when she expressed concern about 
Cruver’s acceptance letter from the company. The actresses’s line, “I just want you to be 
happy,” foreshadowed the story’s primary narrative arc.
9
 As to be expected, Kane’s 
Cruver would not find happiness at Enron, while Shannon Elizabeth’s character would 
                                                 
8
 Bill Murphy, “Ex-Staffers Rip Crooked E to Shreds,” The Houston Chronicle, January 20, 2003, A17. 
<www.lexisnexis.com>, (Accessed June 12, 2011). 
9
 The Crooked E: The Unshredded Truth About Enron, DVD, directed by Penelope Spheeris (Echo Bridge 




instead function as the film’s moral center. The dichotomy of an immoral, corrupting 
marketplace that women and the home offered refuge from was nothing new. Indeed, the 
nineteenth-century ideology of separate spheres was in part predicated on this divided 
moral world. Such a moral world even informed treatments of business in American 
fiction as early as the late nineteenth century. In William Dean Howell’s novel from 
1885, The Rise of Silas Lapham, for instance, Silas’s wife remained grounded by 
traditional values even as Silas forsook them in the pursuit of expanding his fortune. 
Likewise, at the end of Sloan Wilson’s 1950s novel, The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit, 
the protagonist, Tom Rath, ultimately found happiness at home with his wife rather than 
in the business world. Indeed, even if the ideology of separate spheres had (arguably) 
faded, it remained a perennial trope in American fiction about the world of business. 
The made-for-TV movie built off this older framework, introducing an element 
that was specific to the informational economy. In dividing up the film according to the 
separate spheres ideology, Spheeris also placed the material world within the domestic 
sphere, giving it a moral force that, by contrast, symbolic analysis lacked. In this 
symbolic universe, Shannon Elizabeth’s character stood in synecdochally for the physical 
world that was more moral, though less sophisticated, than the world of knowledge work 
that her fiancé dealt with at Enron. Because of these correspondences, a scene where 
Courtney expressed shock and horror upon learning that Brian had dined out on sushi 
with coworkers instead of coming home at a reasonable hour to her and her pot of chili 




when the camera revealed Courtney glowering when Brian sold the battered, muddy Jeep 
in exchange for a flashy new Lexus, a moral judgment of the informational economy was 
being offered. These symbols of morality and materiality – a muddy Jeep and a bowl of 
chili – were also at play in Brian’s redemption. Arriving at Courtney’s rural family home, 
he did so in the Jeep (having somehow gotten it back). That his fiancé was working in a 
garden was significant, too. In these moments, Shannon Elizabeth’s character stood in as 
a reminder of a traditional – and culturally conservative - world that stood both above and 
apart from the informational economy and symbolic analysis. 
The informational marketplace (represented by Enron) was the other, more 
immoral sphere that threatened to seduce and corrupt Brian throughout most of The 
Crooked E. Brian’s moral drift began early in the story. For instance, when the fictional 
Cruver ditched his tie after noticing the casual attire of the symbolic analysts moving 
around him, it signaled the beginning of his decline. Indeed, it was not too long after that 
point in the narrative that the term “virtual assets” made its first appearance. In these first 
moments, the term flummoxed the naïve, uncorrupted symbolic analyst. Yet as the story 
unfolded, Brian himself began to use the term. 
As the scene where Brian took off his necktie signified, the character was in for 
an education of sorts about the world he was entering. Early scenes in the movie showed 
Brian striking out in a series of cold calls (unsolicited sales calls), recalling early scenes 
in Oliver Stone’s 1987 movie Wall Street. Of course, the audience was meant to take his 




Though early scenes in the movie depicted Brian as dealing with some sort of 
inner turmoil, he ultimately shed his sense of ethics, becoming “Enronized.” Ironically, 
the business unit the character worked for in the movie was “Bankruptcy Protection.” The 
real-world Enron did have plans for such a unit that would have offered derivatives that 
allowed businesses to hedge against the possibility of bankruptcy, though such intricate 
details did not appear in The Crooked E. In the movie, the fictional Cruver more or less 
operated as a slick salesman, peddling an insurance policy to an unsuspecting executive, 
Alan Flemming, who was working for a decidedly old, industrial corporation. However, 
as viewers quickly became aware, if Enron were to go bankrupt, the policy would have 
been worthless. Though the deal itself was worthless, it advanced the character’s career 
(being the biggest deal – on paper – that the unit had to date).  
The hapless executive on the other end of the phone was practically the polar 
opposite of the fictional Cruver. That executive was roughly Brian’s age and both 
characters were drenched in signifiers that played off one another. While the fictional 
Brian Cruver was surrounded by the intoxicating chaos of Enron’s trading floor (though 
the film’s low budget only allowed for a sparse set decorations), the rube on the other end 
of the telephone sat alone in a quiet office. Likewise, Cruver’s hair was rakishly tousled 
while the other man’s hair was combed in a neat part. Sans tie, Brian’s attire was also hip 
(in the preferred style of symbolic analysts) while his opposite wore a traditional business 
suit. Even the technology surrounding the two was different. Cruver wore a (modern-ish) 




2003. True to many of the photographs and journalistic descriptions of Enron’s offices 
and desks, the set of the Enron trading floor was filled with computer screens. While 
these details were not terribly subtle, Spheeris and company apparently did not want to 
leave matters open to interpretation. Exterior shots of Enron’s fictional client, Walderson 
Industries, clearly implied that the company actually produced something. The sequence 
that opened the scene revealed a large truck slowly approaching a building that had stacks 
and ramps. This was not the informational economy.  
The interaction between the two men, and its consequences, also highlighted the 
dangers of the informational economy. Swayed by the recently “Enronized” Brian, 
Alan’s decision to buy the insurance policy was ultimately revealed as folly. In what was 
meant to be one of the film’s most exciting sequences, Brian saved Walderson Industries 
by shredding a contract (that if enforced would have bankrupted Walderson Industries). 
This plot should not have been new to some viewers. In fact, it closely mirrored the 
corruption (and ultimate salvation) of the main character in the 2000 film, The Boiler 
Room. Of course, The Crooked E was sure to end with Brian’s (and Walderson 
Industries’) salvation, but the movie was still clear in the way that it juxtaposed Brian and 
Allen. In the differences between these two characters, Spheeris depicted the 
informational economy as both corrupt and corrupting while the world of traditional 
business was at least built on honest work. The contrast between the two characters was 




informational economy. Rather, the script’s repetition of the phrase “virtual assets” made 
clear the film’s moral universe. 
In one particularly telling moment, Brian became annoyed and dismissive as his 
decidedly blue collar future brother-in-law failed to grasp the concept of “virtual assets.” 
In trying to explain what he did at Enron, Brian became increasingly annoyed with 
Courtney’s brother while they were getting ready for a hunting trip. The brother’s 
question “What does that mean: virtual assets?” was a reflection of the plain spoken 
retorts to Enron’s language games that had appeared in earlier complaints about the 
company.
10
 Similarly, Brian’s answer: “It’s an asset that’s not tied into any physical plant 
or product” failed to satisfy his audience.
11
 The brother-in-law’s response - “Yeah, but 
what does it mean?” - once again highlighted how language failed in the informational 
economy.
12
 Amidst the rural backdrop and among his future in-laws (his father-in-law in 
a full ten gallon hat), Brian failed to communicate what it was he did, finally offering a 
flustered “it’s really complicated to explain if you’re not in business.”
13
 In these scenes, 
the sophistry of the informational economy was meant to be laid bare. In an albeit clichéd 
scene, the exchange echoed many early complaints about the role of language in the 
informational economy. By contrast, the domestic sphere and Courtney’s emphasis on 
home and family offered Brian a moral refuge from the informational economy’s ills.  
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However, while The Crooked E arranged the events of Enron’s collapse into a 
coherent moral tale, such clarity did little to advance a true and sophisticated critique of 
the informational economy. More nuanced and detailed treatments of the company did 
not fare much better. Many of these later attempts to use Enron as a way to comment on 
the informational economy yielded a confusion of sympathies and ideas that made it 
difficult to determine where to place the blame. Through a variety of works, authors and 
filmmakers who took up Enron as a subject often ended up in a morass of seemingly 
contradictory political and cultural sentiments. 
 
 
“INTELLECTUALLY PURE” - ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM AND CONFUSED 
POLITICS IN ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM 
 
Such confusion could be found in the shift in tone was evident in Bethany 
McLean’s writing. By the time of her book’s publication in 2003, Enron’s collapse no 
longer constituted an existential threat where meaning and reality itself seemed 
malleable.
 14
 As the two reporters wrote of the infamous October 16, 2001, earnings 
report in The Smartest Guys in the Room, it was “an attempt to hide what was really 
going on by stretching the rules, twisting the language, and playing games.”
15
 A scandal 
had been uncovered and its potential fallout had been contained. The “games” and 
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“twisted language” that Enron played were recast here as a sham – plain and simple. This 
sentiment extended to McLean and Elkind’s treatment of Andy Fastow’s Special Purpose 
Entities. As they wrote, the structures “which seemed so clever – so elegant – not long 
before, now stood revealed as rickety contraptions, lashed to one another and rigged to 
explode.”
16
 The statement, replete with schadenfreude and ironic undertones, was largely 
devoid of the trepidation that swirled around Enron’s revelations in late 2001 or even the 
worry just below the surface in McLean’s March 2001 article. 
McLean and Elkind’s tone in that passage seemed to have more in common with 
some of the earliest cartoon depictions, or late-night jokes.
17
 The sarcasm in titles like 
The Smartest Guys in the Room and Conspiracy of Fools was obvious. Still, it would be a 
mistake to overlook the moral seriousness at the root of these works. Whereas the initial 
media coverage gave voice to an anxiety about a world where meaning and value seemed 
indeterminate, these works attempted to fix meaning, insisting on absolute truths and 
values. Much like The Crooked E, these works suggested that the informational economy 
had not completely done away with definition and meaning. 
However, telling Enron’s story was no easy task. Despite the number of Enron 
narratives that had emerged in the wake of the scandal, the company’s history did not 
really lend itself to a straight narrative. Indeed, there was no single scandal or fraud, but 
rather years of different departments, projects and people that were mismanaged, covered 
up, honestly incompetent or plainly fraudulent. Jeff Skilling, perhaps the man most 
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synonymous with Enron and the collapse, did not even join the company until 1990. As a 
result, to retell Enron’s story was to shift among different actors and events. Lou Pai, for 
example, became a favorite subject in part because of his now-well-documented love of 
strip clubs. Of course, the division Pai ran, Enron Energy Services (EES), was a disaster; 
but Pai himself had nothing to do with Andrew Fastow and the complicated finance 
vehicles that ultimately felled the company (even if some of Fastow’s SPEs may have 
been used to cover up EES losses). Given this problem, in The Smartest Guys in the 
Room, McLean and Elkind focused on the symbolic analysts and the havoc they wrought 
at Enron. Beyond simply recounting the seedier details of the entire affair, the writing 
nudged the reader towards interpreting each episode as a moment of confrontation with 
and moral condemnation of symbolic analysts and the informational economy. In this 
way, The Smartest Guys in the Room seemed to have a clear progressive political 
sensibility. Cecelia Tichi is one scholar who has noted the preponderance of muckraking 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As she puts it: “the movement is 
enjoying a renaissance in this, the Second Gilded Age. A c2000 generation of muckrakers 
has taken center stage on best-seller lists.”
18
  
Yet it would be wrong to claim that these Enron narratives were examples of 
muckraking “c.2000.” After all, the books that Tichi singles out, Eric Schlosser’s Fast 
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Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal and Barbara Ehrenreich’s Nickel 
and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America, were markedly different from the most 
prominent Enron narratives. Both Schlosser and Ehrenreich sought to expose formerly 
hidden conditions and speak out against systemic injustice in the United States. By 
contrast, works like The Smartest Guys in the Room and A Conspiracy of Fools were 
narrative accounts of what had already been exposed. Still, as Tichi would argue, these 
Enron narratives appeared in a context favorable to a muckraking ethos where all sorts of 
media – magazines, newspapers, television, documentary films and fictional films 
provided a “muckraker function.”
19
 As she puts it, these outlets “create the environment 
for public understanding of – and engagement with – issues crystallized in muckraker 
narratives.”
20
 Certainly, traces of this ethos were present in these texts and films, even if 
it would be folly to read books such as The Smartest Guys in the Room or its movie 
adaptation as exposé journalism. Perhaps what is even more important is that the 
environment was ripe for public reception of these texts and movies as examples of 
muckraking. However, while these works, and Gibney’s film in particular, seemed like 
progressive muckraking to reviewers and audience members, they revealed a mix of 
clashing sensibilities. As a result, these books and movies were shot through with 
contradiction - alternating between outrage and sympathy, admiration and mockery, 
wonder and disgust. Much like the made-for-tv movie, neither work could locate any 
determinative resolution.  
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A comparison of the book and movie versions of The Smartest Guys in the Room 
reveals how these paradoxical sympathies could be found in the same work. This 
comparison is doubly important since the film is by far the most prominent account of 
Enron to date. Gibney’s film ultimately earned over four million dollars through its 
theatrical release and played in 146 theaters - not bad for an unrated documentary about a 
business scandal.
21
 Still, the politics of the two works were distant. McLean and Elkind’s 
book was a piece of business journalism, not the work of two firebrand liberals, while 
Gibney’s documentary was firmly grounded in the semi-craze for liberal (largely anti-
Bush) documentaries during the decade, such as Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11. 
Despite these disparate viewpoints, the interconnectedness of the book and film versions 
of The Smartest Guys in the Room was undeniable. In using McLean and Elkind as the 
film’s source, Gibney unwittingly drew on an anti-intellectualism inherent in the book. 
Still, this disdain for Enron’s “intellectuals” was not a new phenomenon. Rather, the anti-
intellectualism that appeared as brief flashes and asides in 2001 and 2002 became far 
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ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM AS LEIT MOTIF 
Richard Hofstadter was one historian who regarded anti-intellectualism as a long 
tradition in American culture.
23
 Writing in 1964, he described the stereotype of an 
intellectual as:  
pretentious, conceited, effeminate, and snobbish; and very likely immoral, 
dangerous, and subversive. The plain sense of the common man, especially if 
tested by success in some demanding line of practical work, is an altogether 
adequate substitute for, if not actually much superior to, formal knowledge and 




Almost implicitly, Hofstadter set up an oppositional relationship between intellectuals 
and business, seeing them as having different goals. As he put it, “The values of business 
and the intellect are seen as eternally and inevitably at odds.”
25
 For Hofstadter, this was 
because American business had always relished a “devotion to practicality.”
26
 In 
Hofstadter’s telling, the American businessman abhorred new ideas, or, really, anything 
that was not a direct outgrowth of knowledge gained from years of business experience. 
This opposition of ideas and practicality was at the root of criticism of Enron figures like 
Jeff Skilling and the symbolic analysts. However, this opposition was not as paradoxical 
as it may have first seemed. In modeling Enron after a Wall Street investment bank, 
many in the firm had acquired Wall Street’s arrogance. As Karen Ho notes in her 
ethnographic study of Wall Street, “investment bankers, by virtue of their smartness, 
believe that they cannot help but outwit, outmaneuver, and in short, run circles around 
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 In adopting many of these same pretensions and disdain for other 
corporations, Enron offered critics a way to condemn the company in a manner that was 
similar to Hofstadter’s observation about a pre-informational economy business disdain 
for intellectuals. 
This is not to say that Enron’s energy traders were “intellectuals” in any 
traditional sense (far from it). Indeed, the types of intellectuals Hofstadter had in mind 
were completely absent from the Enron narrative; the company’s energy traders were 
hardly espresso-swilling Marxist poets. Still, Skilling-era Enron, marked by ad 
campaigns that boldly implored viewers to “Ask Why” and staffed with young MBAs 
from elite schools, clearly aspired to some sort of “life of the mind.” Enron was not alone 
in adopting this sensibility. Andrew Ross has noted the conflation of some traditionally 
intellectual categories, such as creative artists, with New Economy “knowledge work.”
28
 
This is to say that by the end of the twentieth century, newer, younger white collar 
workers (like those employed by Enron) shared at least some of the sensibilities of 
figures more traditionally associated with intellectualism. Because of this, the anti-
intellectual tradition Hofstadter identified grafted easily onto Enron narratives. That 
Gibney could use the political documentary and muckraking as a form to lambast faux-
intellectuals at Enron did not so much reveal an inconsistency with his work as 
demonstrate how scrambled such categories had become by the mid aughts. 
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This confusion was in some measure attributable to some of the assumptions and 
attitudes in Gibney’s source material. The book, The Smartest Guys in the Room, fit 
squarely within the genre of financial thriller, or what I am labeling here “business 
narratives” (much like Power Failure and 24 Days). Some of the blurbs on the back of 
the cover also placed the book within this genre. Financial commentator James Cramer’s 
blurb read: “This book is right up there with Den of Thieves and Barbarians at the 
Gate….”
29
 Another blurb from a BusinessWeek review declared it “One of the top ten 
business books of the year.”
30
 The publisher, Portfolio, was Penguin’s imprint for 
business and management books. As all of this might suggest, The Smartest Guys in the 
Room was written for and marketed to an audience that had a great deal of interest in U.S. 
business. 
While it was full of focused outrage (the text was littered with details of 
outlandish greed and excess), McLean and Elkind’s book was a “business narrative” that 
primarily critiqued one type of work while favoring another. However, the type of work 
Enron had entered did have some affinity with the intellectuals Hofstadter described. As 
historian Fred Turner has noted, many “new economy” figures saw the informational 
economy as fulfilling the counterculture’s project of the 1960s. As Turner writes, the 
“digital generation” aspired to “tear down hierarchies, undermine the sorts of 
corporations and governments that spawned them, and in the hierarchies’ place, create a 
peer-to-peer, collaborative society interlinked by invisible currents of energy and 
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  It was precisely this attitude that McLean and Elkind were suspicious of 
when it came to Enron. In other words, this was not muckraking, but writing with a 
sensibility closer to the anti-intellectualism that had concerned Hofstadter nearly forty 
years earlier. The authors faulted Enron for dismissing traditional business structures in 
favor of a more chaotic and ultimately corrupt type of work. This critique emerged as the 
book’s unifying leit motif. As they recounted Enron’s history, McLean and Elkind moved 
through a series of scandals and crises that caused problems either for the company or the 
outside world. At the center of each of these was a figure that more or less typified the 
symbolic analyst.
32
 Throughout, each symbolic analyst the reader encountered was 
unscrupulous, greedy, arrogant and ultimately foolish. The schemes they hatched almost 
never paid off.  Try as they might, these symbolic analysts were ultimately unable to 
transcend the material world.
33
 Simultaneously, McLean and Elkind provided many 
examples of older, more practically minded business people – ones without elite 
credentials and big ideas - who were pushed out of the company. In this scheme, these 
older, maligned businessmen were the same that Hofstadter wrote about in 1964, 
disdaining of brainy intellectuals. In The Smartest Guys in the Room, they were usually 
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casualties of the New Economy ethos of both newness in and of itself and, more to the 
point, symbolic analysis. In effect, McLean and Elkind’s book operated as an internal 
critique within the business community. They did not dwell on the plight of the poor or 
middle class worker here; nor did the authors deal with squalid working conditions. 
Rather, they exposed the manipulation of symbols and language as the scandal and sham 
behind the informational economy.  
Still, there was more than enough in this book that did register as muckraking and 
exposé, which is probably why, in part, it became the basis for Alex Gibney’s 2005 
documentary, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room.
34
 Indeed, Gibney hewed fairly 
close to the text of the book, giving its authors a great deal of screen time and even using 
some of the book’s chapter titles. Yet despite the ways in which Gibney remained true to 
the book, there were significant differences in the director’s treatment of Enron. More 
than McLean and Elkind’s book, Gibney’s documentary was largely intended to be an 
affective, emotional experience. In this endeavor, the movie seems to have been a 
success. After all, one could not say that reading McLean and Elkind’s book wanted to 
make someone vomit. But this is exactly the reaction that Michael O'Sullivan allegedly 
had while writing his review of Gibney’s film for The Washington Post. O’Sullivan 
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dutifully reported that: “just reviewing my notes […] is making me physically ill.”
35
 
Though it was hyperbolic, the reviewer suggested that Enron: The Smartest Guys in the 
Room was intended to be a visceral experience. Other, less evocative reviews noted the 
“dark humor” of Gibney’s treatment and highlighted its righteous indignation. Several 
reviewers focused on what they deemed the “arrogance” and “greed” of Enron 
executives. One reviewer noted that a clip of Jeff Skilling getting hit in the face with a pie 
won cheers from a Houston audience filled with former Enron workers.
36
  
The timing was right for Gibney’s film, and the early press accounts attest to the 
popularity of this type of work in 2005. The mid-aughts were a period when political 
documentary flourished in theaters, and many articles and reviews of Gibney’s movie 
inevitably worked their way around to a comparison to Michael Moore’s films.
37
 
Amateur reviews from bloggers and the like also imply that the film was, in large part, 
received as a liberal-progressive indictment of American capitalism. For example, a 
review posted on one political blog, “The Baggage Room,” declared: “The film is a 
penetrating look at a microcosm of criminal capitalism American style.”
38
 Another 
blogger similarly referenced “Ken ‘Kenny Boy’ Lay's embrace of deregulation and his 
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close ties to the Bush administration.”
39
 Even some conservative voices, including 
decidedly pro-business bloggers, appear to have approved of the movie on some level. 
That these divergent voices could find at least some consensus with regards to Gibney’s 
work pointed to the conflicted message at the heart of the film.
40
 When the movie 
premiered at the Sundance Festival several months before the general release, at least one 
reporter described it as a “hot ticket.”
41
  
Indeed, the film itself could be entertaining. Certainly, Gibney’s treatment was far 
more caustic than most of the business narratives, and some of his source material, 
including C-Span clips of Skilling avoiding questions, audiotapes of California energy 
traders swearing, lent itself to such a treatment. More than a few reviewers regarded the 
movie as rendering the scandal understandable and intelligible, though Gibney primarily 
highlighted the emotional content latent in the source material.  
Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room performed this cultural work through both 
form and content. The film was far less comprehensive than many of the book-length 
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accounts. For instance, no one in the movie even mentioned Rebecca Mark, though she 
played an extraordinarily large role in Enron during the 1990s.
42
 Even Ken Lay, who did 
play a prominent role in Gibney’s film, was not the sole focus of this documentary. 
Instead, Gibney focused on symbolic analysts like Skilling and Fastow. Of course, in 
condensing an over 400 page book into just under two hours, Gibney could not avoid 
editorial decisions. These omissions actually added to the film’s power, providing it with 
a focus that was, on some level, lacking in the book. Much more so than many of the 
accounts, the documentary squarely focused on the informational economy and symbolic 
analysts. While the film did not attempt to explain some of the more complicated 
financial and business details, it was more notable for the specific “characters” it 
followed and added an element of class conflict that was largely absent from some of the 
business narratives. 
In these ways, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room was markedly different 
from McLean and Elkind’s book. However, the filmmaker was unable to escape the 
underlying antipathy toward intellectuals that was latent in the book. By building off of 
McLean and Elkind’s work, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room tried – but ultimately 
failed – to find some sort of resolution. What remained was a tangled mix of populism, 
anti-intellectualism, progressive disdain for capitalism’s excesses, and a lament for the 
material, mental and even spiritual decline of some of the business executives.  
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 The slippages, transformations and continuities between these two works were 
readily apparent in the way both McLean and Elkind, as well as Gibney, treated the 
symbolic analyst. While the two Fortune reporters focused on the symbolic analyst as the 
hubristic, impractical perversion of a white collar worker, Gibney heightened the sense of 
injustice and conflated what had been essentially a business-minded critique of 
intellectualism with a populist rage that was constitutionally foreign to business interests. 
Though Skilling emerged as the most prominent symbolic analyst in McLean and 
Elkind’s book, he was not the first to appear. Indeed, the second chapter, entitled “Please 
Keep Making Us Millions,” focused on an early episode in the company’s history – 
fraudulent trading by two “rogue traders” in Valhalla, New York, in 1987. The two 
energy traders, Louis Borget and Tom Mastroeni, nearly ruined the company through 
reckless gambling and speculation while at the same time hiding earnings from the 
company. In the context of the wider story, this was a minor episode, completely 
unconnected with Enron’s later troubles, and Borget and Mastroeni quickly faded from 
the narrative. Still, McLean and Elkind used the event as an opportunity to foreshadow 
several themes. For example, the authors took Lay’s failure to fire the two even after they 
had been exposed as evidence of the CEO’s own moral flexibility. The chapter was also 
thematically significant in that it established the trope of the corrupt symbolic analyst. 
 Early in the chapter, McLean and Elkind juxtaposed trading with the sort of large 




Oil [the trading division that housed the two] as it was renamed, wasn’t anything like the 
rest of the company’s gritty industrial operations. It was the ‘flashy’ part of the 
business….”
43
 This dichotomy, with “flashy” symbolic manipulation on one side and 
boring or even unappealing work on the other was one of the book’s constants.  
The depiction of the trading operation was also reminiscent of other descriptions 
of work in the informational economy. As McLean and Elkind wrote: “In more than 
location, the oil traders were closer to the freewheeling world of Wall Street than to the 
slow-moving, capital-intensive, risk-averse world of natural gas pipelines. Oil trading 
was about trading, not about oil.”
44
 Much like the various symbolic analysts that Enron 
had attempted to cultivate in the 1990s, Borget and Mastroeni specifically did not deal 
with anything material.
45
 Instead of producing anything tangible, they were interested 
only in “making” money through various trading operations. Notably, Borget 
characterized his own work as being able to “generate substantial earnings with virtually 
no fixed investment and relatively low risk,” a characterization that directly paralleled 
later Enron schemes.
46
 Of course, the authors intended these moments to stand in stark 
contrast to the supposedly “real” world of traditional pipeline operations. They described 
                                                 
43




 McLean and Elkind are quick to explore the moral dimensions as well as the internal contradictions of 
the informational economy. In what seems an echo of issues that emerged in the press coverage of the 
company’s downfall, here the function of the trader operation is one of “appearance,” helping to make the 
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Enron Oil’s offices as “sleek and modern and sheathed in glass, a far cry from the more 
modest quarters favored by energy industry executives.”
47
  
Borget himself seemed to mirror these same traits. The reporters quoted a source 
who said of Borget: “He was very intelligent, very imposing, sophisticated and slick.”
48
 
In other words, both the man and his environs were typical of the symbolic analyst. Of 
course, Borget and Mastroeni were engaged in out-right fraud. Not only did they exceed 
their allowed trading limits (a move which threatened to destroy the company), they also 
siphoned profits from the company and hid them in personal bank accounts. Interestingly, 
the hero in this episode was Rich Kinder, a rough, tough-talking executive who was 
Skilling’s predecessor as President and CEO.
49
 Though Kinder was a corporate lawyer by 
training, he was the antithesis of the symbolic analyst – unpolished, rude, plain-spoken 
and commonsensical.  
However fleeting the Valhalla incident may have been in terms of the company’s 
history, Gibney incorporated the episode into his movie. The film’s narrator, Peter 
Coyote, recounted many of the same details that McLean and Elkind did. Gibney even 
interviewed Mike Muckleroy, a gruff, older executive who was instrumental in saving the 
company from imploding during the ’87 Valhalla crisis. However, while he quickly 
disappeared from view in McLean and Elkind’s account, throughout the movie Gibney 
prominently featured Muckleroy as a plain-spoken, commonsense commentator on 
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increasingly outlandish events with an unmistakable Texan drawl and his blunt, folksy 
manner. For example, when the film turned to a consideration of the peer evaluation 
process that Skilling introduced, Gibney chose to show a close up on Muckleroy, who 
had gray hair and wore an open blue button-down shirt and no tie, as he scoffed, “I’ve 
never heard of any company yet that would be successful terminating fifteen percent of 
their people every year, just to satisfy the fact that the other employees have to vote on 
‘em.”
50
 The comment could hardly be said to pass for folk wisdom, but in the context of 
the film Muckleroy did, on some level, function in this manner. When compared to 
Skilling’s decidedly modern appearance and “New Economy” intellectual pretensions, 
Muckleroy came across as reassuringly old-fashioned. Perhaps this was why Muckleroy 
was such an attractive interview subject for the director. The executive was one more 




SKILLING AND HIS SYMBOLIC ANALYSTS 
Indeed, more than any other figure in the Enron story, both versions placed Jeff 
Skilling at the center of their narratives. In their book, McLean and Elkind focused on 
Jeff Skilling as the consummate symbolic analyst. It bears noting that the authors’ 
treatment of Skilling was far more nuanced than their treatment of Borget. Muted though 
it maybe, there were instances where the authors, despite themselves, displayed an odd 
admiration for Skilling. In a move akin to other business narratives, they ascribed to him 
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 It is worth quoting the book at length here. Of Skilling, they 
wrote:  
When Skilling looked at the natural-gas industry, he didn’t see natural gas. 
Instead, he saw the needs of customers on one side and the needs of suppliers on 
the other – and the gaps in between where, he believed, serious money could be 
made. To put it another way, he saw the ways in which the natural-gas industry 
resembled commodity businesses like wheat and pork bellies and especially 
financial services, where money itself is a commodity. That no natural-gas 
executives shared his vision didn’t bother Skilling in the least; other energy 





This passage offered up a near-perfect confluence of the different strains of the 
informational economy. First, Skilling’s idea was intended to overcome the material 
world with information and the manipulation of symbols. Second, his strategy as 
described by McLean and Elkind was closely related to the way financial derivatives had 
been used since the 1970s. Finally, Skilling, in this characterization, viewed older ways 
of doing business as uncreative. This was an important distinction. Skilling’s goal was 
not to replace manual labor with automation. Rather, he was a thinker, chafing against 
what he (apparently) regarded as dull managerial work. Of course, Skilling was again 
mirroring investment banker pretensions. As Karen Ho argues, many investment bankers 
during the 1990s and 2000s possessed a sense of “moral superiority” over what they 
regarded as “inefficient corporate America.”
54
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 However, McLean and Elkind took a dim view of Skilling’s brand of symbolic 
analyst. As they wrote: “What thrilled Skilling, always, was the intellectual purity of an 
idea, not the translation of that idea into reality.”
55
 While that comment alone was not a 
negative, the authors immediately followed with the criticism: “he was often too slow – 
even unwilling – to recognize when the reality didn’t match the theory.”
56
 These 
statements were direct rebukes to the “world making” ethos of the informational 
economy. In a trope that the reporters repeatedly called upon, any attempt by symbolic 
analysts to control the world through manipulating information was ultimately a fool’s 
errand. Nonetheless, the executive did get his chance to create his own division (Enron 
Gas Services) that allowed Skilling to “create a place where raw brains and creativity 
mattered more than management skills and real world experience.”
57
 Here, the reporters 
framed it as an absurd project. As if directly addressing Skilling himself, they retorted: 
“You can’t build a company on brilliance alone. […] You also need people who can 
implement those ideas.”
58
 Indeed, McLean and Elkind seemed to pin Enron’s eventual 
downfall on Skilling’s almost blind commitment to symbolic analysis, noting that in the 
end his division would turn into a “chaotic destructive free-for-all.”
59
  
The authors also frowned upon Skilling’s recruitment practices. In their telling, 
once given the opportunity, Skilling chose to compete with investment banks for the 
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same employees. In doing so, Enron’s hiring policies began to mirror Wall Street’s. As 
McLean and Elkind wrote with considerable disapproval:   
Everyone got Wall Street-style titles, such as managing director. Traditional 
offices were torn out, replaced with cubicles and glass walls. Instead of pursuing 
engineers from the University of Nebraska and Texas A&M, Skilling recruited 
MBAs from Wharton, the University of Texas, and Harvard. Over time, people 




It was in passages such as the one above where Hofstadter’s essay resonated the most. 
The reporters mapped a moral schemata onto the two groups – the engineers from state 
schools and the MBAs from (mostly) elite private ones. Here, the reader was meant to 
feel sympathy for the downtrodden engineers and was encouraged to harbor suspicion 
toward the Harvard MBAs. It is also worth taking note of the geography here. Echoing 
the moral geography that Bryce and Fraser mapped in their treatments of Enron, Texas 
A&M and Nebraska practically stood in as places of honest work (they yielded engineers 
– workers who dealt directly with the material world). Rather, the symbolic analysts that 
Skilling went out of his way to collect generally hailed from the East Coast. Little 
wonder, then, that McLean and Elkind reported that Skilling duplicated Wall Street’s 
office environment at Enron.  
Significantly, even when McLean and Elkind’s book did not directly address 
Skilling, the text nonetheless slipped back towards him and his commitment to symbolic 
analysts. The book’s chapters on Rebecca Mark were telling. Mark’s Enron story was 
scandalous in its own right. After all, it was Mark who helmed Enron’s failed foray into 
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building a power plant in India, and her time as the head of Azurix, Enron’s water utility 
spin-off, was also disastrous. While McLean and Elkind discussed these misadventures, 
in large part, Mark served to highlight Skilling’s growing disdain for “physical assets” 
and the materiality of the non-informational economy. The authors framed the rivalry 
between Rebecca Mark and Skilling as that of materiality versus immateriality, and also 
claimed that Skilling went on (after various promotions) to “refashion” Enron “in his 
image,” writing, “He would emphasize intellectual capital and promote risk taking.”
61
 
This put him at odds with Mark, who, as head of Enron’s international development 
efforts, spent her time trying to build large scale projects, such as power plants.
62
 In other 
words, even as the reporters tried to cover the entire scope and span of Enron’s history, 
Skilling and symbolic analysts were never far from the center. 
 
NOT JUST SKILLING, BUT THE WHOLE LOT OF THEM 
Though the authors clearly saw Skilling as the fountainhead of Enron’s growing 
contempt for the material world and the work associated with it, they expanded their 
scope to include others, particularly his protégés. In these sections, the book 
simultaneously resembled the sort of exposé that Tichi had in mind as well as 
Hofstadter’s point about business antipathy for intellectuals. This strain was apparent in 
Chapter Nine, “The Klieg-Light Syndrome.” It was, on some level, difficult to work 
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through at least some of the conflicted sentiments. The authors walked a fine in their 
treatment of terms like “innovative” and “creative.”
63
 Here, McLean and Elkind did not 
so much outright condemn these values as imply that dedication to them would lead to 
chaos. As they wrote:  
Skilling created a freewheeling culture that he touted as innovative – but didn’t 
reign in the excesses that came with it. He preached the gospel of intellectual 
capital, claiming that it was critically important to give smart people the resources 
and freedom to let creativity flourish, but looked the other way when this became 




As a result, McLean and Elkind presented an image of the symbolic analyst and the 
informational environment as chaotic. Yet another theme emerged in their 
characterization of Skilling’s symbolic analysts’ contempt for “honest” work.  
The co-authors consistently portrayed the typical symbolic analyst as 
contemptuous of other classes of workers. By valuing what they termed “intellectually 
pure” ideas, the symbolic analysts engaged in destructive behavior. Throughout, specific 
profiles of certain Enron figures worked to simultaneously define them as symbolic 
analysts and paint them as unscrupulous. Here, intelligence was almost synonymous with 
arrogance. This slippage was most apparent in the authors’ discussion of the energy 
traders.
65
 Their portrait of Greg Whalley, for instance, was particularly unflattering. They 
painted him as a bully who considered his intelligence a license to treat the people around 
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him badly. Connecting these two points, boorish personalities with intellectual ability and 
snobbery, was a persistent theme in The Smartest Guys in the Room.  
Yet even beyond this class snobbery, the authors came close to warning that 
symbolic analysts were dangerous figures. They noted that Enron had created a specific 
environment for their symbolic analysts and that, ultimately, the traders tried to remake 
the world in their image.
66
 Yet the world that had been tailor-made for the symbolic 
analysts was constitutionally unstable. McLean and Elkind connected symbolic analysts 
to the idea of risk and volatility when they wrote that “toward the end of the 1990s came 
unprecedented volatility, and for traders, volatility is one of the necessary ingredients for 
making outsize profits. And as trading profits soared, the traders became convinced of 
their own invincibility.”
67
 In effect, the two reporters offered a sophisticated critique of 
the informational economy. 
The idea of the symbolic analysts as both socially unpalatable and threatening 
came into sharpest relief when McLean and Elkind turned their attention to Andy Fastow. 
Not coincidentally, such passages were also the moments when The Smartest Guys in the 
Room veered closest to a populist sense of outrage. This should not have been surprising. 
After all, it was Fastow who became the focus of Enron coverage when reporters began 
to question Enron’s earnings statements and though his schemes were clever, they were 
ultimately foolhardy and destroyed the company. With his “creative forms of financial 
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chicanery” he represented the most extreme example of the symbolic analyst.
68
 
Significantly, the two reporters took one of the core values of the informational economy 
and symbolic analysis, “creativity,” and linked it to “chicanery.” Ultimately, Andy 
Fastow’s case allowed the authors to frame the work of symbolic analysts as a con – 
nothing more.  
However, in a more direct throwback to older forms of muckraking and exposé, 
McLean and Elkind also called attention to Fastow’s material excesses. In focusing on a 
vacation that Fastow and the entire staff of LJM took – a four-day retreat to Los Cabos – 
they wrote that the lot of them (potentially guilty of defrauding the company) had a 
“glorious time in the sun.”
69
 The passage represented a moment when the reporters 
dropped any pretension of objectivity and commented on the vacation (a minor detail in 
the grand scheme of things), writing: “And why not? LJM picked up the $52,000 tab. 
And most of them had just made a fortune.”
70
 Further down the page, they described 
Andy Fastow’s “giddy, smug delight.”
71
 Sprinkled throughout The Smartest Guys in the 
Room, these little asides encouraged indignation, representing moral judgments of the 
informational economy. 
Elsewhere, the reporters offered other, similar details that depicted Enron’s 
symbolic analysts as boorish and arrogant. For example, and in a comment layered with 
class issues, they reported that some of the members of Enron Energy Services referred to 
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certain businesses that they purchased (and that involved manual labor) as “butt-crack 
businesses.”
72
 At other moments, McLean and Elkind’s reporting was almost entirely 
given over to muckraking. For example, they singled out a particular episode when Enron 
Energy Services, headed by Lou Pai, hustled random workers onto an empty floor to 
pretend that they were busy in an attempt to impress a visiting cadre of stock analysts – 
which they described as a “veritable sham” and a “Potemkin Village.”
73
  
However, the book’s major theme was not class conflict, but rather the problem of 
impractical knowledge and too much of an emphasis on ideas that ruined a business built 
by solid, steady businessmen. This disdain for symbolic analysts and creative work also 
applied to the reporters’ treatment of Arthur Andersen consultants. They set up a contrast 
between “sleek, self-satisfied consultants” and “downtrodden auditors.”
74
 Indeed, for 
McLean and Elkind, the tragedy of Arthur Andersen and accounting was that, much like 
the natural gas business, the company was no longer “boring.” Tellingly (and in another 
nod towards the preoccupation with language in the informational economy), the 
reporters lamented the demise of the accounting firm’s old slogan, “Think straight, talk 
straight.”
75
 While these white collar jobs may have lacked the flash of creative, symbolic 
manipulation, they were straightforward and honest ways of doing business.  
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Similarly, in his film, Alex Gibney established a dichotomy between solid 
business executives and the creative chicanery of the informational economy. However, 
in an attempt to broaden the scope of his treatment of the scandal, the director confused 
and conflated a range of categories. Whereas the book version of The Smartest Guys in 
the Room championed older ways of doing business with traces of a traditional brand of 
anti-intellectualism, Gibney mixed this theme with an overtly liberal, populist sentiment. 
For instance, just as Mike Muckleroy appeared as a commonsense rejoinder to the 
informational economy, the director also highlighted the plight of Al Kaseweter, an 
electricity lineman from Portland General Electric (the power company Enron purchased 
in 1996 in order to gain entry into West Coast power trading) who suddenly became an 
Enron employee. Gibney followed the lineman through his workday – driving a company 
van and wearing a hardhat. In these segments, Kasewater was often behind the wheel of 
his vehicle or just outside of it (an electricity pole usually in the background). All of these 
details coded him as blue collar, providing a striking contrast to the younger, sharply 
dressed employees walking the halls of Enron’s sleek, modern towers in Houston. Gibney 
tracked the hard-working Kasewater as he invested as much money in Enron as possible 
only to see his savings disappear when the stock collapsed. The lineman’s fate was also 
another example of how the informational economy invariably produced material effects. 
Moments such as these were packed with emotion. Kasewater operated synecdochally for 




operated as a marker for the sage, practical businessman pointing out the folly of big 
ideas.  
Gibney’s use of the two men as stand-ins for larger groups was striking in several 
respects. Though a white collar worker, Muckleroy was figured here as something closer 
to the PGE lineman. Both acted as rejoinders to the sophistry of Skilling and the other 
symbolic analysts. Here, the two appeared as sympathetic, no-nonsense voices. 
Muckleroy may not have been working with his hands, but his roots and attitudes were 
unmistakable. The two reflected the same position – the lineman and old-line executive 
united as two causalities of Enron’s essentially false way of doing business.
76
 Though 
presumably these two men would have had clashing economic interests, here they were 
aligned as common victims of the informational economy. The move had the effect of 
making the differences and distance between the two men shrink. There was no sense of 
irony in this conflation. Muckleroy might as well have been blue collar, while the 
lineman might have favored business-minded conservatism. In these ways, Gibney took 
up the anti-intellectual attitude in The Smartest Guys in the Room and collapsed it into a 
liberal condemnation of businessmen in general. To be sure, these works were critiquing 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the company’s involvement in the deregulation of 
California’s electricity and the subsequent crisis in that state figured prominently in both 
the book and movie. If any segment of the company’s story called for muckraking, then it 
was surely Enron’s manipulation of the state’s electricity market, and both authors and 
the filmmaker used the state’s problems to advance another withering critique of 
symbolic analysts as a group. However, the book and film offered different approaches to 
doing so. In the case of McLean and Elkind’s book this was the section where 
muckraking sat most easily with the book’s anti-intellectualism.  
The authors explicitly connected this episode to the informational economy and 
its attendant values. Interestingly, the chapter also marked a point where the implicit anti-
intellectualism in their work threatened to become explicit. For instance, in describing 
West Coast energy trader Tim Belden, they wrote: “He was, as they liked to say at Enron, 
intellectually pure – a trader who believed in the beauty of free markets and had no 
scruples when it came to exploiting inefficiencies to make money.”
77
 Even the way the 
chapter opened, with a description of Belden, brought the book’s latent anti-
intellectualism to the fore. As they put it, the trader did not “fit the typical profile” for an 
Enron trader, but “favored the rumpled look of the academic researcher he’d once 
been.”
78
 This parallel with anti-intellectualism extended to the authors’ discussion of 
Belden’s work process, where instead of laboring to create something of lasting and 
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material value, he led “the effort to find exploitable loopholes” and worked “14-hour 
days learning the arcane rules of California deregulation.”
79
 Ultimately, Belden found a 
“flaw” in the rules and conducted an “experiment” (scheduling a particular power routing 
schedule across inadequate power lines) to see if his ideas were correct. Here, in the 
authors’ telling, Belden was simply and dispassionately playing around with complex and 
abstract ideas that he then decided to test, almost like a scientist, in the physical world. It 
was, in other words, an intellectual exercise, devoid of moral and ethical consideration. 
The “experiment,” of course, was ultimately disastrous for California. Once 
Belden proved that the state’s energy rules could be exploited, he and the other traders 
rushed in, causing huge fluctuations in rates, rolling blackouts and energy crises. The 
implication was that the state’s woes were the direct result of the symbolic analysts’ 
“creative” play and dedication to “intellectually pure” ideas. In effect, the reporters were 
critiquing the “world making” capabilities of models and markets – the reigning ethos of 
the informational economy. Here, symbolic analysts appeared as malevolent forces and 
targets of outrage. McLean and Elkind were commenting (albeit not explicitly) on Robert 
Reich’s initial point about symbolic analysts – they wielded a great deal of power over 
the lives of people whom they would never meet, but were not charged with behaving 
ethically. Rather than being public servants, they were in it for profit.
80
 Here McLean and 
Elkind added a sense of moral outrage to Reich’s observation.
81
 This levying of a moral 
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judgment became clear when they quoted a former trader who said of California: “It was 
the school yard we lived in. The energy markets were new, immature, unsupervised. We 
took pride in getting around the rules. It was a game.”
82
 Indeed, the California episode in 
particular offered McLean and Elkind the greatest opportunity for critiquing the symbolic 
analyst as a class of worker. They did this by contrasting the function of a public utility 
worker against that of Enron’s trading operations. However, the authors stopped short of 
condemning the system that supports symbolic analysts. Rather, they wrote, “from Ken 
Lay on down, Enron executives simply refused to see that their best interest lay in 
helping the state succeed.”
83
 This was an important distinction. McLean and Elkind were 
not challenging the deregulation of California’s energy market. Instead, the two authors 
faulted Enron’s traders for their allegiance to “intellectually pure” ideas instead of being 
practical. 
While the California episode received a good dose of moral indignation in 
McLean and Elkind’s book, the film documentary format provided a unique vehicle for 
investing these moments with even more emotion. However, whereas in McLean and 
Elkind’s book, the symbolic analysts were usually painted as dispassionate 
“intellectuals,” in Gibney’s treatment, they were thoroughly contemptible boors. To be 
sure, the California debacle was the most inflammatory segment in the film. Here, the 
symbolic analysts literally played with risk without any regard for the Californians who 
were dependent on them. To further emphasize this point, Gibney used a snippet of an 
                                                 
82
 Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room, 275. (Emphasis in original). 
83




interview with Colin Whitehead, a young West Coast energy trader (who, in the context 
of the film, seemed to be a rara avis – a thoughtful and ethical Enron employee). 
Whitehead revealed that as a trader his marching orders were to seek out “arbitrage 
opportunities,” explaining that “an arbitrage opportunity has been defined to me as an 
opportunity to make abnormal profits. So an abnormal profit would be returns above and 
beyond the norm. I was told that a good trader is a creative trader; and a creative trader is 
one who can find arbitrage opportunities.”
84
 Here, just as in McLean and Elkind’s 
narrative, the term “creative” was a euphemism for deceptiveness. It was this denigration 
of the very word “creative” – a term so central to symbolic analysis and manipulation – 
that worked to frame the California chapter as a particularly damming indictment of the 
informational economy. 
The California episode also found Gibney reworking some of the basic 
iconography of the symbolic analyst at work in an informational environment. Rather 
than the triumphant positioning of these moments in Enron’s marketing literature, or even 
the ambivalent captions in the March 2001 Fortune article, Gibney invested these scenes 
with menacing undertones. The camera moved over footage of Enron’s energy trading 
floor, zooming in and out on details like telephones, headsets, and row upon row of 
computer monitors, many of them flashing symbols and charts in an array of electric 
colors. The people in these shots were invariably on the phone and staring at computer 
screens.  
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Gibney employed these images as the visual accompaniment to the coarse banter 
between energy traders. Amid all of the movement in the office, the narrator, Peter 
Coyote, intoned: “In the midst of the energy shortages, Enron energy traders began to 
export power out of the state. When prices soared, they brought it back in.”
85
 This 
statement was immediately followed by audio clips of two traders, one snorting, “So we 
fuckin’ export like a motherfucker,” before the other asked, “Getting’ rich?” Coming 
from telephone lines, the voices sounded slightly mechanical and compressed, lending 
even more of a sinister quality to them.
86
 A little later, Gibney cut to another audio clip of 
a trader saying, “We’re getting’ pretty spoiled with all this money.”
87
 The other trader’s 
reply: “You said you’re a little scared we’re makin’ a little too much. And I tend to agree 
with you,” was punctuated by maniacal laughter.
88
 To maximize the effect, Gibney also 
used subtitles, often lobbing the “g” off of words, perhaps to emphasize that these were 
Texans, in Houston, toying with California. The recordings hardly needed Coyote’s 
commentary, though his statement, “The tapes reveal Enron’s contempt for any values 
except one: money,” ensured Gibney’s point would not be lost.
89
 Here, Gibney framed 
the symbolic analyst – crass, unethical, possibly criminal – at play, exploiting California 
and contemptuous of its residents.  




 There is also an odd play with space here – just where are the traders located? In different offices? Desks 
apart on the same trading floor? As Gibney’s visual suggests, it hardly matters. 
87








However, Gibney did not stop here, but also used the California episode to 
connect the immaterial play of the symbolic analysts to the material world (again 
highlighting the false split between the two). Gibney left these images of the 
informational environment behind, but stayed with the traders’ tapes, pairing them 
instead with news clips of wild fires raging, power outages leaving people trapped in 
elevators, and cars crashing into each other because the traffic lights no longer worked. 
Far more immediate than the tone that McLean and Elkind struck in their book, the 
trajectory Gibney presented was that of symbolic analysts shaping the world to disastrous 
effect. It should come as no surprise, then, that many initial reviews singled out this 
portion of the film as the most powerful. 
 
DIFFERING OPINIONS ON DEREGULATION 
However connected the book and film might be, there were also moments where 
the authors and Gibney arrived at wildly different interpretations of the same issue. This 
cleavage was most apparent in the two works’ divergent interpretations of deregulation. 
In keeping with the largely pro-business disposition of McLean and Elkind, they did not 
interrogate deregulation in principle. Rather, the Fortune authors were more inclined to 
fault Enron for unethical behavior that potentially threatened deregulation. Perhaps 
predictably, Gibney was far more willing to condemn the idea of deregulation. This basic 




For example, the California chapter in the film also juxtaposed images, 
commentary and sound to achieve a decidedly visceral effect. For certain segments in this 
section, Gibney chose the image of a dice tumbling down a casino craps table, fading into 
an eagle’s eye view of a spinning roulette wheel as a rock song blasted: “There’s nothing 
wrong with the capitalism/ There’s nothing wrong with the free enterprise.”
90
 These 
moments highlighted the role risk played in the informational economy. Interestingly, it 
was in these moments that Gibney broke from McLean and Elkind, offering a stinging 
critique of deregulation.  
This tension could, at other points, produce contradictory passages. For instance, 
in a moment echoing the point that McLean and Elkind made in their book, Gibney cut to 
Bethany McLean as the camera stayed with an image of the trading floor, even while 
McLean commented:  
The Enron traders never seemed to step back and say: “Wait, is what we’re doing 
ethical? Is it in our best long-term interests? Does it help us if we totally rape 
California? Does that advance our goals of nationwide deregulation?” Instead, 




While McLean heaped scorn on Enron traders, she stepped back from a systemic critique 
of deregulation, even as Gibney was offering one. These dissonant notes revealed an 
equivocation at the heart of Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room. 
                                                 
90
 Ibid. Karyn Ball is one scholar who has noted how pervasive these images are in Gibney’s film, writing 
that the “documentary zealously provides images for every referent, even the nearly dead metaphoric 
ones.” See Karyn Ball, “Death-Driven Futures, or You Can’t Spell Deconstruction without Enron,” 
Cultural Critique (Winter 2007):65, 6-42, 6. 
91




McLean’s statement was particularly awkward, coming amid Gibney’s use of 
California to attack neoliberal ideology. Gibney’s interviews with state utility regulators, 
citizens’ action groups, and even governor Gray Davis indicted Enron for “selecting 
California” for its deregulation experiment. Again, Gibney’s treatment of this philosophy 
stood in sharp relief to Ken Lay’s vision of it throughout the 1990s. While Lay repeatedly 
tried to frame neoliberal rollbacks of regulatory approaches as promoting “consumer 
choice,” here Gibney highlighted the absence of the consumers’ voices in the way 
California deregulated. Rather, deregulation was the end result of “pressure from the 
energy companies.”
92
 Here again, Gibney deployed the traders’ tapes to great effect, as 
one voice confided to another, “There would be ample supply [of electricity] available at 
the right fuckin’ price.”
93
 
Even aside from the California episode, deregulation was a prominent thread in 
the film, particularly the connection between Republican politicians and Enron 
executives such as Ken Lay. The film’s first extended treatment of the executive noted 
(as many Enron narratives did) that he took his father’s Baptist preaching and applied it 
to stumping for deregulation. In a section rich with symbolism, Gibney superimposed an 
old, black and white photograph of Lay over various images of Washington, DC’s 
landscape. Lay stood at what could be a lectern or pulpit, in the middle of speaking, one 
arm declaratively flung into the air. Lay might have been testifying; a suggestion aided 
by Peter Elkind calling him an “apostle for deregulation” and Peter Coyote noting that 








Lay became “part of a new crusade to liberate businessmen from the rules and regulation 
of government.”
94
 Of course, the use of terms with such religious connotations only 
strengthened the connection that Gibney was implying. From there, the documentary 
moved to a clip of Reagan speaking in the 1980s, declaring that “government is not the 
solution to our problem, government is the problem.” In another clip, Reagan waxed 
rhapsodic about the “magic of the marketplace” as the film cut to an image of East Texas 
refineries before the jazz standard “That Old Black Magic” began to play.
95
 Peter Coyote 
then elaborated on the point, explaining that, “the magic power of deregulation pushed 
Ken Lay to found Enron in 1985.”
96
 These moments dramatized a common critique about 
deregulation – that it is more a matter of faith than of logic. 
Still, though Gibney intended to assail deregulation as a sham, he could not 
entirely escape his source material. Specifically, comments from Peter Elkind that 
appeared just before the filmmaker launched into a critique of deregulation undercut 
Gibney’s point. Not without some admiration, Elkind noted that Ken Lay was “way 
ahead of the curve” on deregulation, and that he “was thinking about energy markets that 
would be deregulated.”
97
 Elkind even singled out the natural gas industry which, he 
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declared, was “shackled by regulation.”
98
 To a large extent, the Fortune reporter was 
echoing what many have said about natural gas deregulation. Still, it is noteworthy that 
Elkind was not condemning deregulation as a principle, even though this was Gibney’s 
intention. This slippage complicated what would have otherwise been a forceful 
condemnation of neoliberalism. 
Between the two sources, and the number of voices weighing in, there was a 
failure to reach consensus. Much like the dissonance in the way the two sources 
approached the role of intellectuals and class, these disparate takes on deregulation (even 
as they appeared in the same work) revealed both the multiple opportunities for 
interpretation that Enron opened up, as well as the fraught and tangled set of ideas at play 
in the informational economy.  
 
BUT NOT ALL BAD 
However, there were even more overt signs that cultural workers, rather than 
arriving at some final judgment, were far more uneasy about symbolic analysts and the 
informational economy.
99
 The odd conflations and confusions present in Gibney’s film 
were further complicated by a lingering admiration of and sympathy for symbolic 
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analysts. In part, this was because the same sympathy could be found in McLean and 
Elkind’s book. Despite the condemnation (moral and otherwise) of Enron figures in both 
works, there were also ripples of tragedy and sympathy just below the surface, working 
against strict characterizations of Enron figures as villains. Even if they were ultimately 
corrupted by arrogance and greed, both the film and the book suggested that Lay and 
Skilling were at the very least complex human beings. Such details and passages were 
disruptive moments of equivocation and confused sentiments. 
Often, when McLean and Elkind delved into the early lives of their subjects, they 
generally described Horatio Alger or rags-to-riches type narratives, a convention typical 
of business narratives.
100
 For example, even in the middle of the Valhalla, New York, 
scandal, McLean and Elkind mentioned Louis Borget’s humble beginnings, shining shoes 
as a young boy and putting himself through college.
101
 This was a crucial detail, 
complicating their treatment of Borget and other symbolic analysts. The sophisticated but 
potentially fraudulent and certainly corrupting work of the informational economy stood 
in stark contrast to the “honest” labor of shining shoes or working nights to put oneself 
through college.  
This treatment even extended to other infamous Enron figures. Even though the 
authors fixed most of the blame for Enron’s failure on Jeff Skilling, the book could also 
turn to deeply sympathetic moments. The reporters were practically elegiac in describing 
Skilling’s early desires to transcend the ugliness of industrialism. This notion was 
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dramatized by a visit to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, where as a young man Skilling stared 
out over “acre after acre of aging, decrepit steel mills, many of them boarded up and 
abandoned.”
102
 This tragic air lingered even as the executive wreaked havoc on the 
company and economy. On the contrary, McLean and Elkind increasingly treated 
Skilling as a tragic figure as the narrative unfolded. The reporters even devoted two 
whole chapters towards the end of their book detailing Skilling’s mental decline. In these 
moments, he often appeared with “tears in his eyes” and muttered things “darkly.”
103
 The 
Fortune writers reported that Amanda Martin, a former Enron executive who knew 
Skilling well, could “see that he was falling apart.”
104
 Even the last few pages of their 
book dwelled on an episode where Skilling was found drunk and confused in a New York 
City street after the company had collapsed.
105
  
Gibney’s film took up many of these same themes. Amanda Martin, for instance, 
appeared in the film, recounting the same episode that she had in McLean and Elkind’s 
book. Even as Gibney interviewed other people talking about Skilling, the visuals were 
often close ups of the executive looking haggard and worried, soft music murmuring in 
the background. In interviews with figures like stock analyst Carol Coale, words such as 
“distraught” described Skilling’s emotional and mental state. The message here was 
clear, even if it clashed with the rest of the film. 
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 Ken Lay, too, was cast as a somewhat complex figure in Gibney’s film. After an 
interview clip where Elkind acknowledged Lay’s humble beginnings, the director moved 
through a series of images before finally settling on an old black and white photo of a 
young boy atop a tractor with Elkind’s voice narrating: “He [Lay] told a story later about 
sitting on a tractor dreaming about the world of business and how different it could be 
from the way things were for him and his family.”
106
 The photograph itself offered a stark 
contrast to the slick offices the audience would see later in the film. Like some of the 
images preceding the fading picture, it almost seemed yanked out of a different time, 
some indistinct but remote past. The moment was filled with sentiment. For all of Lay’s 
faults, the way Gibney introduced his back story prevented a full throated condemnation. 
Yet even if Gibney’s treatment of specific executives was ultimately nuanced, a similar 
tension even applied to his treatment of symbolic analysts as a group. 
Indeed, Gibney’s film established a tragic air from the film’s outset that 
periodically reappeared. After a slow pan of Enron’s towers and Houston, Gibney cut to 
the movie’s sole extended reenactment. Early on, a luxury sedan drove into a parking lot 
in the middle of the night. As Billie Holiday’s “God Bless the Child” played, the camera 
revealed a lit cigarette in the car’s ashtray. From there, the camera moved to an exterior 
view, the black car’s outline barely discernable against the night sky. Over the music, 
audiences heard a strange, metallic sound that was followed by a large bang and bright 
flash inside the car. From there, Gibney cut to a clip of a Houston police officer at a news 
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briefing; Cliff Baxter, he told reporters, a former Enron executive, had committed 
suicide. Of course, this was also how McLean and Elkind open their book, but in the 
written document, it was a brief episode. Gibney, by contrast, lingered on it, establishing 
the film’s emotional timbre.
107
 
Because of this element of tragedy, it became even more difficult to discern what 
the director’s thoughts were towards the symbolic analysts. While the film appeared to 
open in a sarcastic manner, with a campy Tom Waits song playing in the background, the 
first visual Gibney provided was a close up on a banner that read “Jesus Saves.”
108
 From 
there, the camera pulled out to reveal a church in the foreground, literally overshadowed 
by a gleaming, glassy skyscraper that dominated the frame. The incongruities between 
the image and the sound could hardly have been more striking. What was the viewer to 
make of this scene? The answer seemed unclear, as if Gibney himself was unsure.  
Even if, as many reviewers noted, the movie’s predominant tone was one of dark 
humor and righteous indignation, the lack of clarity was pervasive. For example, Gibney 
provided a quote from Pastor James Nutter, a Baptist minister in Houston, early in the 
film, introducing an air of gravitas. The minister was featured more prominently at the 
end of the film as the company collapsed. The pastor, in these moments, did not express 
concern for figures such as the Portland lineman who lost his lifesavings, or even Mike 
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Muckleroy. Rather, the minister seemed to worry about the souls of the symbolic 
analysts. As he remembered in one interview,  
We could just hear rumbles up and down Main Street and … all throughout the 
city that things were…were very difficult at Enron. One guy who – a year before 
had come to me and said “I’m working for Enron,’” and was very excited, but 
within a year, was waking up every night with nightmares – “I’ve got no life left, 




From time to time during this segment, Gibney cut away from Nutter and moved to 
images of Enron Tower’s glassy façade, as well as forlorn Enron employees exiting and 
milling around the building. Throughout, Gibney chose understated, mournful music to 
play in the background. Nutter’s presence in the film should not be regarded as some 
minor detail, either. In fact, Gibney elected to give him some of the final words in his 
movie. As the film closed, after going through the details of the company’s collapse, 
testimonials from former white collar workers, as well as Al Kaseweter, the PGE 
lineman, Nutter’s voice was once again audible: “There’s still to this city a layer of anger 
and upset,” he pontificated. Yet the pastor did not stop there, but expanded on this point, 
saying: “you can gain the whole world, and all the trinkets and all the trophies of the 
world; the corner office, and all the perks – and you really can lose your soul in the midst 
of this.”
110
 Nutter’s comments implied that the symbolic analysts were not the rapacious 
fiends from the California debacle, but causalities of the informational economy. Gibney 
even cut to an image of Cliff Baxter during Nutter’s statements. For a documentary that 








was supposedly full of progressive muckraking, worrying over the damage done to 
symbolic analysts was an odd way to end.
111
  
Yet if the anti-intellectualism latent in valuing practical old-line business and 
liberal-progressive critiques of business could coexist in the same work (and make for 
engaging reading and viewing), it was a reflection of the complicated nature of the 
informational economy. And indeed, Enron was not the only example of this confusion. 
Both scholars and public intellectuals had worried about the confluence of certain 
academic trends and large corporate interests. Thomas Frank in particular has long taken 
note of the odd inversions around business rhetoric in the late 1990s – where essentially 
right-wing ideas, such as neoliberal ideology, were recast as hip and revolutionary. “The 
grand umbrella of the Market,” he wrote in One Market Under God, “united right-wing 
libertarian think-tankers and left-wing academic literary scholars; former Communists 
and management theorists.”
112
 More recently, Fred Turner has convincingly framed the 
1990s as period when conservative economic ideals became linked to a countercultural 
anti-statism, sometimes called “California ideology.”
113
 Because of such strange 
conflations, it was not entirely unusual to regard the symbolic analyst as some form of 
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intellectual. Likewise, in this context, a critique coming from both a business outlet and a 
progressive filmmaker became conceptually possible. 
A similar tangle of ideas and cultural representations were manifest in both the 
book and film versions of The Smartest Guys in the Room. However, rather than 
resolving these contradictions or even advancing a clear critique, the primary cultural 
work these books and movies could perform was to articulate this confusion. Just as 
relying on the nineteenth-century ideology of separate spheres in the case of The Crooked 
E or twentieth-century progressive muckraking in the case of Enron: The Smartest Guys 
in the Room both proved inadequate, other works that drew on earlier depictions of 
business in American literature and culture to help make sense of Enron and the 
informational economy did not meet with much success. 
 
 
CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS AND THE INTERIOR LIFE OF THE 
INFORMATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
While Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room was the most prominent Enron 
narrative of 2005, New York Times business reporter Kurt Eichenwald’s massive tome, 
Conspiracy of Fools, appeared the same year to some notoriety. Like McLean and 
Elkind, Eichenwald was a business reporter who had covered Enron as the crisis 
unfolded.
114
 However, Eichenwald’s work was far more emotional in character than 
McLean and Elkind’s book. The distance between Conspiracy of Fools and The Smartest 
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Guys in the Room was reflected in the publisher’s decision to market Eichenwald’s book 
as a crime thriller. This marketing strategy was partly based on the fear that, much like 
some of the other Enron books, it would not be a profitable venture.
115
 Even the book’s 
cover featured the provocative teaser: “Behind thick corporate walls, in the shadows of 
Wall Street, along the corridors of political power, a scandal is brewing…” The decision 
was apparently the correct one. In just a few short months, Publisher’s Weekly noted that 
Eichenwald’s book had sold 175,000 copies.
116
 The New York Times also excerpted 
portions of the text that same year, making it one of the most prominent versions of the 
Enron story to appear. 
However, it would be wrong to suggest that Eichenwald’s book was intended as 
mere entertainment. Literary scholar Celia Tichi, for one, has noted the serious endeavor 
of the detective novel and its relation to muckraking. She sees both muckraking and 
detective narratives (which have more than a little in common with “true-crime thrillers”) 
as “fact-based.”
117
 For Tichi, muckraking narratives and detective novels adopt a 
“traditional” (and, hence, uncomplicated) approach to narrative. 
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Ken Lay even referred to Eichenwald twice during his speech before the Houston 
Forum, at one point noting, “As Kurt Eichenwald, author of Conspiracy of Fools, shared 
with this same Houston Forum a few weeks ago, most of the seven charges against me 
could not even be brought in a civil case because they would be dismissed by the court 
before trial as being immaterial.”
118
 Similarly, other conservative writers referenced 
Eichenwald, even borrowing phrases such as “Enron Myths” to protest the 
“criminalization” of the company.
119
 It would be hard to imagine Ken Lay, or any 
disgraced Enron executive, pointing to Gibney’s film as an exonerating document, but 
this was precisely what Ken Lay did with Conspiracy of Fools in December of 2005. At 
first glance, Eichenwald’s book might have seemed an odd reading recommendation from 
Lay. On one level, Eichenwald’s work was clearly a condemnation of the corporation and 
its executives, but the book’s form worked against this condemnation. If both versions of 
The Smartest Guys in the Room unwittingly traded on a sense of anti-intellectualism, then 
Conspiracy of Fools, through its form, stylistic conventions and reliance on older themes 
in American fiction, reaffirmed some Enron executives as tragic heroes. 
Stylistically, Conspiracy of Fools was far removed from the relatively sober 
account and “straight” business reporting McLean and Elkind’s 2003 book offered. 
Eichenwald’s narrative was filled with dialogue and even interior monologue. However, 
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despite Eichenwald’s obvious use of literary conventions, he did not see them as 
detracting from the book’s basic truth claims. In defense of his decision, the author 
included an appendix, in which he announced that while some of the dialogue was taken 
from transcripts, the majority of dialogue was “reconstructed with the help of participants 
or witnesses to conversations, or documents that describe the discussion.” After offering 
several such caveats, Eichenwald insisted that while the dialogue was not “a perfect 
transcript of events dating back some twenty years,” it was “the best recollection of these 
events and conversations by participants, and more accurately reflects reality than mere 
paraphrase would.” Even though the reporter clearly felt this technique was in need of a 




In addition to the author’s statements regarding the use of dialogue, the appendix 
also addressed the issue of continuity. As Eichenwald explained: “For ease of reading, if 
a scene was moved a few days out of order to allow for a theme in one chapter to be 
completed, the next chapter moved back in time to an unrelated event, launching a new 
story line. Such instances are described in the notes.”
121
 To be sure, that decision at least 
in part reflected the difficulty the writer faced in turning Enron into a coherent narrative. 
Complicating matters even further was the author’s justification of his use of interior 
monologue. As he put it in the appendix, “When a person is described as having thought 
or felt something, it comes either directly from that individual, from a document written 
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by that individual, from notes or other records of that individual’s comments to a third 
party, or from others to whom the individuals in question directly described their 
experiences.”
122
 Far from removing doubt about the narrative’s truth claims, the appendix 
hinted at how shaky the concept of “truth” could be as far as Enron was concerned. 
Indeed, perhaps more than anything, Eichenwald’s appendix laid bare the amount of 





COMPLEX INTERIORS: LAY, SKILLING AND THE LEGACY OF AMERICAN 
FICTION  
 
Despite the author’s stated intentions and best attempts, what emerged was a 
conflicted account of the company. Indeed, when one considers the way Eichenwald 
approached Ken Lay as a subject, there is little wonder that Lay would turn to this author 
and narrative out of all the others to use in his defense. In sketching out descriptions of 
some (though not all) Enron executives, the author fell back on earlier U.S. literary 
traditions. Often, these intermittent passages provided sympathy for these figures, or at 
the very least made them seem like complex human beings. For instance, Eichenwald 
depicted Ken Lay as someone who was both more like the older type of executive, 




 After all, individual memories fade and people do not necessarily accurately perceive the thoughts and 
feelings of others. Finally, as some of the interviews with former Enron employees demonstrates, the role 
of the media and Enron narratives themselves proved to be powerful influences on the way these former 





syncedochally represented by Mike Muckleroy in Enron: The Smartest Guys in the 
Room, and who was duped by symbolic analysts like Jeff Skilling and Andy Fastow.  
Though there were sentimental traces present in the way both versions of The 
Smartest Guys in the Room treated the executive, Eichenwald’s portrayal of Lay was 
particularly romantic. For instance, rather than simply relate the humble beginnings of the 
CEO, Eichenwald provided a rich description of the family’s fortunes. In first introducing 
the Lay family, the author pointed to a fateful episode, writing:  
The dilapidated black truck rumbled over the rural Missouri road, veering ever 
closer to the edge. In the flatbed, dozens of crated-up chickens squawked, 
scratched, and clucked as the truck headed out of speck of a town called 
Raymondville. It was 1948, and Ken Lay’s father, Omer, was struggling for the 




This description preceded a car wreck that destroyed the Lay family’s financial stability. 
The romantic, somewhat downtrodden, somewhat admirably stoic portrait of the Lay 
family Eichenwald painted here should not be wholly unfamiliar to students of U.S. 
literature. The paragraph bore more than a passing resemblance to forthrightly proletarian 
literature. In many ways, this scene recalled the trials of the Joads in the The Grapes of 
Wrath. When the Joads abandon their land and start out for California in that novel, 
Steinbeck writes: “In the late afternoon the truck came back, bumping and rattling 
through the dust, and there was a layer of dust in the bed, and the hood was covered with 
dust, and the headlights were obscured with a red flour.”
125
 These similarities between 
the two and suggest that Eichenwald was, at least in part, drawing from a longer tradition 
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 What is most striking about Eichenwald’s passage was that it worked 
to fix Lay as one of the downtrodden. It was one of several instances where the author 
betrayed sympathy for the executive. 
From there, even as Eichenwald, in far more detail than other Enron narratives, 
dwelled on Ken Lay’s background, noting his personal life (including his first failed 
marriage, his academic acumen, etc.), Lay emerged as a somewhat admirable figure. 
Surely, the reader was meant to feel sorry for the gray, bald and (by this point) 
thoroughly bewildered man when Eichenwald, in describing a plane ride after it had 
become clear that the company could not be saved, writes: “As the plane took off, Lay 
heard a crack in his ear. The changing cabin pressure, combined with his cold, had caused 
some damage. He had just lost not only his company, but his full hearing as well.”
127
 If 
other cultural workers had savaged and demonized Lay, Eichenwald’s prominent 
narrative, on some level, operated as a corrective of sorts. 
The author closed his book with Lay addressing a crowd immediately after 
pleading “not guilty” in court. The last lines of the narrative read: “He [Lay] thanked 
everyone and walked over to Linda [his wife]. As the couple headed off the stage, a 
group of supporters on one side of the room stood and applauded, cheering on Lay as he 
entered into his last and most desperate battle.”
128
 Hardly the greedy, cunning, rapacious 
corporate villain here, Lay seemed a stoic and complex figure, if not entirely noble. Still, 
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this end was striking since Eichenwald spent so much of his narrative framing Enron as a 
fateful intersection of greed, arrogance, immorality and incompetence, providing a 
counterpoint to, if not a complication of, the preceding narratives.  
In reviewing Conspiracy of Fools for The New York Times, Charles R. Morris (in 
a mostly positive review) griped that Eichenwald had written Lay “as a kind of amiable 
simpleton, glad-handing his way through Houston's moneyed upper crust” even though 
“Mr. Lay is a Ph.D. economist and a former deputy under secretary of the interior, who 
had transformed the natural gas industry.”
129
 Throughout the review, Morris remained 
skeptical, wondering, “Does Mr. Eichenwald believe that he really had no clue? That he 
never noticed the mad scramble to manufacture profits at the end of each reporting 




Eichenwald’s treatment of Skilling was equally fraught. Much like McLean and 
Elkind, as well as Alex Gibney, Eichenwald addressed Skilling’s mental (and physical) 
decline, though in far more detail than either the director or the two Fortune reporters. 
For instance, in one passage, right after Skilling was promoted to CEO. Eichenwald 
wrote: “The next night, Skilling was in Dallas, alone on a business trip and consumed by 
depression. Wow, he thought. I just made CEO. He was exhausted. Feeling lousy, sorry 
for himself. […] He wandered into the hotel bar. He needed a drink.”
131
 There was a 
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good deal of foreshadowing here. The captain of industry would eventually resign 
abruptly and fall into alcoholism. However, what was most notable about this passage 
was how it began: Skilling was alone. The episode was basically unverifiable.
132
 Rather 
than simply noting others’ observations about Skilling as many accounts did, here 
Eichenwald imagined the executive’s interior. 
 The author returned to this technique and theme later in the book. His retelling of 
Skilling’s decline became even more dramatic later when, in a private moment between 
the executive and his fiancé, he described “billows of cigarette smoke waft[ing]” in the 
air as the man slipped “deeper into depression.”
133
 In the middle of this scene, 
Eichenwald’s Skilling thought to himself that the market did not “like him.”
134
 The 
passage was dense with meaning and, much like the book’s earlier characterizations of 
Ken Lay, bore the imprint of an earlier tradition of American literature. Here, Skilling’s 
behavior was beginning to affect his home life (“Carter [his fiancé] felt terrible,” the 
author confided to his readers).
135
 The man’s physical and mental health were also feeling 
the effects of the market – or at the very least, the world of business. This connection to 
an unhappy personal life and business success (after all, it was supposedly Skilling’s big 
promotion that precipitated his misery) can be found in numerous fictional treatments of 
business executives in American literature.  
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 One prominent example is Frank Norris’s The Pit, when the protagonist, Curtis 
Jadwin, almost loses his wife – ignoring both her and domestic life in general – as he 
becomes “addicted” to the market. However, Norris also connects Jadwin’s involvement 
in the market to his health. As Norris writes,  
…it seemed to be a slow, tense crisping of every tiniest nerve in his body. It 
would begin as he lay in bed – counting interminably to get himself to sleep – 
between his knees and ankles, and thence slowly spread to every part of him, 
creeping upward, from loin to shoulder, in a gradual wave of torture that was not 




Similarly, in William Dean Howells’s novel The Rise of Silas Lapham, the titular 
character becomes miserable even as his worldly fortune grows. These two novels were 
prominent examples of a perennial trope in American fiction that was also present in 
Eichenwald’s book. This is not to suggest that Eichenwald consciously used the models 
provided by earlier pieces of American fiction to craft his narrative. Rather, the traces of 
these models attest to how pervasive they had become for making sense of business and 
businessmen. Surely, in Eichenwald’s hands these tropes and stock conventions rendered 
the company more “understandable,” but these also deemphasized many of the hard facts 
around the case and provided a check against any meaningful critique of the system that 
had allowed the company to flourish. 
 Lamentably, matters did not improve for the beleaguered executive. A while later, 
Eichenwald provided yet another tragic moment where, in Dallas, Skilling drank himself 
into a stupor and in the middle of his “bleary-eyed” hangover, turned his fiancé Carter 
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away. His deterioration, the reader was left to assume, was near complete. This lent 
Conspiracy of Fools a narrative coherence; a brooding, drunken Skilling even appeared 
in the book’s prologue.
137
 These characterizations of the two top Enron figures gave 
Conspiracy of Fools a pathos that was also present, though less overt, in The Smartest 
Guys in the Room. Far from muckraking, Eichenwald seemed to view both Lay and 
Skilling as tragic figures (a sentiment that in interviews McLean has also expressed with 
regards to Skilling).  
In this way, Conspiracy of Fools sat alongside both the book and film versions of 
The Smartest Guys in the Room as expressions of unease and equivocation when it came 
to the character and fate of these business executives. These hesitations also extended to 
other aspects of the informational economy. 
 
THE INFORMATIONAL ECONOMY AS HALL OF MIRRORS 
At other points in the narrative, the reporter revealed contradictory attitudes 
toward the informational economy and symbolic analysts. For instance, at first blush, 
Conspiracy of Fools appeared to have the same stance towards symbolic analysts that 
McLean and Elkind did. Much like McLean and Elkind, Eichenwald held up certain 
figures and schemes, including Andy Fastow and his veritable labyrinth of “structured 
finance” deals, as typically vapid and dangerous, symbolic analysts. The book also 
                                                 
137




dramatized a clash among symbolic analysts through figures like Vince Kaminski and 
Jim Chanos.  
However, Eichenwald seemed less concerned with what McLean and Elkind 
characterized as pervasive at Enron. Rather, Eichenwald focused much of his energy on 
Fastow and Kopper, just as The Smartest Guys in the Room also singled out Fastow and 
his team for particularly harsh treatment. Still, Eichenwald’s account provided far more 
detail and, in keeping with the text’s overall tone, was far more sensational. For instance, 
in an early scene where Kopper and Fastow revealed some of their ultimately foolhardy 
plans, Eichenwald wrote:  
The diagram in Michal Kopper’s hand was one of hundreds churned out, month 
after month, by Fastow’s finance group. Boxes and names, lines and numbers. All 
depicting structured deals that juggled around assets – power plants, cash, 




The rest of this passage was, likewise, skeptical of Enron’s Special Purpose Entities. 
However, Eichenwald framed them as nonsense from the outset. In this passage, bits of 
interior monologue undercut what elsewhere was framed as Fastow’s dazzling financial 
schemes. “It didn’t make sense,” characters thought to themselves.
139
 Again through the 
use of interior monologue, Eichenwald depicted Fastow as a vain fool.
140
  
At other points (and in some ways echoing the intermittently incensed tone in The 
Smartest Guys in the Room) the author described a moment when Fastow and Rick 
Causey dreamed up the first Raptor SPE (ultimately among the most disastrous in the 
                                                 
138








end) while the two were golfing (they even named the deal “in honor of this glorious golf 
course”).
141
 Of course, later, the author reported that Raptor I had become an absurd 
circle because (through all the complicated deal making) “Enron, by any definition, was 
hedging with itself.”
142
 To be sure, Eichenwald could hardly be faulted for condemning 
Fastow’s various deals – and he was hardly the first to do so. Still, rather than clarify the 
issue (as the book’s appendix claimed), the various bits of interior monologue operated as 
tiny emotional cues for the reader – pushing a specific feeling about what was happening.  
In other ways, these passages of interior monologue dramatized the book’s 
internal conflicts. This sense was best captured by figures such as Vince Kaminski. 
Though he appeared as a very minor character in McLean and Elkind’s book (and was 
nonexistent in Gibney’s film), Eichenwald employed Kaminski as a persistent rejoinder 
to Fastow and his schemes. For example, towards the end of the narrative, as Fastow’s 
deals began to fall apart, Kaminski thought to himself:  
This couldn’t be. Enron had sold stock at a discount to the Raptors because they 
were restricted from hedging. But then the company turned around and agreed to 
hedge the shares for the Raptors? The Raptors would pay Enron for losses in its 





Here, again, in explaining the function of some of the stranger Fastow deals in a dramatic 
way, the thoughts of the players took precedence over factual detail. After Eichenwald 
wrote that the terms of the deal were “meaningless” because “it did nothing,” Kaminski’s 
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“world” and “career” “f[e]ll away.”
144
 “This company…is criminal,” Eichenwald’s 
Kaminski thought to himself, adding, “They were lying to investors. They were playing a 
shell game, hiding losses to make themselves look successful.”
145
 In these moments, the 
line between interior monologue and the author’s own commentary blurred, rendering it 
impossible to discern if Eichenwald was “reporting” or if these were his extended 
thoughts. Again, in attempting to arrive at some sort of finality or truth, Eichenwald 
failed to clarify anything other than to highlight the tangle of feelings and essentially 
emotional experience that the Enron scandal had become. 
 Perhaps, though, Eichenwald could not be faulted for looking at fundamentally 
emotional experiences and thoughts, since the exterior world he presented was one where 
truth itself had become difficult to locate among language games, cons and legal hair-
splitting. In this way, Conspiracy of Fools looked back to some of the earliest coverage 
of and commentary on the fall of the company, as well as the intertextuality of some of 
the earlier books, like 24 Days, Power Failure, and Anatomy of Greed. Just as those 
narratives were ultimately consumed and mired in various other texts that the 
author/protagonists had to navigate and react to, here, in a similar move, new pieces of 
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SOME KIND OF “DOCUMENTARY EXPRESSION” 
The earliest of these document-centered episodes came (in a scene found in other 
Enron narratives), when Jim Chanos, an intrepid, shrewd “short seller,” noticed a Wall 
Street Journal article about accounting among energy companies, including Enron, and 
began looking closely at Enron’s public documents.
146
 A while later, Chanos had a 
conversation with Bethany McLean that would eventually result in her March 2001 
Fortune article.
147
 Naturally, in Eichenwald’s telling, McLean’s article was signally 
important. So, too, did Emshwiller and Smith’s Wall Street Journal reports assume a 
prominent role in the narrative. Much as in other Enron books, and 24 Days in particular, 
in Conspiracy of Fools the news stories began to take on an active force. Of course, this 
also meant that Eichenwald’s narrative ended adrift in a sea of indeterminacy – unable to 
comment on Enron without referencing other narratives, news stories and media 
coverage. In a way, Eichenwald’s inability to avoid other Enron texts was a testament to 
how prominent issues of representation factored into Enron’s story.  
Eichenwald was quick to note that the emerging narrative had enough (including 
shady White House connections) to become a sensational news story. However, in a 
comment on the informational economy, he wrote: “Still, the chronicle of events 
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remained dense, creating an immense thicket of information too convoluted to capture the 
public imagination.”
148
 Eichenwald’s choice of words, a “thicket of information,” was 
quite telling. There were no real actions to grab onto, but simply pieces of information 
such as contracts, stock prices, earnings statements and so forth. In describing the scandal 
this way, Eichenwald pointed to the difficulty of representation when everything is 
representation, as well as how easily information could actually cloud the issue in the 
informational economy (a theme that New Yorker writer Malcolm Gladwell would take 
up later). Yet Eichenwald did locate the detail that “capture[d] the public imagination” – 
document destruction. To be sure, the images (many of which were shown in Enron: The 
Smartest Guys in the Room) of hundreds of pounds of shredded paper was striking, but 
so, too, was the subtext – the menace of documents, pieces of information, disappearing. 
Suddenly, the documents themselves had become important. Every time another 
document surfaced, it dramatically altered events, changing characters’ understanding of 
the events and situation they found themselves in.
149
 One striking example came when  
Boxes of documents were piled high around the offices of the Energy and 
Commerce investigation subcommittee. The records had been shipped over by 
Enron in response to a document request, and now staffers were digging through 
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It is in one of these piles that a staffer found the Watkins memo. “Oh, my God!” the 
staffer thought to himself, “It’s a smoking gun.”
151
 It was a turn of events that did not 
auger well for Lay and Enron. Not a little hyperbolically, Eichenwald wrote:  
It was as if the world had exploded. Within minutes of the letter’s release, 
Watkins’s name was being reported as the Enron whistle-blower. The story now 
had a full cast of characters, including a heroine who appeared to have tipped off 




The author, again, may as well have been commenting on his own work. Indeed, in 
another moment of meta-commentary, Eichenwald also noted how the revelation of the 
Watkins memo affected Enron as a narrative. 
Interestingly, Eichenwald gave similar treatment to the discovery of another 
document: a contract that changed the terms of a debt payment schedule for Enron, 
ultimately destroying a near-complete merger with Dynegy.
153
 Again, it was a piece of 
information that drastically altered the landscape in Conspiracy of Fools.  
These moments, where new pieces of information changed the situation that 
people found themselves in, dramatized the fraught nature of “reality” in the 
informational economy that had worried people at the time of the company’s initial 
collapse. “Perception is reality,” Skilling told Fastow earlier in the book.
154
 The comment 
also helped explain why Enron narratives eventually ran aground, split between 
describing “events” (usually the creation or emergence of documents) and coverage of 
those events. These authors had the unenviable task of separating out “perception” from 
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“reality” in the informational economy. Even if, as Tichi explains, detective novels were 
about sniffing out the truth, Eichenwald himself became disoriented in the “thicket” of 
information.
155
 For Eichenwald, the external world proved unreliable for determining 
“truth” about Enron. Perhaps because of this, Eichenwald, much like Gibney, relied on 
emotional truths instead.  
The imagined interiors of people who appeared in Conspiracy of Fools were cast 
as more reliable sources of the “truth” than “piles of documents” and news reports that 
surrounded Enron. Indeed, the reporter ultimately seemed unsure about some of the 
“truth” about Enron.
156
 However, in the end, Conspiracy of Fools was hardly more 
edifying than The Smartest Guys in the Room. Likewise, filmic treatments of Enron’s 
collapse in the final instance could not make clear sense of Enron and what it represented. 
While all of these works either directly employed, or at the very least bore the traces of, a 
long tradition of cultural representations of business, they also contained bizarre and 
contradictory slippages and conflations. Though they were all massive efforts to contain 
Enron in all its complexity and messiness, the books and films could not resolve core 
ambiguities about the informational economy that attached themselves to Enron. Perhaps 
in the end, the totality of Enron documents after the collapse – news reports, magazine 
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articles, books, movies and the like – could be taken together as a document of how 
confusing the political economic landscape had become in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. 
 
A MOMENT OF PAUSE FOR SYMBOLIC ANALYSTS 
For their part, some symbolic analysts also used Enron to comment on and 
distance themselves from the type of work they had been doing. With Enron’s collapse, 
these symbolic analysts appeared to align themselves with the company’s critics. 
However, much like the journalists and filmmakers, the symbolic analysts could not find 
suitable forms for making sense of the informational economy. An early instance came in 
2002, when Tim Barry, who had worked in the computer industry since the mid-1970s, 
compiled a number of jokes about Enron that had begun to circulate on the Internet into a 
short book, The Totally Unauthorized Enron Joke Book.
157
  While Barry himself did not 
contribute any material, as a symbolic analyst collecting satirical material about people 
who worked in the informational economy, Barry was making his sympathies known. 
However, the vast majority of the jokes Barry collected were gags and comic tropes 
much older than Enron’s collapse. Often, the names Enron, Ken Lay, or Jeff Skilling 
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Other examples of such cultural production came from symbolic analysts with 
more direct connections to the company. The author of The Kingdom of Norne, a satirical 
treatment of Enron that was framed as a children’s book, was an electrical engineer 
whose wife had worked for Enron. Though an engineer by training, the author used the 
scandal to explore his “lifelong interest in doodling and sketching.”
159
 Writing with the 
nom de plume Busta Scam in 2006, the author dedicated his book to “all the hardworking 
Nornians.”
160
 The most extensive rebuke from a symbolic analyst, though, had appeared 
in 2003. 
That year, David Tonsall, a former Enron employee, took the stage name N-Run 
and recorded a hardcore hip hop album attacking “corporate America.” Tonsall self-
financed and released the hip hop album, Corporate America, on the two-year 
anniversary of the company’s bankruptcy. In his lyrics, Tonsall did not betray any sense 
of lingering loyalty to his former employer. Much like McLean and Elkind, as well as 
Alex Gibney and Kurt Eichenwald, in his guise as N-Run Tonsall, who had been an 
energy efficiency manager, distanced himself from the world of symbolic analysis. What 
is more, filled as it was with direct jabs at Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, the album was an 
angry salvo lobbed in a spirit that echoed earlier articulations of worker unrest in 
America.  
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Shortly after the music faded in on his CD’s first track, “The Entrance,” Tonsall 
intoned: “Give me your tired/ I am he that she speaks of.”
161
 However, the “tiredness” 
that Tonsall referred to here was a sense of weariness with the Enron scandal – something 
Tonsall saw as representative of a widespread corrupt corporate culture. Later in the 
track, Tonsall equated himself with the “bottom dwellers” of the corporate ladder and 
asserted that the “bottom dwellers are the ‘we’ in ‘we the people.’”
162
 With these words, 
Tonsall figured the “the people” as America and the corporation and the business elite as 
somehow different. The rapper’s schema was not the first time in the United States such a 
juxtaposition had appeared. In the preface to 2007’s 25th anniversary edition of The 
Incorporation of America, Alan Trachtenberg insisted that the opening decade of the 
twenty first century was a distressing “replay of Gilded Age scheming and cheating.”
 163
 
As if to confirm Trachtenberg’s assessment, Tonsall’s rap album echoed the labor 
militancy of the late nineteenth century. 
 In that earlier period of upheaval, the labor movement and groups like the Knights 
of Labor “opposed the various forms of inequality” and presented themselves as “the 
most authentic voice of America itself.”
164
 Indeed, in the various symbols and tropes that 
Tonsall deployed, his vision of America was similar to that of the Gilded Age labor 
movement. Trachtenberg sets up two competing ideas of America that emerged during 
the Gilded Age – “union” and “corporation.” He writes, “In the antithesis between 
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‘union’ and ‘corporation,’ the age indeed witnessed an impassable gulf of troubling 
proportions, for it remained unsettled on which side lay the true America.”
165
 With song 
titles like “Vendetta” and “Take the S off Skilling,” N-Run employed many of the tropes 
typically associated with “gangsta” rap, such as revenge narratives and violent imagery. 
However, in these songs, former rank-and-file Enron workers exacted vengeance on Ken 
Lay and Jeff Skilling. In effect, Tonsall used gangsta rap as a vehicle to communicate 
labor militancy. The violence here was not exacted by outlaws, but by laborers. 
However, N-Run’s album added another element to this mix, figuring the 
“people” he was aligning himself with the sort of industrial workers who dealt in the 
material world. In his lyrics, Tonsall proclaimed himself to be one of the “pipeline boys” 
“who gave their life.”
166
 The images on Tonsall’s website also played with these conceits.   
In some of these, Tonsall was wearing a blue workers’ outfit as well as a hardhat 
while standing over a gas pipeline – and in one case holding a wrench. Taken as a whole, 
these images worked to frame the material world and – pre-informational production – as 
far more noble than the immaterial sophistry of Enron executives. However, in other 
ways, Tonsall’s project undercut his intended critique. The burgeoning rapper’s website 
also included images of Tonsall wearing a suit and tie in an elegant and stately office. 
Such representations were indebted to an undercurrent of decidedly pro-business rhetoric 
in hip hop that was at odds with Tonsall’s political agenda.
167
 Eithne Quinn has noted the 
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entrepreneurial overtones that have always been a part of gangsta rap, writing that 
“political empowerment” tended to be “submerged by economic empowerment in the 
narratives of commercial hip-hop.”
168
 As a genre, mainstream and gangsta rap was ill-
suited for communicating an anti-capitalist critique. 
All of these instances revealed symbolic analysts trying to distance themselves 
from the company in some way. Enron had spent much of the latter half of the 1990s 
working to turn the symbolic analyst into a cultural hero. Now, symbolic analysts 
themselves were experiencing a crisis of identity. In both their sentiments and failings, 
these humorous and artistic outpourings from symbolic analysts mirrored the spate of 
books that former employees and business journalists rushed to the market in 2003. 
White collar workers appeared to linger over Enron long after the rest of the country 
moved on, perhaps because Enron’s collapse had called their work practices, cultural 
habits and assumptions, and political and economic ideology into question. However, 
their experiences working with Enron left them no more prepared than other observers to 
make sense of the informational economy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Enron collapsed almost thirty years after the informational economy began to take 
shape, but older cultural narratives and tropes failed to help make sense of events. The 
seeming irrelevancy of such models hinted at the fundamental change in economic life 
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that late capitalism represented. Likewise, perhaps the speed with which extended 
critiques of Enron disappeared was also indicative of the some of the informational 
economy’s dynamic and unstable characteristics. 
As Rosalie Genova observes, 2005 was the last year that a substantial number of 
Enron narratives appeared.
169
 Enron eventually faded from headlines, but the word 
“Enron” itself circulated in subsequent years in off hand jokes in sitcoms, crossword 
puzzle clues and so on. Such casual references would appear to suggest that, for many, 
the “meaning” of Enron had been settled. As Jon Stewart, host of The Daily Show 
remarked while interviewing Bethany McLean in 2009, “Enron, that’s fraud.”
170
 Yet 
evidence suggests that Stewart’s analysis was too simplistic. Though the ensuing years 
saw Enron become the subject of April Fool’s jokes, ruminative New Yorker essays, and 
stage plays, many of these same tensions of the informational economy reemerged. Even 
the legal status of Enron was hard to determine. In 2010, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that prosecutors should not have used the “honest services” statute in Jeff 
Skilling’s criminal trial, complicating what some regarded as a simple case of right and 
wrong.
171
 The ruling was just one more way the complicated nature of the informational 
economy made it difficult to use Enron as a vehicle for a systemic critique of late 
capitalism. 
 
                                                 
169
 Rosalie Genova, Big Business, Democracy, and American Way: Narratives of the Enron Scandal in 
2000s Political Culture, Unpublished dissertation. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2010, 207. 
170
 Jon Stewart, interview with Bethany McLean. The Daily Show January 15, 2009. 
171
 Mary Flood, “Skilling Ruling Leaves Much Undecided,” in The Houston Chronicle, 24 Jan. 2010, 






Though Enron faded as a significant media story after 2005, the corporation’s 
name sometimes reappeared in subsequent years. Most notably, the criminal trials of Ken 
Lay and Jeff Skilling occasioned some coverage, though as Rosalie Genova notes, by 
2006, many in the U.S. had lost interest in the scandal.
1
 Still, the fact that Skilling 
received a harsh sentence (Lay died of a heart attack before beginning his prison term), 
and the way lawyers for the prosecution framed their argument, was enough for Malcolm 
Gladwell to write an essay for The New Yorker. As he was often inclined to do, Gladwell 
adopted a contrarian point of view, using the prosecution’s arguments as a foil to make a 
larger point about the information age. The article’s title, “Open Secrets: Enron, 
Intelligence and the Perils of Too Much Information,” underscored Gladwell’s larger 
concerns. While the prosecutor stated that the Enron case was a “simple” matter of “truth 
and lies,” the essayist contended that Enron was a “mystery” instead of a “puzzle.”  
This was a crucial distinction for Gladwell. “Puzzles” indicated a dearth of 
information, while “mysteries” were “a lot murkier: sometimes the information we’ve 
been given is inadequate, and sometimes we aren’t very smart about making sense of 
what we’ve been given, and sometimes the question itself cannot be answered.”
2
 For 
Gladwell, Enron was a mystery because the company did not so much withhold 
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information from the public as it presented so much data that the information itself 
became incomprehensible. As Gladwell pointed out, Jonathan Weil, the first journalist to 
question Enron, arrived at his conclusions by looking at “a series of public documents 
that had been prepared and distributed by Enron itself.”
3
 Rather than clarify Enron’s 
business for Weill, the documents were filled with “noise.” Gladwell even went so far as 
to measure the magnitude of this noise, writing that “Enron had some three thousand 
SPEs, and the paperwork for each one probably ran in excess of a thousand pages. It 
scarcely would have helped investors if Enron had made all three million pages public.”
4
 
Here, it was the deluge of words and numbers that made Enron a paradigmatic 
informational economy scandal.  
The writer, as well as a law professor he interviewed, dismissed the idea of more 
information as intrinsically good as “an anachronism.” Enron was the financial equivalent 
to the changes in intelligence gathering in the post-Cold War era. Just as intelligence 
professionals now had to sift through mountains of public data (“chatter”) and identify 
and interpret the relevant items, Gladwell reasoned that the financial community had to 
become better interpreters of the increased quantity and complexity of the information 
that was already available. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Gladwell 
implied, Americans did not need to worry about another Watergate, but rather a 
catastrophe suddenly erupting from a pile of complicated information that was already in 
the public realm. 
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However, rather than see the company’s collapse as an instance of the “perils of 
too much information,” some in the business community took a measure of comfort in 
Enron's collapse. Though numerous Wall Street banks had been complicit in creating the 
company’s ultimately fraudulent financial schemes while singing its praises, some of 
these same banks also bought credit default swaps on Enron.
5
 At the time, a credit default 
swap was a relatively new type of unregulated derivative contract that was supposed to 
act like an insurance policy. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the use of credit default 
swaps had grown substantially. In the immediate aftermath of the company’s failure, 
Alan Greenspan, who was then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, proclaimed the use of 
credit default swaps in Enron’s case had worked to spread the financial fallout from the 
company’s collapse.
6
 As he put it in a November 2002 speech:  
instruments that are more complex and less transparent--such as credit default 
swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and credit-linked notes--have been 
developed and their use has grown very rapidly in recent years. The result? 
Improved credit-risk management together with more and better risk-management 
tools appear to have significantly reduced loan concentrations in 
telecommunications and, indeed, other areas and the associated stress on banks 




The Enron debacle, Greenspan’s reasoning went, could have been far worse, if not for 
derivatives like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps. 
Greenspan (and others at the Federal Reserve) interpreted the relatively mild economic 
fallout caused by Enron as evidence of the financial system’s “unprecedented stability 
                                                 
5





 Alan Greenspan, “International Financial Risk Management,” (Speech, The Council of Foreign Relations, 




and strong risk management.”
8
 In fact, for some at the Federal Reserve the use of these 




Greenspan and his colleagues were not alone in this opinion. It was a sentiment 
that the business journalist Nelson D. Schwartz had also expressed in December 2001. 
Much in the way Smith and Emshwiller ended 24 Days with an expression of faith in the 
market ultimately punishing Enron, in writing about the scandal, Schwartz noted that “not 
a single light flickered after Enron's implosion.”
10
 Schwartz marveled at how smaller 
companies had stepped in to fill the void left by Enron's collapse. As he put it, the turn of 
events was “a show of creative destruction that would make philosopher Joseph 
Schumpeter proud.”
11
 Schwartz was not the only Fortune writer to take some comfort in 
the market’s response to Enron’s collapse. 
 In that same issue of Fortune, Bethany McLean used Enron's collapse to show 
how important credit rating agencies had become to the nation’s financial system. 
McLean noted that Enron's fall was hastened by credit rating downgrades from credit 
rating agencies Standard & Poor's and Moody's. As the journalist noted: “the rating 
agencies – private, for-profit companies that are privy to insider information – have come 
to play a quasi-regulatory role in the market.”
12
 Though in Enron's case, the credit-rating 
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agencies had not acted fast enough (the company's stock had already been declining when 
its credit rating was downgraded), McLean wrote that the agencies had “done a 
remarkable job of keeping pace with innovations in the capital markets.”
13
 Tellingly, the 
journalist's evidence was: 
 the explosion of a new type of debt known as 'structured finance' – a bond, for 
 instance, backed by the cash flow from residential mortgages. Here the rating is 
 everything: It measures the level of risk in an extremely complicated security and 




Just a bit later in the article, McLean noted that structured finance had become Moody's 
largest business, necessitating a more aggressive approach to credit ratings. As then-CEO 
of Moody's John Rutherfurd was quoted as saying: “If a credit is deteriorating, we want 
to be the first to spot it.”
15
 For Rutherford, this meant “incorporating the judgment of the 
equity market into ratings” since “the equity market [was] forward-looking, whereas 
accounting data [were] reflective of the past.”
16
 As McLean noted as she closed her piece, 
“barring a few more Enron-caliber events, the credit-rating system” would probably not 
change; if only the next event had been “Enron-caliber,” instead of the much more 
devastating crash in 2007 and 2008. 
As the Federal Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission put it in their report, the 
global financial meltdown in 2007 and 2008 was years in the making, with “an explosion 
in risky subprime lending and securitization, an unsustainable rise in housing prices,” as 
well as “widespread reports of egregious and predatory lending practices, dramatic 
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increases in household mortgage debt, and exponential growth in financial firms’ trading 
activities, unregulated derivatives” and other factors.
17
 Interestingly, despite the basic 
connections between Enron and the financial meltdown that closed out the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, the federal report hinted that Enron’s limited economic damage 
may have spurred the spread of risk in the latter case. 
 Both the credit default swaps that Greenspan saw as mitigating the financial 
damage Enron caused, as well as the credit-rating agencies that the Enron debacle called 
attention to in McLean's article, played huge roles in the global financial meltdown. As 
the Federal Commission later concluded, “credit default swaps, sold to provide protection 
against default to purchasers of the top-rated tranches [slices of structured finance deals 
that can be traded as securities] of CDOs, facilitated the sale of those tranches by 
convincing investors of their low risk, but greatly increased the exposure of the sellers of 
the credit default protection to the housing bubble's collapse.”
18
 Likewise, the 
commission concluded that “high ratings erroneously given CDOs by credit rating 
agencies encouraged investors and financial institutions to purchase them and enabled the 
continuing securitization of nonprime mortgages.”
19
 In other words, even as the Fortune 
reporters and Greenspan (as well as others at the Federal Reserve) were expressing 
confidence in a modern system that appeared to have weathered Enron's collapse, the 
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same elements they were praising were quietly magnifying what would be a far greater 
crisis.  
Much like Enron’s transformation, the financial crisis towards the end of the 
decade was fueled by the use of complicated derivatives. The financial crisis also used a 
good deal of “securitized” mortgages. As was the case with Enron, these banks had used 
a variety of financial instruments to divide up risk associated with the material world – in 
this case, the risk that came with lending to home buyers who might not have been able to 
pay their mortgages. As the report determined, financial instruments and securitized 
mortgages with “strange-sounding names” like “Alt-A, subprime, I-O (interest only)” and 
so on had virtually bound the entire globe together in a network of debt obligations.
20
 
Much like the strategy Enron had followed from the mid-1990s onward, these financial 
products that banks, mortgage lenders, and insurance companies were introducing 
throughout the 2000s became increasingly separated from the material world they were 
meant to service. Similar to the SPEs that Andy Fastow created, these instruments 
became too complicated to even comprehend. As the report noted: “because of the 
growth of securitization, it wasn’t even clear anymore who the lender was. The 




That subprime mortgage crisis was, of course, far more severe than Enron’s 
collapse. The crisis, unlike Enron's swift fall, slowly unfurled as a succession of 
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increasingly ominous events, such as the failure of the investment bank Bear Sterns, as 
well as mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Banks filing for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy threatened to become ordinary events. In September, 2008, Lehman Brothers 
became the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, far surpassing Enron's. The effects of the 
investment bank's collapse were both immediate and severe. As the Federal Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission's report put it, “On the day that Lehman filed for bankruptcy, 
the Dow plummeted more than 500 points, $700 billion in value from retirement plans, 
government pension funds, and other investment portfolios disappeared.”
22
 As the 




Curiously, despite the magnitude of the 2007 – 2008 crisis, it did not inspire a 
wave of cultural production, though some books and films did begin to trickle out after a 
few years. As Daniel Gross, wrote in the May 3, 2010, edition of Newsweek: 
It's particularly tough to turn the most recent crisis into good entertainment. 
 Blogs, in-depth newspaper reports, CNBC's wall-to-wall coverage, and several 
 dozen nonfiction books have turned the players into too-familiar characters. Also, 
 it's still too soon. The best and most enduring Wall Street entertainment hasn't 




Indeed, for Gross the wounds were too recent and raw.  
However, the writer did call attention to a Broadway show that was opening that 
week: Enron. Though new to U.S. audiences, British playwright Lucy Prebble’s drama 
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about the company had actually been playing in England for nearly a year. In an 
interview in London, Prebble acknowledged she was attracted to Enron as a subject 
because its style of business was "that most theatrical of entities, just a game, an illusion, 
a system of belief."
25
 Prebble's script took a good measure of artistic license. Real life 
figures, such as Ken Lay, Andy Fastow, and Jeff Skilling, coexisted with fictitious 
characters, such as Claudia Roe, Skilling’s nemesis and sometimes lover, who was based, 
in part, on Rebecca Mark, the head of Enron International and later Azurix in the 1990s. 
The script itself also blended well-known public statements from the executives with 
fictitious dialogue. More so than other works, the playwright tried to cast Skilling as a 
tragic figure – with his ambition as both his best and worst quality. However, the play’s 
true thematic tension was between materiality and immateriality, embodied in the 
characters Claudia Roe and Jeff Skilling, respectively. Throughout the first half of the 
play, the characters vied for Lay’s ear.
26
 Here, however, the rivalry was distilled into a 
running debate about large industrial processes versus the symbolic analysis that Enron 
ultimately triumphed. One early scene found both Skilling and Roe describing their 
vision for the company. While Skilling favored a style of business “without ever having 
to deliver the gas or maintain the pipeline,” a business that could be “just dealing in the 
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Early on, Skilling explained to Roe his vision for the company, declaring: “[i]t’s 
time to evolve again. We have to. America doesn’t have the natural resources anymore. 
Not really. And that’s good, that’s fine. We have intellectual capital, and the best of it in 
the world.”
28
 In lines such as this, the actual phrases Skilling used such as “intellectual 
capital” helped establish the dichotomy between the two characters. During this piece of 
dialogue, Skilling even stated: “We should be coming up with new ideas. About 
everything. Employ the smartest people we can find. And have ‘em free to look at 
whatever they want, free from the old assumptions about what a company is.”
29
 Here, the 
character Skilling perfectly described his fetishization of “smartness” and symbolic 
analysts. Claudia Roe’s rejoinder, “Sounds like hippy talk to me,” was cutting and to the 
point. In such moments, the playwright was unambiguous about postindustrial production 
– it was nonsense, though hardly without consequences. As the stage directions instructed 
one of the Raptors – monstrous creatures that stood as corporeal manifestations of virtual 
corporations that ultimately ruined Enron – to menacingly toy with Skilling, Claudia Roe 
worried that “something is happening to business. At the beginning of this century. 
Things have started to get divorced from the underlying realities.”
30
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In the play, this unreality of twenty-first century business had a direct effect on 
Skilling. One running motif throughout the play was Andy Fastow as sorcerer, creating 
new and ever more fantastical financial schemes that ultimately turn on their creator. In 
one particularly telling scene, one of the Raptors – the SPEs that Enron used to deal with 
exploding debt and failing assets – actually attacked Jeff Skilling.  This metaphor may 
have been a bit heavy handed. On the stage, Fastow’s “lair” was presented as a chaotic 
and mystical place where he created the structured finance vehicle LJM, which, in the 
language of the stage directions, “has been designed literally and metaphorically to 
‘support’ the level above it, Enron.”
31
 Of course, the audience knew that this arrangement 
could only work for so long. The immaterial world of symbolic analysis would, by the 
play's end, come up against physical limits. At one point, as a panicked Skilling 
demanded that Fastow produce four billion dollars to shore up the suddenly cash-strapped 
company, Fastow complained: “This is all…this is structured finance. This is how it 
looks…I can’t make real money just appear.”
32
 In Prebble’s play, it was moments such as 
these that were meant to reveal the sophistry at the heart of postindustrial production – 
the remove from the “underlying realities” that Claudia Roe invoked. It was a point that 
Prebble returned to again later in the play. After the company has collapsed, and Skilling, 
Lay and Fastow were disgraced, Claudia Roe reappeared, and in an exchange with 
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Skilling, demanded to know: “Is it true, after it fell – the only part of the business with 
any worth at all was my division? The things you could hold?”
33
  
Significantly, Prebble, as well as the original production’s director, Rupert Goold, 
and English reviewers, took the subject to be distinctly American. As Goold was quoted 
in the London Times in early 2010, around the time a Broadway production was being 
developed, the United States was “built on liberty and avarice - or at least competition - 
and that is peculiarly American. A frontier kind of go getting attitude.”
34
 In Goold’s 
telling, it was this national character trait that made an American company the only real 
choice for such a dramatic subject. The implication, of course, was that Enron’s disaster 
was also an American disaster. In London, the play was a hit that seemed eerie in its 
timeliness. 
 In the United Kingdom, the context of the subprime mortgage crisis heightened 
interest in Enron. However, the play's reception once it came to New York was markedly 
different. In an early review for The New York Times, Ben Brantley savaged Prebble's 
creation. The reviewer noted that “British and American tastes don't always coincide,” 
particularly “when the subject is American.”
35
 Yet Brantley did not stop at the idea that 
Americans simply preferred a different type of theater. Rather, the reviewer felt the play 
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failed to accurately dramatize the informational economy. The play's stagecraft, Brantley 
complained, owed too much to a vaudevillian tradition. In the play, money didn't “just 
talk. It s[a]ng[]. It dance[d]. It [put] on funny animal costumes. And of course it [blew] 
bubbles.”
36
 It was as if the production was struggling to find suitable visual metaphors for 
the informational economy. For Brantley, much like Enron itself, “the energy generated” 
by the play felt “factitious, all show (or show and tell) and little substance.”
37
 By his 
account, Enron's theatrics did not articulate a critique of the informational economy's 
inconsistencies, but mirrored them. The subject matter was too complicated, which was 
the reason for Brantley's other main problem with the production. If the vaudevillian 
stagecraft failed, it was because the techniques themselves were overly complex parallels 
of the informational economy. On the other hand, Prebble's writing was “lucid to the 
point of simple-mindedness.”
38
 If Prebble's script ultimately looked back to “classical 
tragedy,” that familiar schema was inappropriate for the sort of postmodern finance that 
Enron was involved in.
39
 Though other outlets, such as USA Today, regarded the play as a 
morally serious treatment of “American excess,”  the play did not do well on Broadway, 
closing in less than three weeks.
40
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 Back in England, at least one reviewer described Enron's ill-fated stint on 
Broadway as “shocking.”
41
 Michael Billington, writing in The Guardian, laid a large 
portion of the blame on what he saw as Brantley's “obtuse and hostile” review.
42 
Billington reasoned that “a lingering suspicion of a young British dramatist's right to 
tackle a profoundly American subject” was partly to blame.
43 
Tellingly, Billington 
characterized Prebble's play as a satire of “American capitalism.”
44
 Rather than being a 
global, international business that the company aspired to be, in this review Billington 
specifically saw Enron's business as an American one – much like Prebble and Goold 
had. The reviewer also disagreed with Brantley's dismissal of the play's vaudeville. For 
Billington, “the play's vaudevillian style” was a “visual embodiment of the dream-like 
illusion to which the Texan energy giant, and similar corporations, surrendered.”
45
  The 
English reviewer clearly saw the play's failure as a shame. At a time when Americans 
were “gripped by the story of alleged misdeeds at Goldman Sachs,” Prebble's play called 
attention to the public's “complicity in financial bubbles.”
46 
For Billington, Enron offered 
the starkest example of the dangers embedded in late capitalism. 
 Perhaps it was inevitable that Enron would resurface as a referent in the midst of a 
much broader crisis. Indeed, in 2011 the liberal writer Thomas Frank declared that 
Americans were living in an “Age of Enron.” The company's collapse, he wrote, was “the 
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starting gun for the modern age neoliberal scandal” - a list that included the shenanigans 
of convicted felons Bernie Madoff and Jack Abramoff, the BP oil spill in 2010, and, of 
course, the 2008 financial collapse.
47
 For Frank, what united all of the scandals was 
deregulation as a general principle and the writer lamented the probability that there were 
more (and more spectacular) scandals to come in the Age of Enron. Frank was not 
hopeful about this new age. Summing up what he took to be the national mood, Frank 
wrote: “So let the next scandal ruin our neighbor, let it black out entire regions of the 




However, Enron's collapse did not inaugurate a new era in global or even 
American capitalism. Rather, Enron's history neatly encapsulated the entire trajectory of 
the informational economy. Since the early 1970s, the geography of industrial production 
began to shift away from the U.S. and sectors that trafficked in information (such 
financial services) assumed a more prominent role in economic life. Likewise, a renewed 
faith in free markets and deregulation that worried Frank had begun decades before 
Enron’s collapse. Still, in an era when all of these changes served to make capitalism 
more abstract and difficult to understand while simultaneously demanding an increased 
trust in its processes, Enron emerged as a rare concrete example of late capitalism's most 
troubling qualities. Because of its visibility in an otherwise abstract realm, the company 
became a vehicle for cultural expressions of outrage over undemocratic economic change 
                                                 
47
 Thomas Frank, “Easy Chair: The Age of Enron,” Harper's, August 2011, 7-11, 7. 
48




and injustice. Yet the confused politics in the public outcry over the company and its 
failure to produce easy answers revealed the ways in which corporations have assumed a 
large and ambiguous role in public life. Older cultural ways of understanding proved 
inadequate when trying to navigate through the informational economy. The cultural 
materials we need in this task may not have existed when Enron collapsed, but this does 
not mean that Enron was a lost opportunity. 
Even as Enron is now synonymous with corporate deception, its history can be 
credited with revealing at least one truth – that economic and commercial activities are 
intimately bound to wider cultural currents. From the moment its business began to 
resemble many of characteristics of the informational economy, Enron entered the 
cultural realm. Enron’s cultural production was intended to help it establish and sustain a 
political economic environment that would give the company every advantage it needed 
to amass a staggering amount of money. The message embedded in the company’s 
cultural production was clear – that the Market would be good for everyone as long as it 
was left to proceed without any oversight or constraints. In Enron’s telling, even the 
turbulence that would accompany this market was a desirable effect. Yet such a cultural 
element challenges the orthodox view of a self-regulating economic system that is 
somehow separate from other facets of social and political life. Rather, political-
economic systems cannot be established or function without a great deal of cultural work. 
It is also through this cultural work that formerly abstract or invisible processes reveal 




Market is just as cultural, social and political as it is economic - will be the true legacy of 
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